scholarly journals Blameworthiness in Multi-Agent Settings

Author(s):  
Meir Friedenberg ◽  
Joseph Y. Halpern

We provide a formal definition of blameworthiness in settings where multiple agents can collaborate to avoid a negative outcome. We first provide a method for ascribing blameworthiness to groups relative to an epistemic state (a distribution over causal models that describe how the outcome might arise). We then show how we can go from an ascription of blameworthiness for groups to an ascription of blameworthiness for individuals using a standard notion from cooperative game theory, the Shapley value. We believe that getting a good notion of blameworthiness in a group setting will be critical for designing autonomous agents that behave in a moral manner.

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Ester Livshits ◽  
Leopoldo Bertossi ◽  
Benny Kimelfeld ◽  
Moshe Sebag

Database tuples can be seen as players in the game of jointly realizing the answer to a query. Some tuples may contribute more than others to the outcome, which can be a binary value in the case of a Boolean query, a number for a numerical aggregate query, and so on. To quantify the contributions of tuples, we use the Shapley value that was introduced in cooperative game theory and has found applications in a plethora of domains. Specifically, the Shapley value of an individual tuple quantifies its contribution to the query. We investigate the applicability of the Shapley value in this setting, as well as the computational aspects of its calculation in terms of complexity, algorithms, and approximation.


Author(s):  
Selma Benkessirat ◽  
Narhimene Boustia ◽  
Rezoug Nachida

Recommendation systems can help internet users to find interesting things that match more with their profile. With the development of the digital age, recommendation systems have become indispensable in our lives. On the one hand, most of recommendation systems of the actual generation are based on Collaborative Filtering (CF) and their effectiveness is proved in several real applications. The main objective of this paper is to improve the recommendations provided by collaborative filtering using clustering. Nevertheless, taking into account the intrinsic relationship between users can enhance the recommendations performances. On the other hand, cooperative game theory techniques such as Shapley Value, take into consideration the intrinsic relationship among users when creating communities. With that in mind, we have used SV for the creation of user communities. Indeed, our proposed algorithm preforms into two steps, the first one consists to generate communities user based on Shapley Value, all taking into account the intrinsic properties between users. It applies in the second step a classical collaborative filtering process on each community to provide the Top-N recommendation. Experimental results show that the proposed approach significantly enhances the recommendation compared to the classical collaborative filtering and k-means based collaborative filtering. The cooperative game theory contributes to the improvement of the clustering based CF process because the quality of the users communities obtained is better.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (19) ◽  
pp. 4037 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongye Shi ◽  
Peter Steenkiste ◽  
Manuela Veloso

Multi-agent path planning (MAPP) is increasingly being used to address resource allocation problems in highly dynamic, distributed environments that involve autonomous agents. Example domains include surveillance automation, traffic control and others. Most MAPP approaches assume hard collisions, e.g., agents cannot share resources, or co-exist at the same node or edge. This assumption unnecessarily restricts the solution space and does not apply to many real-world scenarios. To mitigate this limitation, this paper introduces a more general class of MAPP problems—MAPP in a soft-collision context. In soft-collision MAPP problems, agents can share resources or co-exist in the same location at the expense of reducing the quality of the solution. Hard constraints can still be modeled by imposing a very high cost for sharing. This paper motivates and defines the soft-collision MAPP problem, and generalizes the widely-used M* MAPP algorithm to support the concept of soft-collisions. Soft-collision M* (SC-M*) extends M* by changing the definition of a collision, so paths with collisions that have a quality penalty below a given threshold are acceptable. For each candidate path, SC-M* keeps track of the reduction in satisfaction level of each agent using a collision score, and it places agents whose collision scores exceed its threshold into a soft-collision set for reducing the score. Our evaluation shows that SC-M* is more flexible and more scalable than M*. It can also handle complex environments that include agents requesting different types of resources. Furthermore, we show the benefits of SC-M* compared with several baseline algorithms in terms of path cost, success rate and run time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050012
Author(s):  
Zhendong Gu ◽  
Shuming Zhou ◽  
Jiafei Liu ◽  
Qianru Zhou ◽  
Dajin Wang

The Shapley distance in a graph is defined based on Shapley value in cooperative game theory. It is used to measure the cost for a vertex in a graph to access another vertex. In this paper, we establish the Shapley distance between two arbitrary vertices for some special graphs, i.e., path, tree, cycle, complete graph, complete bipartite, and complete multipartite graph. Moreover, based on the Shapley distance, we propose a new index, namely Shapley index, and then compare Shapley index with Wiener index and Kirchhoff index for these special graphs. We also characterize the extremal graphs in which these three indices are equal.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 257-272
Author(s):  
Leszek Zaremba ◽  
Cezary S. Zaremba ◽  
Marek Suchenek

Abstract The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a concept for co-operative games yielded a solution that was satisfactory for 4 lesser importers and not satisfactory for the biggest importer. Appropriate modification of Shapley value presented in this article allowed to identify appropriate distribution of the saved purchase amount, which according to each player accurately reflects their actual strength and position on the importer market. A computer program was used in order to make appropriate calculations for 325 permutations of all possible coalitions. In the last chapter of this paper, we recognize the lasting contributions of Lloyd Shapley to the cooperative game theory, commemorating his recent (March 12, 2016) descent from this world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-168
Author(s):  
Stan Lipovetsky

The work describes developments in the multiple regression performed for building models resistant to multicollinearity, having meaningful robust solution for individual parameters, convenient for interpretation of the results, and good for prediction. A tool from the cooperative game theory, the Shapley Value analysis, have been tried for estimation of regression coefficients and relative usefulness of the predictors in a model. This approach has been checked and successfully applied in various real-life projects in data analysts for commercial companies. It is useful for decision makers in economics, management, marketing research, and any other practical fields.


Author(s):  
N. Boyko ◽  
S. Dotsenko

The article is consider three different mechanisms of project’s profit sharing, assuming that the projects have common resource pool and both resources and profit may be distributed at arbitrary way without losses. The resources and profit distribution mechanisms are based on cooperative game theory thesis. As three different alternatives, such cooperative game solutions, as Shapley value, nucleolus ant τ-value are proposed. The calculation routine is delivered by easy typical example.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (04) ◽  
pp. 383-402
Author(s):  
HARALD WIESE

The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several values for TU games with coalition structures have been presented in the literature, most notably by Aumann and Drèze and Owen. We present a value that is capable of dealing with unemployment and unionization. We show that unemployment benefits increase wages but contribute to unemployment, that unemployment can be voluntary, and that unions tend to be beneficial for employed workers if there is overstaffing.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Z. Alparslan Gök ◽  
R. Branzei ◽  
S. Tijs

Convex interval games are introduced and characterizations are given. Some economic situations leading to convex interval games are discussed. The Weber set and the Shapley value are defined for a suitable class of interval games and their relations with the interval core for convex interval games are established. The notion of population monotonic interval allocation scheme (pmias) in the interval setting is introduced and it is proved that each element of the Weber set of a convex interval game is extendable to such a pmias. A square operator is introduced which allows us to obtain interval solutions starting from the corresponding classical cooperative game theory solutions. It turns out that on the class of convex interval games the square Weber set coincides with the interval core.


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