scholarly journals Commentary on "Congressional Informal Groups as Representative Responsiveness"

1993 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 375-379
Author(s):  
Susan Webb Hammond

“Congressional Informal Groups as Representative Responsiveness” by Arturo Vega focuses on an interesting topic-congressional caucuses-and examines an important theoretical concept-representation-using a new data set that he has gathered. In the contemporary era, congressional caucuses-voluntary groups of members of Congress, without formal recognition in chamber rules or line-item appropriations that seek a role in the policy process-are increasingly salient congressional actors. The number of caucuses has increased dramatically during the 1980s; about 140 operated during the 102nd Congress (1991-1992). It is not surprising that caucuses have flourished during the 1970s and 1980s, two decades of structural decentralization during which members of Congress often pursued individual goals at the expense of collective action. I have argued elsewhere that caucuses, particularly in this environment, assist members in achieving individual goals and also help Congress achieve institutional goals (Hammond 1989). Vega’s focus on caucuses is useful.

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 485-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graig R. Klein ◽  
Patrick M. Regan

AbstractThe links between protests and state responses have taken on increased visibility in light of the Arab Spring movements. But we still have unanswered questions about the relationship between protest behaviors and responses by the state. We frame this in terms of concession and disruption costs. Costs are typically defined as government behaviors that impede dissidents’ capacity for collective action. We change this causal arrow and hypothesize how dissidents can generate costs that structure the government's response to a protest. By disaggregating costs along dimensions of concession and disruption we extend our understanding of protest behaviors and the conditions under which they are more (or less) effective. Utilizing a new cross-national protest-event data set, we test our theoretical expectations against protests from 1990 to 2014 and find that when protesters generate high concession costs, the state responds in a coercive manner. Conversely, high disruption costs encourage the state to accommodate demands. Our research provides substantial insights and inferences about the dynamics of government response to protest.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-124
Author(s):  
David R. Johnson ◽  
Liang Zhang

Using a data set that captures the introduction and enactment of “campus carry” bills between 2004 and 2016, we examined how the state policy adoption and diffusion framework explains the policy process related to allowing concealed weapons on the campuses of U.S. colleges and universities. Panel data logistic regression analyses revealed that active shooter incidents, the percentage of Republicans in state government, citizen political ideology, and policy diffusion influence the introduction of campus carry legislation. In addition, survival analysis showed that conservative citizen political ideology and anti-gun-control interests are positively related to the enactment of campus carry laws. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of the policy process related to campus carry legislation. It expands the empirical scope of higher education policy research by considering a social problem that, like free speech and transgender “bathroom bills,” is only indirectly related to student achievement but nevertheless a high priority for some state legislators. Importantly, the results underscore the importance of examining how the influences of state characteristics and interstate dynamics vary across stages of the policy process.


Author(s):  
Paul Spicker

Substantive collectivism is the idea that we live, not as 'individuals', but as a member of social groups, and that many of our actions are done together with others in organisations and social institutions, such as schools and businesses. Social groups are distinguished by a common identity, a network of relationships between people and a capacity for collective action. The relationships are clearest in discussions of formal organisations, but the same principles extend to informal groups, such as families, neighbourhoods and communities.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. I. Gow

AbstractIn 1944, two civil servants' associations formed the General Council of Employees of the Province of Quebec for the collective defence of the interests of their members. This movement met with the opposition of Premier Duplessis, who disarmed it by a strategy in which formal recognition and consideration disguised the absence of any real concession. The Council soon gave up its attempts at collective action and its member associations continued to function as social and recreational organizations. After 1960, the Council, although first in the field, was unable to resist the rise of the Syndicat des fonctionnaires provinciaux, a more militant group sponsored by the Confédération des syndicats nationaux.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (11) ◽  
pp. 2357-2372
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown

Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.


Geophysics ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. R59-R69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Eidsvik ◽  
Debarun Bhattacharjya ◽  
Tapan Mukerji

We propose a method for computing the value of information in petroleum exploration, a field in which decisions regarding seismic or electromagnetic data acquisition and processing are critical. We estimate the monetary value, in a certain context, of a seismic amplitude or electromagnetic-resistivity data set before purchasing the data. The method is novel in the way we incorporate spatial dependence to solve large-scale, real-world problems by integrating the decision-theoretical concept of value of information with rock physics and statistics. The method is based on a statistical model for saturation and porosity on a lattice along the top reservoir. Our model treats these variables as spatially correlated. The porosity and saturation are tied to the seismic and electromagnetic data via nonlinear rock-physics relations. We efficiently approximate the posterior distribution for the reservoir variables in a Bayesian model by fitting a Gaussian at the posterior mode for transformed versions of saturation and porosity. The value of information is estimated based on the prior and posterior distributions, the possible revenues from the reservoir, and the cost of drilling wells. We illustrate the method with three examples.


2020 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-643
Author(s):  
DAVID R. JOHNSON ◽  
LIANG ZHANG

The persistent problem of sexual assault on college campuses is receiving attention in both the public sphere and state legislatures. Although a considerable body of research examines various aspects of campus sexual assault, such as rates and reporting, scholars have not examined how state characteristics and interstate dynamics influence the policy process related to campus sexual assault. This gap is compounded by an underemphasis on gender in theories of state policy adoption, even as a record number of women serve in state legislatures. Drawing on a data set that captures the introduction and enactment of campus sexual assault legislation between 2007 and 2017, David R. Johnson and Liang Zhang examine in this article how the state policy adoption and diffusion framework explains the introduction and enactment of campus sexual assault policy. The results of their study show that the number of forcible sex offenses at public colleges, the number of female Democrats in state senates, contributions from women’s interest groups, gubernatorial power, Republican influence, and bipartisan sponsorship influence the campus sexual assault policy process, with varying influence across legislative stages. The authors discuss the implications of their findings for researchers interested in policy adoption and gender issues as well as for advocates working on campus sexual assault policy reform.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd C. Lehmann ◽  
Yuri M. Zhukov

AbstractWhy do armies sometimes surrender to the enemy and sometimes fight to the bitter end? Existing research has highlighted the importance of battlefield resolve for the onset, conduct, and outcome of war, but has left these life-and-death decisions mostly unexplained. We know little about why battle-level surrender occurs, and why it stops. In this paper, we argue that surrender emerges from a collective-action problem: success in battle requires that soldiers choose to fight as a unit rather than flee, but individual decisions to fight depend on whether soldiers expect their comrades to do the same. Surrender becomes contagious across battles because soldiers take cues from what other soldiers did when they were in a similar position. Where no recent precedent exists, mass surrender is unlikely. We find empirical support for this claim using a new data set of conventional battles in all interstate wars from 1939 to 2011. These findings advance our understanding of battlefield resolve, with broader implications for the design of political-military institutions and decisions to initiate, continue, and terminate war.


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