scholarly journals DOIS CONCEITOS DE LIBERDADE: 60 ANOS APÓS A SUA PUBLICAÇÃO

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (100) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo Coser
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray

Este artigo analisa criticamente o ensaio “Dois conceitos de liberdade”, de Isaiah Berlin. Para isso, compara a primeira edição de 1958 com a edição de 1969 e o ditado oral de 1957, à luz de trabalhos anteriores e posteriores do autor. Abordam-se as críticas ao ensaio, feitas por CrawfordBrough MacPherson, Gerald MacCallum Jr., Charles Taylor e James Tully, e também são recuperadas interpretações distintas da obra de Berlin, feitas por John Gray e George Crowder. Para a interpretação do ensaio, mobilizou-se a ideia de “pluralismo de valores”, presente em toda a obra de Berlin, cujos fundamentos são: a diversidade cultural e a decisão do sujeito com relação a valores últimos. De todo modo, como há certa instabilidade teórica no conceito de pluralismo de valores, buscar-se-á uma nova fundamentação com base em suas interpretações contemporâneas.

Democracy and Value Pluralism

2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Galston
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Thomas Nagel ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray ◽  
Stuart Hampshire ◽  
The Relationship

My intention in this essay is to open up a question I cannot fully resolve: the relationship between democracy and value pluralism. By “value pluralism” I mean the view propounded so memorably by the late Isaiah Berlin and developed in various ways by thinkers including Stuart Hampshire, Steven Lukes, Thomas Nagel, Martha Nussbaum, Michael Stocker, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, John Kekes, and John Gray, among others. I shall define and discuss this view in some detail in Section III. For now, suffice it to say that value pluralism is the view that what we (rightly) value in our lives turns out to be multiple, heterogeneous, not reducible to a common measure, and not hierarchically ordered with a single dominant value or set of values binding on all persons in all circumstances. I use the phrase “value pluralism” rather than “moral pluralism” to indicate that this view encompasses nonmoral as well as moral goods.

scholarly journals El romanticismo y el problema de la «Historia de las Ideas» de Berlin

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
David Hereza Modrego
Keyword(s):  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray

Reseña de:Isaiah Berlin, Las ideas políticas en la era romántica. Surgimiento e influencia en el pensamiento moderno [traducción de Víctor Altamirano, a partir de la segunda edición inglesa de 2014], Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2014. Isaiah Berlin, Las raíces del romanticismo [traducción de Silvina Marí a partir de la segunda edición inglesa con el nuevo prólogo de John Gray (traducido por Miguel Marqués) publicada en 2013], Taurus, Madrid, 2015. 

scholarly journals La crisis de la libertad:

2015 ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Ignacio Sepúlveda del Río
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Siglo Xx

En los últimos 60 años ha habido, por lo menos, dos concepciones de libertad en el mundo occidental: la libertad negativa y la libertad positiva. Ambas concepciones estuvieron en pugna hasta hace poco. En la última parte del siglo XX –con la caída del Muro– daba la impresión que la primera había triunfado sobre la segunda. En lo que sigue deseamos reflexionar sobre estos dos conceptos desde la perspectiva de Isaiah Berlin y Charles Taylor, apuntando a sus distintas comprensiones, sentidos y las aportaciones de cada uno. En un segundo momento, y tomando como base algunos planteamientos de Paul Krugman, intentaremos mostrar como la idea de libertad negativa ha sido responsable, en parte, de la gran crisis económica–social que estamos viviendo en la actualidad. Por último, acogiendo el pensamiento de Taylor sobre la libertad positiva, intentaremos esbozar los posibles aportes que desde esta libertad –bien entendida y delimitada– se pueden generar en la construcción de una sociedad más integrada, responsable y solidaria.

scholarly journals The Value-Pluralism and Liberalism Problem Revisited

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beata Polanowska - Sygulska
Keyword(s):  
Controversial Issue ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
John Gray ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Is Value

This article tackles one of the most burning issues discussed by adherents of the dynamically developing movement in ethics which bears on political and legal philosophy, that is value-pluralism. In particular, the article is devoted to an investigation into the highly controversial issue of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism, based upon the three crucial, divergent approaches represented by Isaiah Berlin and his two main opponents, John Gray and George Crowder. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the two concepts in question are neither mutually exclusive nor logically connected, but actually overlapping, which signifies the existence of a loose, de facto connection between them. Such a final thesis proves to be consistent with the position of Isaiah Berlin, and contrary to the final statements endorsed by his critics, John Gray and George Crowder.

‘One Very Simple Principle’

Utilitas ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Riley
Keyword(s):  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
General Utility ◽  
John Gray ◽  
Harm Prevention ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Liberty Principle

John Gray, much influenced by Isaiah Berlin and building on work by the late John Rees and the late Fred Berger, has recently stated three ‘fatal’ objections which virtually all analysts seem to find persuasive against John Stuart Mill's classic doctrine of liberty. First, Gray thinks it ‘an obvious objection to Mill's project that conceptions of harm vary with competing moral outlooks, so that no Principle of Liberty whose application turns on judgements about harm can expect to resolve disputes between exponents of opposed moral perspectives’. Even if we overlook Mill's strange silence in the matter and supply him with a reasonable definition of harm (such as damage to certain vital human interests or rights), it remains clear that the liberty principle ‘is not, and cannot be, the very simple principle Mill sought’. For ‘Mill's principle is in its very nature radically incomplete. It tells us what we may not do, but not what we ought to do.’ To know when liberty should in fact be restrained, ‘we must look to other principles—chiefly the Principle of Utility itself’. But if general utility alone can ‘tell us how much liberty may be given up for how much harm-prevention’, then ‘there can be no question of adherence to [an] exceptionless principle such as Mill's Principle of Liberty’. Thus, even if we believe that Mill's version of utilitarianism is coherent, his judgements about the regulation of conduct must depend on a highly complex and controversial moral doctrine.

scholarly journals L’exil intérieur des Québécois dans le Canada de la Charte

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2007
Author(s):  
Guy Laforest
Keyword(s):  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Il Y A ◽  
Judith Shklar ◽  
Raymond Aron ◽  
Le Canada

Je vais commencer cet article par une note personnelle. Il y a vingt-cinq ans, au temps de l’entrée en vigueur de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés1, je vivais à Montréal et j’étudiais à l’Université McGill. Parmi mes professeurs, il y avait deux grands intellectuels qui étaient aussi deux grands idéalistes, Charles Taylor et James Tully2. J’ai beaucoup appris d’eux et avec le temps, ils sont devenus des amis. J’avais d’autres profes- seurs qui m’ont influencé, peut-être moins directe- ment, mais tout aussi durablement, notamment les Blema Steinberg, Daniel Latouche, James Mal- lory et Harold Waller. Leur approche était teintée de réalisme, et elle contrebalançait à merveille celle que je trouvais chez Taylor et Tully. En phi- losophie, l’approche réaliste est celle du libéral- isme sans illusions que l’on trouve chez les Judith Shklar, Raymond Aron, Isaiah Berlin et Karl Pop- per, selon laquelle en politique, il faut d’abord et avant tout éviter le pire. Il faut entendre par là la cruauté, l’effroi, la terreur, la violence, tout ce qui peut broyer la personne humaine, l’atteindre dans sa dignité et dans son intimité. A ce titre je part- age le jugement d’Irvin Studin qui écrivait récem- ment que le Canada est un formidable succès à l’échelle de l’humanité, l’un des pays parmi les plus « pacifiques, justes et civilisés »3. Un pays où, pour ajouter ma propre voix, les forts comme les faibles peuvent dormir tranquilles dans un milieu social humain, décent, confortable, sans crain- dre le pire. Tout cela compte pour beaucoup dans l’histoire de l’humanité.

From Crusades to Colonization: Violence in Secular and Religious Political Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Xavier Scott
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
State Power ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Beliefs And Values

This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern-states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy. 

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