scholarly journals Tennessee: Advantage Republicans

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Robert Swansbrough ◽  
David Brodsky

In 2004, Tennessee failed to receive the national attention it enjoyed in the three prior presidential elections. In l992, the governor of neighboring Arkansas, Bill Clinton, selected Tennessee’s popular Senator Al Gore as his vice presidential running mate, and together they successfully challenged President George H.W. Bush. Clinton won Tennessee’s electoral votes, but captured only a 47 percent plurality of the popular vote in the three-way race; Bush received 42 percent of Tennessee’s votes, while independent Ross Perot took the balance. Four years later, the Clinton-Gore ticket won reelection against the lackluster campaign of Senator Bob Dole. Tennessee’s electoral votes went to the Democratic presidential ticket, but Clinton again failed to win a majority of the ballots cast in November 1996 (winning a plurality of 48.0 percent to Dole’s 45.6 percent with Ross Perot winning 5.6 percent).

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (04) ◽  
pp. 701-708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marty Cohen ◽  
David Karol ◽  
Hans Noel ◽  
John Zaller

ABSTRACTPolitical scientists have devoted vastly more attention to general presidential elections than to party nominations for president. This emphasis might be reasonable if parties could be counted on to nominate generic representatives of their traditions. But it is clear that they cannot. Since the party reforms of the 1970s, regulars like Bill Clinton, Bob Dole, and Al Gore have sometimes won fairly easy nominations, but outsider candidates like Jimmy Carter and Howard Dean have made strong runs or even won. 2016 has produced extremes of both types: ultimate regular Hillary Clinton on the Democratic side and far outsider Donald Trump on the Republican side. It seems, moreover, that party regulars are having more difficulty in recent cycles than they did in the 1980s and 1990s. There is therefore some urgency to the question: when and why do party regulars tend to win nominations?We examine this question from the point of view of two well-known studies, Nelson Polsby’sConsequences of Party Reformand our own,The Party Decides. The former explains why incentives built into the reformed system of presidential nominations make outsider and factional candidates like Trump likely. The latter argues that, following the factional nominations of the 1970s, party leaders learned to steer nominations to insider favorites. This article uses the logic of these studies to argue that major trends over the past two decades – the rise of new political media, the flood of early money into presidential nominations, and the conflict among party factions – have made it easier for factional candidates and outsiders to challenge elite control of nominations.


1998 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 292-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Drew ◽  
David Weaver

This study examines the relationships of exposure and attention to various news media with information learned about the issue positions of 1996 U.S. presidential candidates Bill Clinton, Bob Dole, and Ross Perot; level of interest in this election campaign; and intention to vote among 534 adult residents of Indiana during late October and early November of 1996. Contrary to previous studies of voter learning in U.S. presidential elections, this survey finds statistically significant associations only between the media measures and campaign interest, but not between media exposure/attention and knowledge of candidate issue positions or likelihood of voting, after controlling statistically for various demographics and level of interest in the campaign. Possible reasons for these markedly different findings for 1996 are discussed.


Author(s):  
Edward B. Foley

Each state already has the constitutional power to require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote to receive all of the state’s electoral votes. Each state could adopt the kind of runoff that New Hampshire used in the past, or instant runoff voting. There is no need for a multistate compact. If only two or three states had used runoffs, or instant runoff voting, in 2016—for example, Florida and Michigan, or the three Rust Belt states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—and if Clinton had won those runoffs, then she would have been president. In the future, it might be a Republican candidate who prevails in runoffs in pivotal states but would lose using plurality winner-take-all. States with ballot initiatives can use them to require majority rule for appointing electors as long as they leave the specific details to legislation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Barthélémy ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Ashley Piggins

ABSTRACTDonald J. Trump won the 2016 US presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary R. Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888, and 2000. In earlier work, we analyzed these elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the US House of Representatives. This work was inspired by Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003, 721–5) in their paper, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and the House Size.” A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the popular vote winner in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. We show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888 and unlike Hayes’s in 1876 and Bush’s in 2000. This article updates our previous work to include the 2016 election. It also draws attention to some of the anomalous behavior that can arise under the Electoral College.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


The Forum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 345-373
Author(s):  
Jillian Evans ◽  
Brian J. Gaines

Abstract Advocates of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) promise that it can deliver plurality electoral rule (“first past the post”) for presidential elections, at the national level, without amending the Constitution or abolishing the Electoral College. They also contend that the plan has seen bipartisan support and will pass on the strength of such cross-party attraction. In fact, the NPVIC remains a polarizing scheme, strongly appealing to most Democrats and strongly repellant to most Republicans. In turn, it is extremely unlikely that sufficiently many states will join the Compact for it to reach the next stage of legal testing.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Molek

AbstractThe article describes the reasons for the constitutional amendment to the Czech Constitution turning the traditional indirect elections of the President of the Republic into direct popular vote. It analyses the shortcomings of the constitutional amendment as well as of the Act on Presidential Elections. In the two parts that follow, it addresses the two main problems of the presidential elections: the registration of the candidates and the elec­tion campaign, and analyses the milestone decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court regarding these two questions. Finally, the author reflects the first year of presidency of Miloš Zeman and his questionable attempts to broaden the scope of presidential competences by innovative interpretation of the Czech Constitution.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (04) ◽  
pp. 723-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Klarner

This paper applies the forecasting models of Klarner and Buchanan (2006a) for the U.S. Senate and Klarner and Buchanan (2006b) for the U.S. House of Representatives to the upcoming 2008 elections. Forecasts are also conducted for the 2008 presidential race at the state level. The forecasts presented in this article, made July 28, 2008 (99 days before the election), predicted an 11-seat gain for the Democrats in the House of Representatives, a three-seat gain for the Democrats in the Senate, and that Barack Obama would obtain 53.0% of the popular vote and 346 electoral votes. Furthermore, Obama was forecast to have an 83.6% chance of winning the White House and an 85.9% chance of winning the popular vote.


Author(s):  
Corwin Smidt

This article examines the role of Catholics within the 2020 presidential election in the United States. Although Catholics were once a crucial and dependable component of the Democratic Party’s electoral coalition, their vote in more recent years has been much more splintered. Nevertheless, Catholics have been deemed to be an important “swing vote” in American politics today, as in recent presidential elections they have aligned with the national popular vote. This article therefore focuses on the part that Catholics played within the 2020 presidential election process. It addresses the level of political change and continuity within the ranks of Catholics over the past several elections, how they voted in the Democratic primaries during the initial stages of the 2020 presidential election, their level of support for different candidates over the course of the campaign, how they ultimately came to cast their ballots in the 2020 election, and the extent to which their voting patterns in 2020 differed from that of 2016.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Thomas

The Bread and Peace model of US presidential elections estimates `VOTE`, the incumbent’s party’s share of the major-party vote, as a function of rates of personal-income growth and military fatalities during the incumbent president’s term. I replicate past work fitting the model to elections since 1952, confirming that income growth and war deaths account for most variation in VOTE. Using data available as of the end of October, I then develop 5 income-growth forecasts for Donald Trump’s presidential term and use them to forecast Trump’s share of the two-party vote in the 2020 election. My 5 forecasts range from 49.3% to 56.1% with a mean of 53.0%, notably higher than final polling averages of 45.6%–46.2% and a preliminary election result of 48%. An idiosyncratic factor such as the sitting president’s impeachment might account for the model overrating Donald Trump’s popular-vote performance.


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