scholarly journals J. McTAGGARTAS IR H. MELLORAS APIE LAIKĄ

Problemos ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 115-121
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys

Straipsnyje analizuojamas vienas garsiausių XIX–XX a. sandūros britų idealistinės metafizikos pavyzdžių – Johno McTaggarto argumentas, neigiantis savarankišką laiko egzistavimą. Teigiama, kad, priimdami McTaggarto įvestą A sekos ir B sekos skirtį, susilaikyti nuo jo siūlomos išvados galime tik neigdami B sekos nepakankamumą kismui paaiškinti arba A sekos implicitišką prieštaringumą. Kaip būdingiausias tokios strategijos atvejis čia tiriama Hugh’o Melloro kritika. McTaggarto ir Melloro polemikoje paaiškėja, kad jei pasaulį laikytume faktų (o ne daiktų) visuma, tai tokiame pasaulyje tikras kismas nebūtų įmanomas ir McTaggartas būtų teisus. Tačiau jei tuos faktus nulemiančių daiktų tikrovę laikysime fundamentalesne, turėsime pripažinti, kad bent kai kurie šių daiktų kinta, ir laiko kaip pagrindinio šio kismo matmens negalima atsisakyti. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: laikas, kismas, metafizika, britų idealizmas.J. McTaggart and H. Mellor on TimeJonas Dagys SummaryThe article analyzes John McTaggart’s argument for unreality of time, a classical piece of fin de sičcle Brittish idealist metaphysics. Having accepted the distinction between A-series and B-series, one can only resist McTaggartian conclusion by denying at least one of the two: that B-series alone is insufficient for change or that A-series implies a contradiction. Hugh Mellor’s criticism is taken to represent this strategy. The lesson to be learnt from this debate is that if the world is conceived as a mere totality of facts no change could be real in such a world, and so McTaggart would right. However, if the reality of things determining those facts is recognized as more fundamental, it would not be denied that at least some of these things undergo genuine temporal change, and time as a dimension of this real change cannot be rejected. Keywords: time, change, metaphysics, British idealism.size: 11pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam MCFARLAND ◽  
Katarzyna HAMER

Raphael Lemkin is hardly known to a Polish audiences. One of the most honored Poles of theXX century, forever revered in the history of human rights, nominated six times for the Nobel PeacePrize, Lemkin sacrificed his entire life to make a real change in the world: the creation of the term“genocide” and making it a crime under international law. How long was his struggle to establishwhat we now take as obvious, what we now take for granted?This paper offers his short biography, showing his long road from realizing that the killing oneperson was considered a murder but that under international law in 1930s the killing a million wasnot. Through coining the term “genocide” in 1944, he helped make genocide a criminal charge atthe Nuremburg war crimes trials of Nazi leaders in late 1945, although there the crime of genocidedid not cover killing whole tribes when committed on inhabitants of the same country nor when notduring war. He next lobbied the new United Nations to adopt a resolution that genocide is a crimeunder international law, which it adopted on 11 December, 1946. Although not a U.N. delegate – hewas “Totally Unofficial,” the title of his autobiography – Lemkin then led the U.N. in creating theConvention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December, 1948.Until his death in 1958, Lemkin lobbied tirelessly to get other U.N. states to ratify the Convention.His legacy is that, as of 2015, 147 U.N. states have done so, 46 still on hold. His tomb inscriptionreads simply, “Dr. Raphael Lemkin (1900–1959), Father of the Genocide Convention”. Without himthe world as we know it, would not be possible.


Author(s):  
Martin A. Lipman

This paper proposes a theory of time that takes the notion of passage as its basic primitive. Any notion of passage that is worthy of that name should make for real change across time. It is argued that real change across time in turn requires the obtaining of incompatible facts. The proposed theory will therefore be a form of fragmentalism, which makes room for the obtaining of incompatible facts by taking the world to exhibit a type of fragmented structure. The preferred form of fragmentalism and the primitive notion of passage are elucidated in some detail. It is argued that the resulting picture resolves the problem of change and meets the puzzling yet necessary conditions for the reality of passage


1982 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 478-481
Author(s):  
H. Mohelsky

This paper examines the task and functioning of a contemporary mental institution. The author, drawing from his experience, explores the world within such an institution whose purpose often contradicts the officially stated one. This world with its own assumptions is a creation in response to needs and anxieties of its participants. In the face of rapid shifts and increasing complexity in institutional environments, the capability to change becomes critical. Real change is impossible unless the underlying assumptions of an institution are recognized, understood and dealt with.


Author(s):  
Klaus Dingwerth ◽  
Antonia Witt

In this chapter, we lay out the theoretical framework that informs our book. We argue that international organizations are legitimated in processes of contestation in which a plethora of actors seeks to define what distinguishes a ‘good’ from a ‘bad’ international organization. In doing so, the actors draw on as well as shape the normative environments in which international organizations are embedded. These environments, in turn, depend on the world political contexts of their time. Change in what we call the terms of legitimation therefore comes from two ends: first, from the dynamics of interaction among those who take part in legitimation contests (‘change from within’); and second, from material or ideational developments that support or challenge the persuasiveness of individual normative frames (‘change from the outside’).


On Purpose ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 42-60
Author(s):  
Michael Ruse

This chapter discusses the Scientific Revolution that is dated from the publication of Nicolaus Copernicus's On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres in 1543, the work that put the sun rather than the earth at the center of the universe to Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy in 1687, the work that gave the causal underpinnings of the whole system as developed over the previous one hundred and fifty years. Historian Rupert Hall put his finger precisely on the real change that occurred in the revolution. It was not so much the physical theories, although these were massive and important. It was rather a change of metaphors or models—from that of an organism to that of a machine. By the sixteenth century, machines were becoming ever more common and ever more sophisticated. It was natural therefore for people to start thinking of the world—the universe—as a machine, especially since some of the most elaborate of the new machines were astronomical clocks that had the planets and the sun and moon moving through the heavens, not by human force but by predestined contraptions. In a word, by clockwork!


2019 ◽  
pp. 237-255
Author(s):  
Chantelle Gray van Heerden

Chantelle Gray van Heerden argues that plantation logics create a particular appreciative of the spatial coordinates of histories since the carceral, a kind of facialisation of power, is always reliant on binarisation and biunivocalisation. She argues that in order to bring about real change in the world, anarchism has to become imperceptible without invisibilising whitenesss. Drawing on Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense, she invites the reader to reconsider the surface and the ground. This, she holds, can help us think about how to disrupt the spatial coordinates of the plantation and the racial violence it portends.


Metalepsis ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Duncan Kennedy

This chapter examines the narratological concept of metalepsis in relation to metaphysical texts, investigating how competing metaphysical assumptions affect the ways in which metalepsis is thought to operate in relation to empirical experience. It takes as a major point of reference Christopher Nolan’s 2010 movie Inception, in which three distinct narrative levels are troped as dreams within dreams. The film’s closing scene raises and leaves unanswered the question whether the level inhabited at that point by the central character is his ‘reality’ (as he believes) or whether he is still within a dream. For many people who inhabit the world of empirical experience, that world is not ultimate ‘reality’, which lies at one level removed. As examples of this attitude in texts concerned with metaphysics, the chapter explores Fate in Virgil’s Aeneid and the apostrophized God in Augustine’s Confessions before focusing on the Platonic appeal to the world of the Forms. In the emergence of a ‘classical’ metaphysics of an ultimate reality lying beyond time, change, and narrative, however, the key ancient figure is Parmenides; but ancient texts that embrace those very features, such as Ovid’s Metamorphoses, already point to the ‘counter-classical’ metaphysics which has come to the fore in the wake of Heidegger’s Being and Time and has recently achieved remarkable prominence. The conclusion of the chapter explores how, within such a ‘counter-classical’ metaphysics, the narrative frames by which we order and project our empirical experience break in on each other as they establish what we accept as our ‘reality’.


Author(s):  
Jaus Müller

Abstract In 1974, the Netherlands became the first country in the world that no longer forbade gay men from joining the military. It took other Western countries much longer to do the same. From the outside, therefore, it looked as though the liberal country of the Netherlands took a leading position in 1974 regarding the inclusion of people with different sexual orientations in the military. That does not mean, however, that gay service members had an easy time after 1974. The situation hardly changed for the better. This article argues that the dominant view of the Netherlands as a liberal country that was the first to allow gay people into the army in 1974 is in need of revision.


In a previous paper attention was drawn by one of us to the fact that the upper ionized, F, region of the ionosphere tended to reach a minimum height in the early morning. A study of the results of other workers reveals the world-wide nature of this effect, which is readily observable in both English and American published data. Any method of measurement of the height of the ionized regions of the atmosphere yields the “equivalent height" z' = ∫ z 0 0 dz /μ, where z 0 is the height to which the measuring radio wave penetrates, and μ is the refractive index of the intervening medium at the height z . It follows that a temporal change in z' may be due either to a change in z 0 or to a change in the height distribution of μ ( i. e. , of N the ionization density per cc). We cannot therefore be certain, in general, whether the occurrence of a minimum in z' indicates a true minimum height of the F ionized region, or a readjustment of ionization in and below this region.


Author(s):  
Brian Leftow

The doctrine of divine immutability consists in the assertion that God cannot undergo real change. Plato and Boethius infer divine immutability from God’s perfection, Aristotle from God’s being the first cause of change, Augustine from God’s having created time. Aquinas derives divine immutability from God’s simplicity, his having no parts or attributes which are distinct from himself. All of these arguments finally appeal to aspects of God’s perfection; thus, the doctrine of divine immutability grew from a convergence of intuitions about perfection. These intuitions dominated Western thought about God well into the nineteenth century. The doctrine’s foes argue that God’s power, providence and knowledge require its rejection. Their arguments contend that since the world does in fact change through time, this must entail change in God. If God responds to changing historical circumstances and to prayers, that would seem to require some sort of change in him (from not responding to responding). And if he does not intervene to prevent a war, for example, then after the war, he will have lost the power to prevent it (assuming, as many do, that God cannot alter the past), so again there is a change of state. Finally, it is argued that God’s knowledge of tensed truths (for example, ‘it is now noon’) must change as what time ‘now’ is changes. Some responses to these arguments appeal to the claim that God is in some sense outside time.


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