scholarly journals GERIAUSIO PAAIŠKINIMO IŠVEDIMO PSICHOLOGINIS ADEKVATUMAS IR ONTOLOGINIAI ĮSIPAREIGOJIMAI

Problemos ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 41-54
Author(s):  
Adolfas Mackonis

Geriausio paaiškino išvedimas (GPI) dabartinėje analitinėje epistemologijoje ir mokslo filosofijoje yra plačiai tyrinėjama episteminė teorija, teigianti, kad hipotezės buvimas geriausiu paaiškinimu yra pakankama šios hipotezės teisingumo sąlyga. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad GPI analizuotina ne tik kaip episteminė, bet ir kaip psichologinė bei ontologinė teorija. Pirma, aptariami kognityviųjų mokslų tyrimai, kurie leidžia teigti, jog GPI teisingai aprašo žmonių samprotavimų praktiką: paaiškinimas suvokiamas kaip teisingumo požymis; teiginiai, kurie yra geresni paaiškinimai, priimami kaip labiau tikėtini; aiškinimo vertybės bei turimas žinojimas daro įtaką teiginių tikimybės vertinimui. Antra, straipsnyje aptariama, kokia turėtų būti pasaulio ontologija, kad GPI kaip episteminė teorija būtų teisinga. Realizmas apie išorinį pasaulį, gamtos vienodumas, turimo žinojimo teisingumas bei aiškinimo vertybių palankumas tiesai yra būtinos ir pakankamos sąlygos tam, kad GPI būtų teisinga.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: geriausio paaiškinimo išvedimas, abdukcija, psichologija, ontologija, aiškinimo vertybės.Psychological Adequacy and Ontological Commitments of Inference to the Best Explanation Adolfas Mackonis SummaryThe article explicates psychological and ontological aspects of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE is a psychological theory, because cognitive science studies support IBE as descriptively true and psychologically adequate theory, i.e., people perceive best explanations as true and follow the rule of IBE in their reasoning. Moreover, different features of IBE imply that conclusions of IBE can be true only in a world with a very particular ontological constitution. Realism about the external world, the uniformity of nature, the truth of background knowledge and the truth-conduciveness of explanatory virtues are necessary and sufficient for IBE to be truth-conducive. Therefore, IBE is an epistemic theory only because at the same time it is committed to a particular ontology.Keywords: inference to the best explanation, abduction, psychology, ontology, explanatory virtues.

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Hill

For Christian psychologists to move from their marginalized position with mainstream psychology, they must be able to substantively demonstrate the unique insights that the integration of psychology with Christian theology offers to the discipline. To do this, Christian psychologists must be able to show, not just claim, the authority of Scripture by demonstrating its explanatory power on psychology's terms. Three factors in psychology's new zeitgeist provide both opportunities and challenges to demonstrating Scriptural authority: a growing cultural interest in spirituality, postmodernism, and novel approaches to cognitive science. Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST) is provided as a concrete example where Christian thinking provides greater understanding of an emerging psychological theory, thus demonstrating explanatory power and providing Scripture a more authoritative position.


2019 ◽  
pp. 111-131
Author(s):  
William G. Lycan

The method of reflective equilibrium is a special case of explanatory-coherentist epistemology. This chapter defends explanatory coherentism against pertinent objections: Keith Lehrer’s problem regarding the data base; the charge of unacceptable conservatism; Stich’s threat of relativism; Goldman’s problem of wild and crazy beliefs; and Hacking’s doubt that explanatory virtues such as simplicity have anything to do with truth. The epistemological picture defended in this book does not incur the traditional problem of “getting from” one’s own sensory experiences to the external world, and so offers an unusual answer to the skeptic. But if one were to engage that problem, the explanatory coherentist has a viable approach.


1994 ◽  
Vol 42 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 118-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rogers Hall ◽  
Reed Stevens

Research accounts of mathematical and scientific competence play a central role in ongoing efforts to reorganize education. At the same time, new technologies change the character of work in settings where these competencies are learned and used. Two contemporary research programs—(1) cognitive science studies of expert versus novice skill and (2) interactional studies of scientific and technical practice—produce sharply diverging accounts of what competence is and how it develops. Cognitive science has been broadly accepted as a template for educational change, while relevant interactional perspectives have had little impact. We propose a synthetic approach that draws on both programs, illustrated with a comparative study of mathematical practices in design work. Starting with scenes in which groups of designers collaborate to make space for others, we restore material and social aspects of their work settings in an exploration of discipline-specific forms of competence. Our continuing project is to reassemble competence in terms of: (a) people's local representational practices, (b) their trajectories of participation within and across institutional settings, and (c) their capacity for managing social relations of accountability. Experts' schemata contain a great deal of procedural knowledge, with explicit conditions for applicability. Novices' schemata may be characterized as containing sufficiently elaborate declarative knowledge about the physical configurations of a potential problem, but lacking abstracted solution methods. (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser, 1981:151). Rule 7. Before attributing any special quality to the mind or to the method of people, let us examine first the many ways through which inscriptions are gathered, combined, tied together and sent back. Only if there is something unexplained once the networks have been studied shall we start to speak of cognitive factors. (Latour, 1987:258).


1985 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry A. Fodor

AbstractThe Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.


Author(s):  
Pino Trogu

This article discusses two universal principles from cognitive psychology, and proposes some ways in which those principles relate to graphic design. The two most important principles are first, the strict constraints of working memory, a function which persists for only a few seconds, and second, the finding that perceptions and meanings are mediated by the cultural knowledge of viewers, including their knowledge of design conventions and genre. Better de-signs are likely to emerge from the designer’s familiarity with these psychological and cultur-al principles. Visual examples, including maps and student projects, illustrate how the two principles are useful for classroom instruction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noel Scott

Purpose This paper aims to provide a personal perspective on the application of psychological theory in tourism studies and the importance of cognitive science for future research. Design/methodology/approach Empirical findings and theoretical ideas from cognitive science provide insights useful for tourism researchers. The slow uptake of these ideas provides a means to probe systematic weaknesses in the tourism academy’s research practice. Findings Theories derived from psychology are applied in tourism research, but these same theories are not reassessed after they are discredited, and new approaches emerge. Instead, “old” ideas continue to be used resulting in a moribund theoretical environment. Further, concepts from different paradigms are often adopted in the same study resulting in a confused and confusing literature. Originality/value This paper challenges theoretically conservative “social science”-based tourism researchers to adopt current best practice ideas from cognitive psychology. It highlights the value of cognitive psychology and neuroscience research for understanding social science phenomena.


Author(s):  
Jan Westerhoff

If both the external and the internal world turn out to be less solid than we initially thought, one thing we can still hold on to is the certainty that something is real, even if the external world is not, and even if we and our internal world are not. This, of course, is the belief in the existence of an ultimate foundation that grounds all existence. This chapter considers a series of challenges to this idea. It begins by evaluating possible arguments for the existence of such a foundation, and then describes attempts to establish its opposite, a non-foundational view of reality, also considering what role this non-foundational view plays in particular sciences, such as mathematics, physics, and cognitive science.


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