scholarly journals The G-77, BASIC, and global climate governance: a new era in multilateral environmental negotiations

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (spe) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Ann Hochstetler

The G-77 has historically organized the participation of developing countries in multilateral environmental negotiations. This article analyses the impact of a new coalition of emerging powers - Brazil, China, India, and South Africa as BASIC - on the G-77's role in climate governance. While there are important benefits for both sides in their relationship, I argue that the G-77 is also disadvantaged in several concrete ways by the BASIC countries.

2013 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1350008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mou WANG

Drawing on the idea that countries are eligible to implement differentiated emission reduction policies based on their respective capabilities, some parties of UNFCCC attempt to weaken the principle of “Common but differentiated responsibilities(CBDR)” and impose carbon tariff on international trade. This initiative is in fact another camouflage to burden developing countries with emission cut obligation, which has no doubt undermined the development rights of developing countries. This paper defines Carbon Tariff as border measures that target import goods with embodied carbon emission. It can be import tariffs or other domestic tax measures that adjust border tax, which includes plain import tariffs and export rebates, border tax adjustment, emission quota and permit etc. For some developed countries, carbon tariffs mean to sever trade protectionism and to build trade barriers. Its theoretical arguments like “loss of comparative advantage”, “carbon leakage decreases environmental effectiveness” and “theoretical model bases” are pseudo-propositions without international consensus. Carbon tariff has become an intensively debated issue due to its duality of climate change and trade, but neither UNFCCC nor WTO has clarified this issue or has indicated a clear statement in this regard. As a result, it allows some parties to take advantage of this loophole and escape its international climate change obligation. Carbon tariff is an issue arising from global climate governance. To promote the cooperation of global climate governance and safeguard the social and economic development of developing countries, a fair and justified climate change regime and international trade institution should be established, and the settlement of the carbon tariff issue should be addressed within these frameworks. This paper argues that the international governance of carbon tariff should in cooperation with other international agreements; however, principles and guidelines regarding this issue should be developed under the UNFCCC. Based on these principles and guidelines, WTO can develop related technical operation provisions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 699-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyeeta Gupta ◽  
King Yip Wong

This paper examines China’s policy and position in relation to the evolving climate change negotiations in order to explain how China is dealing with the dilemma of meeting its growing development needs while reducing ghg emissions. It argues that global climate governance requires steering and leadership to deal with the interlocked political process; that the developing countries (dcs) right to develop is challenged by the need for ecosystemic standards especially as climate change is seen as a zero-sum game as the more one country emits the less another one can. This is especially problematic as Industrialized countries (ics) appear to be both unwilling and unable to increase growth without increasing emissions. This explains China’s policy of insisting on its right to develop, of demanding that ics reduce their emissions and that they fulfil their obligations under the fccc, while expressing its willingness to take on a voluntary target. The paper argues that China’s state-led transition has eight unique characteristics that may allow it to lead as it moves beyond a no-regrets policy to a circular and green economy, cooperating with other dcs and mobilizing conscious green values in citizens. The question remains—will the initial success and scale of state-led transition lead the global green transition to a sustainable world?


2014 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 1450002
Author(s):  
Jiahua PAN ◽  
Mou WANG

In 2012, the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18) of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) in Doha concluded a package of results which included the second commitment period of the "Kyoto Protocol", ending the Bali Roadmap negotiating mandate (hereinafter referred to as the Bali mandate) after five years, and officially opening the intensive negotiations of Durban Platform. Compared to the "dual-track" negotiation under Bali mandate, Durban Platform mandate is on "one-track". But it does not mean that some parties' concerns and positions about "dual-track" have been adjusted. They are seeking a way to realize their needs in Durban Platform. Therefore, "one-track" negotiation on Durban Platform does not simplify problems, but presents problems intensively. At the beginning of Durban Platform mandate, whether to mandate the Durban Platform negotiations was controversial among developing countries, while after consultations, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the emerging developing economies divided on main concerns, such as mitigation targets, legal forms, sources of finance mechanism, etc. In fact, AOSIS's position gradually converged with the European Union (EU). And EU and AOSIS became the most aggressive powers to promote the Durban Platform negotiations. The traditional North–South divergence is facing adjustment, and new powers are restructuring negotiations. The huge disparity of interest among parties hinders progress in the Durban Platform negotiations. Parties will continue to debate and seek consensus on the interpretation of the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", emission reduction models and targets, sources of finance mechanism, the legal form of the future agreement, etc. With the social and economic development, China is receiving growing attention in the international climate governance processes. China's status as a developing country is being questioned by some developed and developing countries. Rapid increase of China's foreign investment and aid attracts worldwide attention, which stimulates the voices and expectations for China to shift its role as a developing country to shoulder more international obligations. However, China should be clearly aware of the fact that China's power of discourse is still very limited and far from being a leader in the world in various fields, including the international climate governance processes. China's participation in global climate governance, no matter its role being passively changed by others or a voluntary shift, still needs to keep a low profile, strengthen its economy, balance rights and obligations, and commit according to capabilities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 185-200
Author(s):  
Hongyuan Yu

Since the first global summit on climate change was held in 1992, the international community has managed to adopt a series of agreements and action plans to coordinate efforts of all countries to tackle the existing and potential challenges caused by climate change. Yet due to a lack of legally binding mechanisms and the huge discrepancy between developed and developing countries in their respective responsibilities, little progress has been made in international climate negotiation over the past decade. With the joint endeavor of major greenhouse gas emitters, especially emerging economies like China, the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal, the Paris Climate Agreement, was adopted in December 2015, setting up the legal framework of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and relevant international institutions to combat climate change on a reinterpreted principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).” Conducive as it is to the institutions and working model of global climate governance, the agreement will attach more responsibilities to developing countries including China. Having developed a strong resolution and given many open international commitments to assume more responsibilities in combating climate change, China should develop a green-growth approach while providing more public goods for the international community, so as to make its best contributions to future global climate governance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 777
Author(s):  
Surendran Pillay

Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) have achieved a certain level of cost-effective emission reductions in developing countries. In this context the uneven distribution of CDM projects in certain regions as well as the concentration of CDM projects amongst certain sectors in developing countries have resulted in the issue of whether CDM projects contribute to sustainable development in developing countries. This article examines the impact of CDM projects on sustainable development in South Africa by examining a sample of working CDM projects there and evaluating their impact on environmental, economic and social sustainable development. Based on observations during the study, CDM policy changes are reviewed, and options to enhance the sustainable development implications of CDM projects are explained.


2010 ◽  
Vol 53 (spe) ◽  
pp. 73-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau

Due to its recent economic success, Brazil is considered an emerging country, but is it an emerging power concerning global environmental governance? This article argues that although Brazil has a sui generis profile, it can only be considered an emerging power in some environmental regimes, such as global climate change. Thus, international relations theory needs more analytical instruments to assess the impact of emerging powers in global environmental governance


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Liu ◽  
Tong Wu ◽  
Ziqianhong Wan

Author(s):  
Shantayanan Devarajan ◽  
Delfin S Go ◽  
Sherman Robinson ◽  
Karen Thierfelder

Abstract Noting that developing countries may not have the administrative capacity to levy a “pure” carbon tax, we compare the impact of alternative energy taxes with that of a carbon tax in an economy with multiple distortions. We use a disaggregated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the South African economy and simulate a range of tax policies that reduce CO2 emissions by 15 percent. Consistent with a “first-best” economy, a carbon tax will have the lowest marginal cost of abatement. But the relationship between a tax on energy commodities and one on pollution-intensive commodities depends critically on other distortions in the system and on structural rigidities in the economy. We demonstrate that if South Africa were able to remove distortions in the labor market, the cost of carbon taxation would be negligible. We conclude that the welfare costs of taxing carbon emissions in developing countries depend more on other distortions than on the country’s own carbon emissions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-71
Author(s):  
Kiara Mahadev

Climate change has quickly become one of the greatest challenges impacting regions all over the world. Despite it being a global challenge, developing countries have had a much more difficult time combating these effects (South Africa’s 2nd Annual Climate Change Report, 2017). This is largely due to the population density, lack of funds and necessary resources in most developing countries. This article will explore climate change and the impact of this phenomenon on the country of South Africa.


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