The “populist” foundation of liberal democracy: Jan-Werner Müller, Chantal Mouffe, and post-foundationalism

This article examines the connection between populism and post-foundationalism in the context of contemporary debates about populism as a strategy for the Left. I argue that there is something “populist” about every constitutional order, including liberal democratic ones. I argue so drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s theories of hegemony, agonistic democracy, and left populism. Populism is the quintessential form of post-foundational politics because, rightly understood, populism constructs the object it claims to represent, namely the people. As such, it expresses the fact that, because there is no ultimate foundation, politics consists in the construction of contingent foundations. I develop this argument through readings of Jan-Werner Müller and Chantal Mouffe, showing the differences between their respective post-foundational approaches. I show that Müller cannot uphold the distinction between populism and democracy in the way he seeks to do, but I also argue that this does not mean that we must jettison all normativity, only that it requires that we rethink normativity in hegemonic terms.

The Electoral Politics of the English Jacobins and Its Legacy, 1796–1807

Historians of radicalism have long held that following the repression of the English Jacobins in 1794–95, open agitation by plebeian reformers remained dormant until 1802, when they reemerged in a more clearly constitutionalist pose to fight a number of contests in that year's general election. According to this view, the contests led directly to Sir Francis Burdett's victory at the 1807 Westminster election, a foundational moment for nineteenth-century radicalism. This article argues instead that the previously overlooked English Jacobin intervention at the 1796 general election was the ultimate foundation for the 1807 election victory and far more significant than the contests evident in 1802. While this argument indicates that the Jacobin organizations for radical reform were not in a steep terminal decline by 1796, as is widely assumed, it also undermines the notion that the electoral politics of the 1802–1807 period was a major novelty. There was nevertheless not a clear-cut continuity from 1796 to 1807. This article demonstrates that in 1796 Jacobin political thought led to the development of a pure style of electioneering that rejected corrupt practices in order to turn the electoral process into a venue for the enaction of general will through the open use of sovereign reason. Between 1802 and 1804, this position was abandoned in favor of a more traditional, pragmatic and patricianly form of electioneering. However, this article concludes with a major revision of the 1807 Westminster victory by illustrating that, far from an innovation, it was a direct revival of the “purity” pioneered by the Jacobin contests of 1796.

La responsabilidad como fundamento último de la filosofía

Frecuentemente se ha señalado a la fenomenología de Husserl como una "filosofía de la fundación última y radical auto-responsabilidad." Aquí, sin embargo, examinaremos qué sentido puede tener hablar de "fundación última" y "auto-responsabilidad radical" en filosofía. La "idea de la filosofía" que propone Husserl como una "ciencia universal y rigurosa" de "fundación última" ha sido malinterpretada por sus críticos contemporáneos, que no han prestado atención a su aclaración que esta idea "ha de ser realizada sólo mediante valideces relativas y temporales en un proceso histórico infinito", ni tampoco al hecho que él ya ha replanteado la noción moderna de razón. Que la filosofía ha de proveer una fundación última a toda efectuación de la razón, así como su propia justificación sólo significa que es últimamente responsable de todo sentido y validez en general, así como de sí misma. Empero, el ego consciente activo, con sus efectuaciones racionales –cognitivas, volitivas y emotivas– como el "fundamento absoluto de todas mis validaciones", es precedido por un estrato más profundo, pre-consciente, irracional y pasivo de tendencias emotivas y desiderativas, impulsos e instintos hacia la conciencia y la racionalidad. Así, todo "evidenciar" y Geltungsfundierung se ve finalmente absorbido en una Genesisfundierung. En última instancia, ninguna "evidencia" racional puede ser "adecuada", sino que es esencialmente abierta e inadecuada. La tan criticada "conciencia absoluta" de Husserl está en efecto enraizada en un "absoluto más definitivo y verdadero", a saber, la identidad y diferencia del presente viviente estático-fluyente que pertenece a un ser finito, temporal, perspectivista, encarnado e intersubjetivo. La defensa de la razón y del "discurso fundacional" es para Husserl una cuestión de la "supervivencia de la humanidad" y su preservación de la barbarie. Pero no es una "adquisición permanente" sino la responsabilidad de una "tarea infinita". Así, la filosofía es una "ciencia todo-abarcadora fundada en un fundamento absoluto [...] aunque por cierto bajo la forma de un programa sin fin".Husserl’s phenomenology has been frequently referred to as a “philosophy of ultimate foundation and radical self-responsibility.” Yet here we will examine philosophy’s notion of “ultimate foundation” as “radical self-responsibility.” The “idea of philosophy” that Husserl proposes as a “universal and rigorous science” of “ultimate foundation” has been grossly misinterpreted by his contemporary critics, who have not paid heed to his clarifica-tion that this idea is “to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process,” nor to the fact that he has already recasted the traditional Modern notion of reason. That philosophy is called upon to provide an ultimate foundation to every accomplishment of reason, as well as its own justification, means that it is ultimately responsible for every sense and validity in general, and for itself. However, the active conscious ego, with its rational –cognitive, volitional and emotional– accomplishments, as the “absolute foundation of all my validations,” is preceded by a deeper, pre-conscious, irrational, and passive stratum of emotional and desiderative tendencies, impulses, instincts and strivings towards consciousness and rationality. Thus every “evidencing” and Geltungsfundierung is finally absorbed within Genesisfundierung. Ultimately no rational “evidence” can ever be “adequate,” but is essentially openended, and inadequate. Husserl’s much criticized “absolute consciousness” is in fact an “absolute” rooted in a “more definite and true absolute,” namely, the identity and difference of the static-fluent living present belonging to a finite, temporal, perspectivist, incarnate and intersubjective being. The defense of reason and of “foundational discourse” is for Husserl a question of “humanity’s survival” and its preservation from barbarity. Yet it is not a “permanent acquisition” but the responsibility of an “infinite task.” Thus philosophy is an “all-embracing science grounded on an absolute foundation [...] though of course in the form of an endless program."

Wittgenstein's Forms of Life: A Tool of Perspicuous Representation

The focus is on two texts by Wittgenstein where ‘forms of life’ constitute the pivot of an extended argument: ‘Cause and Effect’ and the discussion of colour concepts in ‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’. The author argues that forms of life are above all Wittgenstein's response to the question what it is to analyse a concept. The remark that forms of life are ‘given’ and must be ‘accepted’ is a natural corollary of Wittgenstein’s antireductionism and his idea of philosophy as a descriptive enterprise. Wittgenstein is, however, not offering forms of life as the ultimate foundation of our statements about causation or colour. He shifts the focus to the questioning activity itself. Our inquiries and descriptions imply conceptions of how to look and what to accept as verification. Forms of life are given, not because they cannot be analysed further, but because the investigation will take them as given. Comparisons are made, on the one hand, with G.H. von Wright’s interventionist account of the concept of causation and, on the other hand, with the two currently dominant interpretations of ‘forms of life’: the ‘linguistic community’ view and the ‘naturalist’ view.

The Non-existence of Ontological Foundations

If both the external and the internal world turn out to be less solid than we initially thought, one thing we can still hold on to is the certainty that something is real, even if the external world is not, and even if we and our internal world are not. This, of course, is the belief in the existence of an ultimate foundation that grounds all existence. This chapter considers a series of challenges to this idea. It begins by evaluating possible arguments for the existence of such a foundation, and then describes attempts to establish its opposite, a non-foundational view of reality, also considering what role this non-foundational view plays in particular sciences, such as mathematics, physics, and cognitive science.

Global Citizenship and Cosmopolitan Governance in the Legal Philosophy of K.C.F. Krause

In the early 1800s, K.C.F. Krause penned a legal philosophy of an unreservedly cosmopolitan bent. In bold strokes, Krause transcended the methodological nationalism of the philosophy of his era, drafting constitutional designs for supranational institutions on the European as well as on the global level. Finding that human rights have their ultimate foundation in the freedom of each and all persons, Krause demanded these rights to be universalized strictly in terms of both their protection and promotion. He called therefore for reparations for colonial injustices, for the empowerment of hitherto marginalized or disenfranchised groups just as much as, going forward, a genuine respect for the rights and interests of future generations. This article tries to reconstruct core arguments of Krause’s cosmopolitan position so as to elucidate their current relevance and systematic validity.

Science and Integral Catholicism in Interwar Argentina

During the interwar period of the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church in Argentina experienced a transition from a ‘liberal’ model to a pattern of ‘integral Catholicism’ in which its values and norms were thought as the ultimate foundation of the political, social, and cultural world. This paper examines the views of representative Catholic figures on the relationship between science and religion and contemporary scientific theories such as relativity, evolution, and the nature of life, relating them to the corresponding historical scenario. The absence of correlation between the scientific and ideological positions of the actors confirms the prevalent idea of complexity at the time of analysing the relationships between science, religion, and politics.

A Stronghold of Ethical Existence of the Serbs and Confronting Immoral Phenomena in Modern Sport

Summary The entire field of ethics (as a discipline of philosophy) is loaded with various issues, different approaches, schools and opinions (as the very field of philosophy, after all). Unlike ethics in general, theological ethics keeps a serious distance from most of those issues. Its starting belief is that whole moral and moral norms rest on God’s revelation, which eliminates any relativity in moral understanding. In other words, God is considered as an ultimate foundation of ethics because man in his essence is far from any perfection. Interaction between the meaning of human and ethical existence (which is based on faith in the Holy Trinity) is discussed in the paper in order to reveal a true origin of ethical existence of the Serbs. In addition, those universal ethical principles are confronted (in the field of sport in particular) with various deviant phenomena in society and sport (phenomenology of immorality in sport).

El idealismo de J. G. Fichte y la pragmática trascendental de K.O. Apel

En el presente artículo, mi objetivo es ofrecer un análisis de la posible comparación entre la filosofía de Fichte y la pragmática trascendental de Apel. A pesar de algunas coincidencias importantes, la comparación no resulta completamente satisfactoria. En realidad, el pensamiento de Fichte corresponde al paradigma moderno de una filosofía de la conciencia. Por consiguiente, su reflexión trascendental no pretende descubrir las condiciones intersubjetivas del discurso, sino las condiciones subjetivas del pensamiento. Según Fichte, el fundamento último de la filosofía no se encuentra en la dimensión pragmática del lenguaje o en una comunidad ideal de comunicación, sino más bien en la unidad de la autoconciencia subjetiva en el pensamiento, el conocimiento y la acción. In this paper, my aim is to offer an approach to the possible comparison between Fichte's idealism and Apel's transcendental pragmatics. Despite some relevant similarities, the comparison of these philosophical theories is not completely satisfactory. Indeed, Fichte's thought corresponds to the modern paradigm of a philosophy of consciousness. Therefore, his transcendental reflection does not intend to discover the intersubjective conditions of discourse, but the subjective conditions of thought. According to Fichte, the ultimate foundation of philosophy cannot be found in the pragmatic dimension of language or ideal community of communication, but in the unity of subjective self-awareness in thinking, knowledge and action.

Legacy of Ludwig von Mises: Rationalism

There are three intentions (aims) of this paper. First, to focus the attention of readers to three not so well known and least frequently quoted by economists of Mises’s books, namely his 1957 Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution, and two closely related The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (1962), and Epistemological Problems of Economics (1933/1960). The second aim is to outline Mises’s legacy, presented in the form of eleven dimensions of Mises’s Intellectual Universe. The eleven dimensions of Mises’s system are: Economics as science, praxeology, and human action; Methodological dualism; Judgments of value and subjectivism; Individualism; Rationalism and human action; Consumer; Cooperation and competition; Thymology; Mathematics in economics; Predictions; and Historical analysis. Third, to present the main issues related to Mises’s concept of rationalism. There is no mention of Ludwig von Mises’s concept of rationality in a great number of books and papers dealing with the understanding of the rationality of human beings. The concept of rationality proposed by Ludwig von Mises is neglected by modern researchers and economists of different schools, but especially by mainstream economists. A good example of neglecting Mises’s ideas on rationality is the latest book by Nassim Taleb, Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life. Although Taleb’s proposition of understanding rationality and irrationality is very close to the concept of Mises, he does not refer to Mises’s work at all. No single word on Mises in that book!