A2. Eu Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah, Recommendations to Reinforce Eu Policy on East Jerusalem, 7 December 2010.

2011 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 198-199

The EU heads of mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah annually produce an end-of-year report on Israeli activities in East Jerusalem for the EU's Political and Security Committee. Though classified as secret, the reports are invariably leaked and widely circulated for the useful historical overview and update they provide on Israel's illegal settlement activity and efforts to Judaize Jerusalem. Unusually this year, Annex 2 of the report, which contains the heads of mission recommendations on steps the EU should take in the coming year to reinforce its longstanding policy on Jerusalem, was also leaked, and attracted particular notice for their somewhat undiplomatic and even confrontational nature. The main “Jerusalem Report 2010” restates the base EU's policy as last reiterated on 8 December 2009: (1) “the EU will not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties”; (2) negotiations must “resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states”; and (3) Israel must “immediately end all settlement activities in East Jerusalem, which the EU considers illegal under international law” and “cease all discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.”The full text of the “Jerusalem Report 2010” and the recommendations reproduced below are available on the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center Web site at www.jmcc.org.

2015 ◽  
pp. 289-306
Author(s):  
Tijana Surlan

Recognition is an instrument of the public international law founded in the classical international law. Still, it preserves its main characteristics formed in the period when states dominated as the only legal persons in international community. Nevertheless, the instrument of recognition is today as vibrant as ever. As long as it does not have a uniform legal definition and means of application, it leaves room to be applied to very specific cases. In this paper, the instrument of recognition is elaborated from two aspects - theoretical and practical. First (theoretical) part of the paper presents main characteristics of the notion of recognition, as presented in main international law theories - declaratory and constitutive theory. Other part of the paper is focused on the recognition in the case of Kosovo. Within this part, main constitutive elements of state are elaborated, with special attention to Kosovo as self-proclaimed state. Conclusion is that Kosovo does not fulfill main constitutive elements of state. It is not an independent and sovereign state. It is in the status of internationalized entity, with four international missions on the field with competencies in the major fields of state authority - police, judiciary system, prosecution system, army, human rights, etc. Main normative framework for the status of Kosovo is still the UN Resolution 1244. It is also the legal ground for international missions, confirming non-independent status of Kosovo. States that recognized Kosovo despite this deficiency promote the constitutive theory of recognition, while states not recognizing Kosovo promote declaratory theory. Brussels Agreement, signed by representatives of Serbia and Kosovo under the auspices of the EU, has also been elaborated through the notion of recognition - (1) whether it represents recognition; (2) from the perspective of consequences it provokes in relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Official position of Serbian Government is clear - Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state. On the other hand, subject matter of Brussels Agreement creates new means of improvement for Kosovo authorities in the north part of Kosovo. Thus, Serbian position regarding the recognition is twofold - it does not recognize Kosovo in foro externo, and it completes its competences in foro domestico. What has been underlined through the paper and confirmed in the conclusion is that there is not a recognition which has the power to create a state and there is not a non-recognition which has the power to annul a state.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig

The discussion thus far has focused on centralized and shared administration as ways in which EU policy is delivered. This chapter focuses on Comitology and the making of secondary norms, which normally take the form of rules. This cuts across the previous analysis, in the sense that rulemaking is a feature of both direct and shared administration. The structure of the discussion is as follows. It begins with analysis of the problem presented by rulemaking, and the necessity for any polity, including the EU, to administer an area through secondary norms of a legislative nature. This is followed by an historical overview of rulemaking in the EU and the role of Comitology therein. The focus then shifts to detailed evaluation of the approach to rulemaking in the Lisbon Treaty.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 603-628
Author(s):  
GUY HARPAZ

AbstractThe EU's consistent policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been that Israel's presence in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip (prior to the 2005 disengagement) and the Golan Heights is subject to the laws of belligerent occupation, that any purported Israeli annexation is illegal and null and void, that Israel's settlements in the Territories are in breach of public international law and constitute a serious obstacle to peace, and that Israel and Palestine should settle their conflict on the basis of public international law and through the two-state solution. In recent years the EU attempted to concretize this policy through its trade and trade-related agreements with Israel, withholding the benefits of EU-Israeli co-operation from companies and research institutions based in the Territories or operating therein, as well as from products produced therein (the New Approach). Thus, from the EU perception, the New Approach towards the long-standing conflict and its reliance on international law may be seen as an instrument to reinforce internal and external legitimacy, buttress identity cohesiveness and as a manifestation of its more robust effectiveness. But this article seeks to conduct a more careful and balanced analysis of the New Approach and in doing so to reveal that the EU's (almost) exclusive focus on non-governmental entities, such as corporations situated in the Territories, and on Territories’ products, is misplaced in terms of public international law and effectiveness. The New Approach's deficiencies, in abstracto and in concreto, as evaluated in this article, are likely to prevent it from serving as a paradigm shift in EU-Israel relations.


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

The European Union (EU) cannot make a plausible claim to sovereignty under international law. However, what the EU can do and what it also does is, is to act as if it were sovereign and claim certain rights that are considered core elements of state sovereignty. This article argues that the Court of Justice’s (ECJ) conception of the EU legal order as autonomous provides the EU with a core element of state sovereignty: jurisdictional sovereignty. Autonomy construed by the ECJ is best understood in conceptual legal and absolute terms. It is meant to shield the ECJ’s conceptual legal claims from interference. Legal autonomy as construed by the ECJ is not relative as many authors have claimed. It cannot come about in an incremental or relative manner. It cannot be based on arguments relating to the status of a self-contained regime of international law that gradually distances itself from the general rules of international law. It is a conceptual claim giving birth to the assumption of apriority that can only be made in categorical terms. In this way it is similar to sovereignty. The article first sets out how the autonomy of the EU legal order is best understood. It examines the ECJ’s case law in light of legal theoretical considerations and relates it to the separation thesis of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. It then explains that autonomy is of such relevance to the EU legal order because the aprioristic character of EU law remains essentially contested. This relevance indirectly explains why the Court so cautiously protects the autonomy of the EU legal order. Finally, the article examines the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 in light of the identified absolute conception of autonomy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Davor Petrić

This contribution reflects on the EU law side of the story of Slovenia and Croatia’s border dispute. It discusses some of the key parts of the Advocate General’s opinion and the Court of Justice’s judgment in this case, including the issue of the scope of EU law, the status of international law in EU law, the interpretation of international law for the purposes of EU law adjudication, and the rule of law dimensions of the border dispute between the two neighbouring Member States. It also offers some general remarks on the nature of legal scholarship that can be read as a response to some of the academic commentary of this case.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-963 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Happold

The participation of the Freedom Party in the Austrian government has given rise to exceptional reactions both in Austria and internationally. The imposition of a freeze in bilateral diplomatic relations by Austria's European Union partners has been particularly notable, amounting to an unprecedented response to the election of a new government in another Member State. This note seeks to describe the development of events and assess the status of the 14 Member States' actions under international law, in particular in the light of any developing norms concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights and the right to democratic governance.


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