scholarly journals THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN CASES OF SEXUAL GBV: AN ANALYSIS OF TSHABALALA v S; NTULI v S 2020 (5) SA 1 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glancina Mokone

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law, and it imposes obligations on all arms of the State, including the judiciary. In performing their functions and exercising their powers, all three arms of the State are obliged to fulfil the obligations imposed by the Constitution. In particular, all three arms of the State are bound by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, provided for in the Constitution, is a cornerstone of democracy in the country. The Bill of Rights provides for fundamental human rights, which must be respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled by the State. Different legal systems recognised in the Republic also have to comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. In particular, section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that whenever legislation is interpreted and when the common law and customary law are being developed, the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights must be promoted. Therefore, even when a case before a court calls for the application of common law and all the principles applicable under common law, such application must comply with the provisions of the Constitution, including in cases of common-law rape. Gender-based violence has reached alarming rates in South Africa. The country is referred to as the “femicide nation” and the “rape capital of the world”. With a Constitution that is supreme and entrenched, a Bill of Rights that provides for the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights, and obligations incurred in terms of international and African human-rights treaties, there are particular obligations placed on all three arms of the State, including the judiciary. All three arms of the State are obliged to comply with these provisions when addressing the scourge of gender-based violence in the country. This article conducts a critical analysis of the constitutional role of the judiciary in cases of sexual gender-based violence, with a focus on section 39(2) of the Constitution. The analysis is based primarily on the case of Tshabalala v S; Ntuli v S 2020 (5) SA 1 (CC).

Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

The Muslim population of South Africa follows a practice which may be referred to asMuslim personal law. Although section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 recognises religious freedom and makes provision for the future recognition of other personal law systems, Muslim personal law is, at this stage, not formally recognised in terms of South African law. Since Muslim personal law receives no constitutional recognition the question may be asked whether the 1996 Constitution, and in particular the Bill of Rights as contained in chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution, is applicable to "non-recognised" Muslim personal law. The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the meaning of "law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution.When the viewpoint of academic writers and the courts are evaluated it seems as if the meaning of law in South Africa is restricted to the common law, customary law and legislation. If such a viewpoint is to be followed, Muslim personal law is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. It is, however, inconceivable that there might be certain areas of "law" that are not subject to the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. In this note it will be argued that Muslim personal law should be regarded as law in terms of the 1996 Constitution, or in the alternative, that Muslim personal law (or at least Muslim marriages) should be recognised in terms of section 15 of the 1996 Constitution.Due to the historical resemblance between South Africa and India the meaning of"law" as contained in the 1996 Constitution will be compared with the meaning of "law" as contained in the Constitution of India. Although the Constitution of India indirectly gives recognition to various personal laws in India, these personal laws are not subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be argued that one should approach the Constitution of India with caution when its provisions are compared to those of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa.


Author(s):  
A. FREDDIE

The article examines the place and role of democracy and human rights in South Africas foreign policy. The author analyzes the process of South Africas foreign policy change after the fall of the apartheid regime and transition to democracy. He gives characteristics of the foreign policy under different presidents of South Africa from 1994 to 2018 and analyzes the political activities of South Africa in the area of peacekeeping and human rights on the African continent.


Author(s):  
M K Ingle

The Bill of Rights contained within South Africa’s Constitution features a number of ‘socio- economic rights’. Although these rights are justiciable they are subject to various limitations. They generally entail a positive onus on the part of the state to provide some good – not immediately, but ‘progressively’. Women have a direct interest in the realization of these rights and, where given effect to, they should exert a positive developmental impact. Some authorities are, however, of the opinion that socio-economic rights are not really enforceable. This article contends that the provision of social goods, by the state, should be the concomitant of the disciplined implementation of policy. Delivery should not therefore be contingent upon the legalistic vagaries of the human rights environment.Keywords: Socio-economic rights; justiciability; Bill of Rights; development; South African Constitution; womenDisciplines: Development Studies;Human Rights; Gender Studies; Political Science


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Botha

In South African Human Rights Commission v Qwelane (hereinafter “Qwelane”) the constitutionality of the threshold test for the hate speech prohibition in section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (hereinafter the “Equality Act”) was challenged. Although the court had no difficulty in finding that the publication in question fell squarely within the parameters of hate speech, the judgment is both incoherent and flawed. The court’s conjunctive interpretation of the section 10(1) requirements for hate speech also differs from the disjunctive interpretation given to the same provision in Herselman v Geleba (ECD (unreported) 2011-09-01 Case No 231/09 hereinafter “Herselman”) by the Eastern Cape High Court. The consequence is a “fragmented jurisprudence” which impacts on legal certainty, and which is especially dangerous when the legislation in question is critical to the achievement of the constitutional mandate (Daniels v Campbell NO 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) par 104 hereinafter “Daniels”).This note demonstrates that the Qwelane court misapplied a number of key principles. These include: the court’s mandate in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the “Constitution”); the need to strike an appropriate balance between competing rights in the constitutional framework; the importance of definitional certainty for a hate speech threshold test; the meaning to be ascribed to the terms “hate”, “hurt” and “harm” in the context of hate speech legislation; and the role of international law when interpreting legislation intended to give effect to international obligations.The consequence of these errors for hate speech regulation in South Africa is profound.


Author(s):  
I Ketut Cahyadi Putra

The State of Pancasila Law essentially stems from the principle of kinship, deliberation of consensus based on customary law, and protection of human rights with the principle of balance between the rights and obligations and the function of the law of auxiliary. As contained in the Fifth Precept of Pancasila that is social justice for all Indonesian people, and the opening of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia related to the phrase "advancing public welfare" is the basic formula of welfare state ideology then manifested into the constitution of the state of Indonesia to be made Guidance of nation life and state administration. Negara Hukum Pancasila esensinya berpangkal pada asas kekeluargaan, musyawarah mufakat berlandaskan hukum adat, dan perlindungan hak asasi manusia dengan prinsip keseimbangan antara hak dan kewajiban dan fungsi hukum pengayoman. Sebagaimana yang terkandung dalam Sila Kelima Pancasila yaitu keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia, dan pembukaan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 terkait frase “memajukan kesejahteraan umum” merupakan rumusan dasar ideologi welfare state kemudian dimanifestasikan ke dalam batang tubuh konstitusi negara Indonesia untuk dijadikan pedoman hidup berbangsa dan penyelenggaraan kenegaraan.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-172
Author(s):  
J. Michael Judin

Purpose This paper aims to discuss the King Reports and Codes and the development of South Africa’s common law. The role of developing the common law is explicitly recognised in the Constitution, as is the obligation to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. With decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal being based on the King Code, the King Code is now an integral part of South Africa’s common law. Design/methodology/approach When the task team drafting King IV commenced their work, one of the important issues raised with Mervyn King, as Chairman, was the challenge to ensure that King IV was aligned to the now firmly entrenched common law principles taken from King I, King II and King III. It is believed that this has been achieved and it is hoped that King IV (and the subsequent King Reports that will inevitably follow because the corporate milieu keeps changing) continues to enrich South Africa’s common law. Findings The King Reports and Codes have been made part of South Africa’s common law. Originality/value This paper fulfils an identified need to study the King Report and Code, as it relates to South Africa’s common law.


Obiter ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

The recent judgment by the Mthatha High Court in Dalisile v Mgoduka ((5056/2018) [2018] ZAECMHC (Dalisile)) has elicited much jubilation over the permeation of customary-law principles into the judicial resolution of disputes that emanate from a customary-law context. The judgment comes at a time when common-law principles appear to have infiltrated the resolution of disputes that originate from customary law. This case paves the way and provides a foundation for the resolution of customary-law disputes within their own context. It reinforces arguments that have long been canvassed to constitutionalise customary law within its own framework. It endorses the envisioned commitment to translate into reality the “healing of the divisions of the past” as envisaged in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Section 211(3) of the Constitution is distinct and prescriptive on the obligations of the courts relating to the application of customary law. Section 211(3) is in the context of pursuing the advancement of a constitutionalised system of customary law that seeks to equate the applicable laws of the Republic.This case has filled a lacuna in the application and interpretation of customary law, which has been clouded by the prism of common law. The gap was acknowledged by the court in Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community (2003 (12) BLCR 1301 (CC). In Alexkor, customary law was affirmed as an independent and legitimate source of law that is empowered to regulate its own affairs within the framework of the Constitution. It does not have to be legitimised and validated by common-law principles in addition to the Constitution.Resolving disputes arising from customary law has been a great cause for concern. The courts have delivered many disappointing judgments in the area of resolving customary-law disputes. These judgments appear to lean towards importing common-law principles into the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. This case note does not intend to discuss these judgments in any depth as they have been dealt with elsewhere.It is thus not the purpose of this case discussion to delve into the history of customary law. Its intended focus is limited to the significant stride made by the court in Dalisile in uprooting the dominance of the application of common-law principles in the resolution of disputes that arise from the system of customary law. The objective is to generate debate on the contribution that the judgment makes to the incorporation of Africanised principles into the broader constitutional framework of the jurisprudence of our courts. The note argues that it is the Constitution that is the dominant authority over all the legal systems that are applicable in the Republic, including customary law.


Author(s):  
Aleksandrs Kuzņecovs ◽  

Due to rapid spread of Covid-19 worldwide, Latvian government declared the state of emergency. This decision was adopted by the parliament in order to contain the virus and undertake all the necessary measures to prevent its further spread. At the same time, it is clear that government’s actions undertaken within the state of emergency mostly remain unchecked. The absence of any legal basis for the parliament to extend their oversight during the state of emergency makes role of the parliament in these circumstances unclear. The current position of the parliament precludes political and legal liability over the executive and their officers. Lack of the delegated legislative and human rights restriction clause applicable specifically during the state of emergency raises questions regarding powers of the government and parliamentary control during the state of emergency. The article explores the possible solutions to rectify such flaws in the legal system of the Republic Latvia


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.


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