scholarly journals Interpretation of a Trust Deed – Harvey v Crawford 2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-460
Author(s):  
S Ferreira ◽  
CJ Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Adoptive Parent ◽  
Specific Reference ◽  
Adopted Children ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
Adopted Child ◽  
Balanced Approach ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Recently, in Harvey v Crawford (2019 (2) SA 153 (SCA)) (Harvey), the Supreme Court of Appeal had to consider whether the adopted grandchildren of a trust donor were beneficiaries in terms of a notarially executed deed of trust. Presently, an adopted child is for all purposes regarded as the child of the adoptive parent, and an adoptive parent is for all purposes regarded as the parent of the adopted child (s 242(3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005) (the Children’s Act)). This was also the case in 1953, when the deed of trust in Harvey was executed and when the Children’s Act 31 of 1937 (the 1937 Act) regulated adoption. However, contrary to current legislation, the 1937 Act included a proviso with regard to property that was included in an instrument prior to the date of the adoption order: the instrument was required to display a clear intention that such property would indeed devolve upon an adopted child.Upon interpretation of the deed in question, the court ruled that the adopted children were not entitled to benefit from the capital in the trust. In this regard, the majority opted for a rather restrictive approach, seemingly out of step with recent developments in the interpretation of contracts. The minority decision, on the other hand, came to the opposite conclusion, displaying a more balanced approach to the issue of interpretation. This decision raises some noteworthy issues regarding the interpretation of inter vivos trust deeds with specific reference to adoption. It is submitted that the court erred in its findings; the aim of this case discussion is to analyse the judgment.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

Regspraak: Novasie en delegasie van skuld – hoe raak dit die versekering van die tersake skuld?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-378
Author(s):  
JC Sonnekus ◽  
EC Schlemmer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Secured Debt ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Preferential Position ◽  
The Creation ◽  
D 20 ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Secured Creditors

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place. This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).

scholarly journals UNTANGLING THE REQUIREMENT OF GOOD FAITH IN THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN COMPANY LAW (Part 1)

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maleka Femida Cassim
Keyword(s):  
Company Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Other ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Complex Issue ◽  
High Court ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

A crucial prerequisite for a derivative action is that the applicant must be acting in good faith in terms of section 165(5)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in order to obtain the leave of the court to bring the proposed derivative action. Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court have recently made important pronouncements of legal principle on the approach that the courts would take to the determination of good faith for the purposes of the statutory derivative action under section 165 of the Companies Act. These judicial findings relate not only to the complex issue of how to prove good faith but also to the meaning and content of the requirement of good faith. The courts have now reached a crossroads in delineating the content of good faith and how it is to be proved. This two-part series of articles critically evaluates these judicial pronouncements. While the focus of these articles is mainly on the tangled requirement of good faith, relevant judicial findings on the other prerequisites for a derivative action under section 165(5)(b) read with (7) and (8) of the Companies Act are also discussed. A comparative approach is adopted that takes into account the jurisprudence developed in Australia, Canada and Singapore. This article, the first in the series of two articles, focuses on the test of good faith. The proof of good faith will be discussed in the second article.

scholarly journals SOME CLARITY ON THE ACCRUAL OF LIVING ANNUITIES AT DEATH OR DIVORCE CM v EM (1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eben Nel
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Investment Performance ◽  
High Court ◽  
Life Annuity ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Term Insurance ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Court Of Appeal

A conventional life annuity is a contract in terms whereof an annuity underwriter guarantees a periodical payment to an insured in exchange for an initial non-refundable premium. The insurer pools all the annuity premiums together and assumes both the investment performance and the mortality risk by way of actuarial comparisons. The annuitant’s income is guaranteed for life or for a minimum period.Living annuities on the other hand are regulated by the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and are market-linked investments (with no income guarantee) in respect of which the annuitant annually chooses the drawdown rate – currently between 2.5 and 17.5 per cent per annum (compare Regulations in terms of s 36 of the Pensions Act 24 of 1956 and s 106(1)(a) read with s 108(1) of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017.) When an annuitant dies, the death benefit is payable to a nominated beneficiary or the estate of the insured. A pension-interest benefit is an asset for the purposes of the division of an estate at divorce, and includes both pension and provident funds. Living annuities, however, do not fall within the definition of “pension interest” as defined in s 1 of the Divorce Act.In CM v EM ((1086/2018) [2020] ZASCA 48; [2020] 3 All SA 1 (SCA); 2020 (5) SA 49 (SCA) (5 May 2020)), the Supreme Court of Appeal, in an appeal from the full court of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, sitting as court of appeal, had the opportunity to determine where the ownership of capital invested in the form of a living annuity vests, as well as whether the value of an annuitant spouse’s right to future annuity payments is an asset in his or her estate and therefore subject to accrual. Accrual in respect of an estate is the amount by which the net value of the estate at the dissolution of a marriage exceeds the net value of that estate at the commencement of the marriage. At the dissolution of a marriage owing to death and subject to the accrual system, the spouse whose estate shows no accrual, or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, has a claim against the other spouse or his or her deceased estate.It is submitted that some implications of the accrual dispensation, particularly within the context of certain pension and financial products, are still in their discovery phase, nearly 40 years after their introduction. In the absence of any reference to a living annuity in an antenuptial contract, the question was always whether such an investment is subject to the accrual system at divorce or death. In the context of a life assurance policy, the surrender value of the policy was taken into account in the event of divorce, but in the event of death, the question was whether, for accrual purposes, the factor taken into account should be the surrender value or the policy proceeds. As only assets that form part of the estate of a spouse can be considered for accrual purposes, the very nature of a living annuity had to be investigated in the matter of CM v EM (supra). This case was an application for special leave to appeal from the full court in the matter of Emilio Pietro Valfredo Montanari v Charmaine Helen Montanari (Montanari v Montanari).

scholarly journals A Fresh Perspective on Historical Sexual Abuse: The Case of Hewitt v S 2017 1 SACR 309 (SCA)

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Windell Nortje ◽  
Pieter Du Toit
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Sexual Abuse ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
Sexual Crimes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Sexual crimes continues to be a scourge in our society. It is therefore not surprising that the prevention and criminalisation of sexual crimes in South Africa has received a large amount of attention over the last few years. Contrarily, the matter of historical sexual abuse has received only occasional consideration. Cases of historical sexual abuse present numerous challenges to all parties involved. The victims of historical sexual abuse, often children at the time, are now adults. Some of these victims might not want to relive the experience or confront the offender. On the other hand, the offender might have been rehabilitated and become a respected citizen. In Hewitt v S 2017 1 SACR 309 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal heard the appeal against the sentence of Bob Hewitt, a retired tennis champion. He was convicted of committing numerous sexual offences against young girls. The first of these crimes was committed more than three decades ago. This case note analyses the decision by the SCA while it also examines historical sexual abuse more generally in South Africa as well as in England and Wales, in order to establish whether any lessons can be learned from previous cases and laws as implemented in these countries.     

scholarly journals THE MEANING OF “EXPENDITURE” FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 11(A) AND (GA) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 58 OF 1962 CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd [2011] ZASCA 157

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
SP van Zyl
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Common Phenomenon ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Gross Income ◽  
A Company ◽  
Court Of Appeal

It is trite that a taxpayer may deduct, from his/her gross income, any expenditure or losses that were actually incurred, in the year of assessment, in relation to the taxpayer’s trade and in the production of income, provided that the expenditure is not of a capital nature. Section 11(a) does not require that the expenditure must have been incurred in the year of assessment. The courts have, however, interpreted this provision as restricting the deductibility of expenditure to expenses incurred in the year of assessment. It often happens that a taxpayer will engage in a transaction where goods are exchanged for services, or services for other services, or goods for rights. Conversely, barter, or agreements akin thereto, are still a common phenomenon in modern-day business. The question often arises whether or not payment in kind satisfies the requirement of “expenditure” actually incurred to determine the deductibility of the “expense” in terms of the general-deduction formula. The term “expenditure” is not defined in the Act. The Supreme Court of Appeal was recently called on in CSARS v Labat Africa Ltd to interpret the meaning of “expenditure” and to determine whether or not the allotment and issuing of shares in a company in exchange for intellectual property rights, satisfies the “expenditure” requirement in terms of the general deduction formula (or in terms of s 11(gA)), and if so, what value would be attached to such expenditure. This case discussion will also critically discuss the application of the judgment on modern-day barter transactions or where substitutive performance is made to satisfy an obligation.

scholarly journals A BIBLICAL LAZARUS: DEREGISTRATION OF A COMPANY AND THE REVIVAL OF RIGHT TO MINERALS A discussion of Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy 2016 (6) SA 121 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Heleen van Niekerk ◽  
Shamila Mpinga
Keyword(s):  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Mineral Resources ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Petroleum Resources ◽  
Religious Teaching ◽  
The Dead ◽  
A Company ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The notion of death and resurrection is intriguing. As part of a religious teaching, rising from the dead is often associated with an act of a deity for the salvation of humankind. Holding the ultimate power of having defeated death, the resurrected deity often has the ability to perform the miracle of commanding others to rise from the dead. For some, these religious beliefs are of the utmost importance and, frequently, take centre stage in the believer’s life. While it is generally accepted that people have the freedom to choose their religious beliefs, we should tread cautiously when the law assumes the characteristic of performing miracles. This need to tread cautiously is well illustrated in Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy 2016 (6) SA 121 (SCA) (hereinafter “Palala Resources (SCA)”).The case concerns the interpretation of section 56(c) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) and section 73(6A) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. According to section 56(c) of the MPRDA, rights to minerals lapse when a company is deregistered. Section 73(6A) of the 1973 Companies Act provides an opportunity for a company that was deregistered for failing to submit annual returns to be restored to the companies register. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the restoration of a company according to section 73(6A) constitutes a “Biblical Lazarus moment” (par 5 and 12) for a prospecting right that lapsed according to section 56(c) of the MPRDA: upon restoration of the company, the prospecting right miraculously revives from the dead.In this case discussion, we investigate whether the revival of rights to minerals in the manner allowed in the Palala case accords with the objectives of the MPRDA. We specifically investigate the correct interpretation of section 56(c) of the MPRDA in the particular circumstances of the case, namely, when companies that hold prospecting rights are deregistered for failing to submit annual returns. Although not discussed here, our arguments can be extended to all rights to minerals and to all scenarios envisaged in section 73 of the 1973 Companies Act; i.e., where companies are removed from the register without being wound up. Our arguments do not cover the voluntary or involuntary winding up of solvent companies (s 80 and 81 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the 2008 Companies Act)) or the winding up of insolvent companies (s 344 of the 1973 Companies Act).At all material times during the dispute, the 1973 Companies Act, and not the 2008 Companies Act, was operational. We compare the position in the 2008 Companies Act throughout the discussion.

scholarly journals Contentious Issues Arising from Payments made in Full and Final Settlement

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Final Settlement ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Specific Amount ◽  
Made In

Payments made in full and final settlement have on several occasions presented interpretative difficulties for our judiciary, as will become apparent from this case discussion: Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex Marketing 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the judgments of the trial court and the appeal court (full bench of the Cape Provincial Division) which were in favour of the creditor. In such cases, the essential enquiry is whether an agreement of compromise exists. A transactio or compromise (in the form of a legal agreement) exists where the relevant parties agree to settle previously disputed or uncertain obligations. Like any other agreement, a compromise is based on the contractual rules of offer and acceptance. The first material enquiry in this case wherein the debtor delivered the cheque payment to the creditor (in full and final settlement of the account), is whether 1) an intended offer of compromise exists; or 2) did the debtor merely intend to make payment towards an admitted liability. The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case came to the correct finding that an offer of compromise existed. Whilst the judgment is brief, the finding itself gives practical recognition to the principle that admission of liability for a specific amount, accompanied by payment (in full and final settlement), may still be accompanied by an intended offer of compromise, instead of merely making payment towards an admission of liability. 

Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (2)

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-645
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Present Part ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The discussion of the South African case law on the quantification of damages arising from wrongful arrest and detention which commenced in part (1) of this series, continues in the present part. In part (1), the Constitutional Court judgment in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) which emphasised the respect and reverence for the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and De Klerk v Minister of Police 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) as well as the recent Constitutional Court judgment in the same case – De Klerk v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); [2019] ZACC 32 (22 August 2019) – were among a host of important cases discussed. The Supreme Court of Appeal cases on quantification of damages for wrongful arrest and detention also discussed include: Mashilo v Prinsloo 2013 (2) SACR 648 (SCA); Minister of Police v Zweni (842/2017) [2018] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2018); Minister of Safety and Security v Magagula (991/2016) [2017] ZASCA 103 (6 September 2017). The first section of this part continues with the discussion of the other instances not involving failure to take the detainee to court within 48 hours or consequences of the accused person’s first appearance in court whereby Hendricks v Minister of Safety and Security (CA&R/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 61 (4 June 2015); Mrasi v Minister of Safety and Security 2015 (2) SACR 28 (ECG); and Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (1) SACR 211 (E) are among the cases discussed. The second limb of the discussion in this part concerns the issue of wrongful arrest and detention under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 where the law has developed side by side with the traditional law of wrongful arrest and police negligence as illustrated by the case of Naidoo v Minister of Police 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA).

Divorce in the Canadian Conflict of Laws: Two Recent Developments

1974 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 193-219
Author(s):  
Joost Blom
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
First Time

Two recent cases have added substantially to the Canadian jurisprudence on divorce in the conflict of laws. In one, discussed in Part I of this article, a court of first instance in Alberta initiated what is likely to be a far-reaching change in the rules for the recognition of foreign decrees. In the other, discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court of Canada gave its imprimatur for the first time to the controversial doctrine whereby someone who has obtained an invalid foreign decree may be precluded from denying its validity in a Canadian court. Although the two questions that these cases deal with are quite separate, their treatment by the Alberta Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada shows a common tendency to resolve conflicts problems by rules that are general and flexible rather than precise and arbitrary.

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