scholarly journals A PERSPECTIVE ON THE DICHOTOMY OF ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS BY FATHERS IN TERMS OF THE CHILDREN’S ACT AND CUSTOMARY LAW

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gugulethu Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Unmarried Fathers ◽  
Commission Report ◽  
The Common ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Law Commission

South Africa’s legal system is pluralist in nature. It is embedded in two components, namely, customary law and the common law, which converge to form one national legal system through legislation and case law. However, the distinct development of these two components of the legal system has a significant impact on how their respective frameworks are perceived and subsequently applied in given cases. Traditional African family systems were regulated under the “banner” of customary law, but the validity of the system was ultimately decided in terms of the common law, subject to the repugnancy clause. The repugnancy clause was introduced during the colonial era and was used as a measure discarding certain indigenous African values as contrary to public policy and natural justice (see Juma “From ‘Repugnancy to Bill of Rights’: African Customary Law and Human Rights in Lesotho and South Africa” 2007 21 Speculum Juris 88). Hence, the common law was generally preferred to customary law. This state of affairs influenced the manner in which the two components of the legal system developed, entrenched an outlook of a subservient position towards African customary law particularly in relation to parental responsibilities and rights as asserted below. This position, in turn, rattles the traditional family value system of the indigenous African people.This state of affairs persists regardless of the fact that in the new constitutional dispensation, customary law has been afforded legitimate recognition. Section 211 (3) of the Constitution provides that the courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law. Furthermore, section 39(3) recognises the rights and freedoms “that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill of Rights”.The official recognition of customary law necessitated that the application of the customary law and the common law within the same legal system be harmonised. Issues pertinent to the harmonisation of the common law and customary law were discussed in the South African Law Commission Report of 1999 (South African Law Commission Report “Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law: Report on Conflicts of Laws” Project 90 of 1999). One of the issues raised in the report was how to determine when the customary law is applicable (Himonga and Bosch “The Application of African Customary Law under the Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning? 2000 117 South African LJ 314). It was found that generally, the judiciary exercises its own discretion to decide when to apply the customary law (South African Law Commission Report of 1999). A constant challenge that the judiciary faces is to ascertain the customary law position in a given case. This exercise generally requires probing of both the “official” and “living” versions of the customary law. Needless to say, an investigation of this nature is complex. Normally the traditional customary law position, that is, the living customary law of the pre-colonial is considered in light of its significance in the contemporary society. The diverse plethora of customs and cultures has further compounded the process of ascertaining a customary law position of the various indigenous African groups. Finally, it is essential that the judiciary consider the manner in which a group interprets and applies a particular custom. Due to the said complexities that prevail when attempting to ascertain the African customary law position, the attitude, then is generally to adopt the apparent African customary law position.In light of the said entrenched tensions between customary law and common law in terms of application, this note seeks to explore the dichotomy of the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights as portrayed in legislation and in terms of customary law. Specific reference will be made to the legal position of unmarried fathers in this regard. This note investigates how parental responsibilities and rights are acquired as provided for in legislation. It further examines whether, in terms of customary law, unmarried fathers can acquire parental responsibilities and rights as stipulated in the legislation.

scholarly journals Muslim personal law and the meaning of "law" in the South African and Indian constitutions

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Muslim Population ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
Personal Law

The Muslim population of South Africa follows a practice which may be referred to asMuslim personal law. Although section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 recognises religious freedom and makes provision for the future recognition of other personal law systems, Muslim personal law is, at this stage, not formally recognised in terms of South African law. Since Muslim personal law receives no constitutional recognition the question may be asked whether the 1996 Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights as contained in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, is applicable to "non-recognised" Muslim personal law. The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution.When the viewpoint of academic writers and the courts are evaluated it seems as if the meaning of law in South Africa is restricted to the common law, customary law and legislation. If such a viewpoint is to be followed, Muslim personal law is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. It is, however, inconceivable that there might be certain areas of "law" that are not subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. In this note it will be argued that Muslim personal law should be regarded as law in terms of the 1996 Constitution, or in the alternative, that Muslim personal law (or at least Muslim marriages) should be recognised in terms of section 15 of the 1996 Constitution.Due to the historical resemblance between South Africa and India the meaning of"law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution will be compared with the meaning of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India. Although the Constitution of India indirectly gives recognition to various personal laws in India, these personal laws are not subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be argued that one should approach the Constitution of India with caution when its provisions are compared to those of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa.

scholarly journals Constitutional Mimicry and Common Law Reform in a Rights-Based Post-Colonial Setting: The Case of South Africa and Malawi

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-170
Author(s):  
Sibo Banda
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The South ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
The Common

AbstractCompetent courts in Malawi must, as courts have done in South Africa, undertake a radical path in order to enhance the common law position of distinct categories of persons. This article discusses judicial appreciation of the common law-changing function of a bill of rights and its associated values, and judicial understanding as to when such a function may be brought into play. The article examines approaches taken by courts in South Africa in determining the circumstances in which the South African Bill of Rights applies to private relationships, when private parties owe each other duties arising out of the Bill of Rights and the scope of a court's authority to amend the common law in that regard. The article projects the debate, analysis and critique of these approaches onto the Malawian legal landscape through a discussion of the tenant worker contracted on the Malawi private estate.

An African Doctrine of Equity in South African Public Law

2013 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Bennett
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Range Of Functions ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
African Form

For the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept – Ubuntu – has been adopted into the common law of the land (which is a mixture of English and Roman-Dutch law). Ever since colonial conquest, the indigenous normative orders of Africa have been treated as inferior. While South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation had the effect of elevating customary law to the same status as that of the common law, the traffic of ideas between the two systems continued to favour the latter as the superior system. The reception of ubuntu into the common law reversed this process. This paper examines the function of ubuntu in its new environment. Most of the discussion about the concept has concentrated on its meaning, a question that has been concentrated on finding a suitable English translation. The most obvious have been the calques, ‘humanity’, ‘personhood’ or ‘humaneness’, but none have been especially helpful, for they cannot hope to convey the full range of functions now performed by ubuntu. It is argued in this paper that searches for a priori meanings are unhelpful: words are continually being exploited by users to serve their own particular ends. In this regard, it must be appreciated that ubuntu is a loanword, and thus especially susceptible to manipulation. The paper shows that the courts have used ubuntu to supply a peculiarly African form of equity that has been used to solve hard cases and conflicts between rules, notably in the area of public law.

Family Provision in South Africa

2020 ◽  
pp. 477-506
Author(s):  
Marius J de Waal
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
South Africans ◽  
The Common ◽  
Property Regime

At the time of the reception of Roman-Dutch law at the Cape in the seventeenth century, both children and the surviving spouse enjoyed sufficient protection at the death of the breadwinner (normally the father and husband): children by way of the civilian legitimate portion and the spouse by way of the matrimonial property regime of community of property prevalent in Roman-Dutch law of the time. However, after the English occupation of the Cape in the early nineteenth century this protection was slowly eroded. This happened, first, by the acceptance of the principle of freedom of testation under English influence and, secondly, by the growing popularity of ante-nuptial contracts excluding community of property. This chapter explains how family protection was gradually restored in South Africa. In the case of children, this happened by the courts awarding a maintenance claim against the deceased parent’s estate; and in the case of the surviving spouse it was by means of a statutory maintenance claim against the estate of the other spouse. South African law therefore chose the common law approach of discretionary maintenance over the civilian approach of fixed shares. The chapter sets out the respective histories of these two claims as well as their operation in modern South African law. It discusses other possible protection measures and potential avoidance mechanisms. Finally, the chapter contains a brief discussion of the position of South Africans living under African customary law and the importance of the customary law principle of ‘ubuntu’ in this context.

9. Inchoate offences

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-115
Author(s):  
Jonathan Herring
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Essential Information ◽  
Serious Crime ◽  
Commission Report ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Commission

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses inchoate offences. Inchoate offences are where the full offence is not completed. The reason that the law fixes liability on defendants who have not fulfilled the full offence is to punish those who are willing to be involved in criminality even where the full offence is not, for one reason or another, completed. The law governing all inchoate offences is in a state of flux; the common law offence of incitement was replaced with new offences under the Serious Crime Act 2007. The law governing conspiracy and attempts was the subject of a Law Commission Report in December 2009.

The Need for a Constitution in the United Kingdom

1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285
Author(s):  
Wilberforce
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Flexible Instrument ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

I was not surprised when, from several alternative subjects, you chose, as the title of my Lecture, the need for a Constitution in Britain. Those of us without a written constitution are indeed, a select club—New Zealand, Israel, the United Kingdom.I will start with a quotation from Lord Salmon. In a recent lecture, he said: In this country [U.K.] we have an unwritten constitution. I have always regarded this as a blessing and never agreed with the theoretical objections to it. It is superbly flexible and above all it has stood the test of time. It works—and works admirably. But I am beginning to wonder whether it might not be wise to evolve, not an elaborate written constitution but perhaps the equivalent of a modern Bill of Rights. A statute which should lay down our basic freedoms, provide for their preservation and enact that it could not be repealed save by, say, a 75% majority of both Houses of Parliament.One can recognize in this passage the views of an eminent common lawyer, believing in the strength and potentialities of the common law as a flexible instrument, in, of course, the right hands: of one who believes deeply in human freedom, and who is concerned about the threat to it: who desires an explicit definition of the basic liberties and who believes that these can be protected by a sufficiently strong, entrenched, legal system. In this he undoubtedly reflects the views of many people, probably of the majority of ordinary men.

scholarly journals Oral Law in Litigation in South Africa: An Evidential Nightmare?

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Court System ◽  
The Status ◽  
Customary Laws ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law Of Evidence

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.

Constructive Trusts in South African Law: The Legacy Refused

1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Cameron
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
University Of Edinburgh ◽  
Joint Seminar ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
Law Commission

This paper was first presented on 19 October 1996 at a joint seminar of the Scottish Law Commission and the Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, on the subject of constructive trusts. Although trusts are a distinctively Common Law institution, seemingly incompatible with Civilian concepts of property, trust law has been received in the mixed South African legal system. But constructive trusts have found no place in South African trust law, in the view of the author, rightly so. Much of the work performed by the constructive trust can be achieved through the law of obligations, while the acceptance of the institution can produce anomalous results in insolvency.

scholarly journals The best of both worlds? some reflections on the interaction between the common law and the Bill of rights in our new constitution

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kate J O'Regan
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Organic System ◽  
The Common ◽  
South African Constitution ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

The relationship between the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution of 1996 and the common law is analyzed in this paper. "Common law" is understood broadly to include not only the Roman-Dutch law, but also the wide variety of legal sources and traditions which make up South African law, including African tradition, Muslim practice and the English law heritage.Firstly an exposition of the chief characteristics of the hybrid system of South African common law is given. It is shown that the common law is not codified; that it is a living and organic system of law constantly under legislative and judicial review; that its sources vary from judicial precedent to civilian authorities, English, indigenous customary and Muslim law; that the style of litigation and adjudication is English rather than Continental in Character and that when a common law rule is modified, it is done retrospectively in conflict with principles of legal certainty.Secondly the chief constitutional provisions relating to the relationship between the Constitution and the common law are considered. The supremacy clause (section 2) renders a common law rule which is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid from the date of the Constitution unless a court gives a different ruling in accordance with justice and equity. Courts have the inherent power to develop the common law, but the Constitutional Court may do so only in constitutional matters. Two forms of constitutional normative effects may be distinguished: direct (as in sections 2 and 8(1)) and indirect (as in section 39(2)). In terms of the latter the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights are to guide the development of the common law.Thirdly the interaction between the common law and the Constitution is thoroughly explored with reference to common law rules that are in conflict with the Constitution as well as where the common law already provides protection for the rights provided by the Bill of Rights. These matters are explored with reference to a number of recent judgments of the Constitutional Court, in some of which the common law was effectively developed.It is concluded that the firm normative thrust of the Constitution may well prove to be a rich source of principle for the development of the common law and that the flexibility of the common law may facilitate a cross-pollination between it and the Constitution.

scholarly journals The Consequences of the Statutory Regulation of Customary Law: An Examination of the South African Customary Law of Succession and Marriage

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Fatima Osman
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
The South ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Of Succession ◽  
Statutory Regulation

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.

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