scholarly journals Arkansas' New Court and Its Effect on the Arkansas Appellate System

1985 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 20-37
Author(s):  
James D. Gingerich

On November 7, 1978, the voters of the State of Arkansas approved Amendment 58 to the Arkansas Constitution, creating the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The impetus for the new court had come from members of the Arkansas Supreme Court and others in the legal profession who argued that the state's judicial system, and specifically the Supreme Court, would suffer without it. Proponents argued that the new court would reduce the Supreme Court's workload, allow judges more time to consider cases and write opinions, and make the appellate process quicker and more efficient. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to determine whether these projected benefits have accrued and what effects, if any, the court has had on the Supreme Court.

1932 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman J. Padelford

The Conference held its ninth annual meeting in Washington on October 1-3, 1931. Authorized by the Judiciary Act of September 14, 1922, the conference of the senior circuit judges with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General has become an established part of the judicial system of the United States. The reports of these conferences are to be found in the annual reports of the Attorney-General, beginning in 1924. The 1922 and 1923 reports may best be found in the Texas Law Review, Vol. II, pages 445 and 448, and in the Journal of the American Judicature Society, Vol. VIII, pages 85 and 92. In view of the general inaccessibility of the reports of the Attorney-General to the legal profession, it has been suggested that they be published in the Supreme Court Reports. The suggestion has not as yet, however, been adopted.


Author(s):  
Rahul Tripathi

Judicial review is the process by which the Courts determine whether or not an administrative decision-maker has acted within the power conferred upon him or her by Parliament. That places the question of statutory construction at the heart of the enquiry. The Supreme Court enjoys a position which entrusts it with the power of reviewing the legislative enactments both of Parliament and the State Legislatures. This grants the court a powerful instrument of judicial review under the constitution. Research reveals that the Supreme Court has taken in hand the task of rewriting the Constitution, which is an important aspect in present scenario.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 03007
Author(s):  
Weda Kupita

The existence of 4 (four) kinds of judicial environment in the Judicial Authority in Indonesia, shows a judicial system adopted in Indonesia. the State Administration Judiciary is a apart of judicial power under the Supreme Court that examines cases relating to state administrative decisions. This article discusses the resolution of disputes as a result of the issuance of state administrative decisions in the state administrative court. This problem will be answered by using the legislation approach and case approach, with analysis using qualitative methods. To test a state administrative decision, a tool is needed to validate a state administrative decision. standard for testing the validity of the state administrative decisions in the examination at the state administrative court, are the laws and regulations and the general principles of good governance.


1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 583-603
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

Validity of Procedure. In the summer of 1925 the appellate division of the supreme court of New York held that the City Home Rule Amendment of 1923 had not been legally adopted and was invalid. In the case of Browne v. City of New York the court of appeals reversed this decision and held the amendment valid. The chief ground of attack on the amendment was, it is believed, unique. It may be stated as follows: The New York constitution requires an amendment to be proposed by one legislature, approved by the legislature chosen at the next election of senators, and then ratified by the voters. The City Home Rule Amendment was proposed by the legislature of 1922, approved by that of 1923, and ratified at the polls in 1923. It was an amendment to Article XII. But the legislature of 1922 had also approved an amendment to Article XII, relatively trivial in nature, which had originated in the legislature of 1920. This amendment was ratified in November, 1922, and went into effect in January, 1923, before the second legislative approval of the City Home Rule Amendment. In other words Article XII, which the City Home Rule Amendment changed, was not the same when the amendment passed the legislature for the first time as when it passed the second time. The appellate division held not only that the amendment must be the same when passed by the two legislatures but that the provision amended must also be the same.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-121
Author(s):  
Shamier Ebrahim

The right to adequate housing is a constitutional imperative which is contained in section 26 of the Constitution. The state is tasked with the progressive realisation of this right. The allocation of housing has been plagued with challenges which impact negatively on the allocation process. This note analyses Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers, Eden Park Extension 51 which dealt with a situation where one of the main reasons provided by the Supreme Court of Appeal for refusing the eviction order was because the appellants subjected the unlawful occupiers to defective waiting lists and failed to engage with the community regarding the compilation of the lists and the criteria used to identify beneficiaries. This case brings to the fore the importance of a coherent (reasonable) waiting list in eviction proceedings. This note further analyses the impact of the waiting list system in eviction proceedings and makes recommendations regarding what would constitute a coherent (reasonable) waiting list for the purpose of section 26(2) of the Constitution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven J. Twist ◽  
Paul G. Cassell ◽  
Allyson N. Ho ◽  
Bradley Hubbard ◽  
John Ehrett

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