Space Modeling of Problem Solving Strategies of “Prisoner's Dilemma”

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-116
Author(s):  
D.J. Balanev ◽  

An iterated version of the game "Prisoner's Dilemma" is used as a model of cooperation largely due to the wide range of strategies that the subjects can use. The problem of the effec-tiveness of strategies for solving the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is most often considered from the point of view of information models, where strategies do not take into account the relationship that arise when real people play. Some of these strategies are obvious, others depend upon social context. In our paper, we use one of the promising directions in the development of studying IPD strategies – the use of artificial neural networks. We use neural networks as a modeling tool and as a part of game environment. The main goal of our work is to build an information model that predicts the behavior of an individual person as well as group of people in the situation of solving of social dilemma. It takes into account social relationship, including those caused by experimental influence, gender differences, and individual differences in the strategy for solving cognitive tasks. The model demonstrates the transition of individual actions into socially determined behavior. Evaluation of the effect of socialization associated with the procedure of the game provides additional information about the effectiveness and characteristics of the experimental impact.The paper defines the minimum unit of analysis of the IPD player's strategy in a group, the identity with which can be considered as a variable. It discusses the influence of the experi-mentally formed group identity on the change of preferred strategies in social dilemmas. We use the possibilities of neural networks as means of categorizing the results of the prisoner's iterative dilemma in terms of the strategy applied by the player, as well as social factors. We define the patterns of changes in the IPD player's strategy before and after socialization are determined. The paper discusses the questions of real player's inclination to use IPD solution strategies in their pure form or to use the same strategy before and after experimental inter-ventions related to social identity formation. It is shown that experimentally induced socialization can be considered as a mechanism for increasing the degree of certainty in the choice of strategies when solving IPD task. It is found out that the models based on neural networks turn out to be more efficient after experi-mentally evoked social identity in a group of 6 people; and the models based on neural net-works are least effective in the case of predicting a subject's belonging to a gender group. When solving IPD problems by real people, it turns out to be possible to talk about generalized strategies that take into account not only the evolutionary properties of «pure» strategies, but also reflect various social factors.

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (23n24) ◽  
pp. 4035-4040 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M. HUI ◽  
CHEN XU ◽  
DA-FANG ZHENG

We study the effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in an evolutionary snowdrift game, which is a possible alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma game. The model is studied in the Newman-Watts network that spans the regular, small-world, and random networks through randomly added links. For a wide range of payoffs, the added links are found to suppress cooperation, when compared with a well-mixed or fully connected system. We identify extinction payoffs that characterize the emergence of a homogeneous steady state and study how these payoffs depend on the extent of addition of links to the network.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (94) ◽  
pp. 20131186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Cimini ◽  
Angel Sánchez

Cooperative behaviour lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, recent experimental findings on networked Prisoner's Dilemma games suggest that conditional cooperation also depends on the previous action of the player—namely on the ‘mood’ in which the player is currently in. Roughly, a majority of people behave as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past, whereas they ignore the context and free ride with high probability if they did not. However, the ultimate origin of this behaviour represents a conundrum itself. Here, we aim specifically to provide an evolutionary explanation of moody conditional cooperation (MCC). To this end, we perform an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics for players' behavioural traits—ranging from standard processes used in game theory based on pay-off comparison to others that include non-economic or social factors. Our results show that only a dynamic built upon reinforcement learning is able to give rise to evolutionarily stable MCC, and at the end to reproduce the human behaviours observed in the experiments.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Wang Liming ◽  
Feng Wu

We study the effects of empty sites in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on social diversity by introducing some empty sites into a square lattice. The results reveal that the empty sites dramatically enhance the cooperation level for a wide range of temptation to defection values if two types of players coexist. By calculating the chances of different type-combinations of the players located on the square lattice, we find that there is an intermediate region where five social ranks are induced to satisfy the certain rank distributions and the cooperation level is significantly enhanced. Moreover, simulation results also show that the moderate gaps among the social ranks can favor cooperation for a larger occupation density.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650039
Author(s):  
Yong Li ◽  
Chen Xu ◽  
Jie Liu ◽  
Pak Ming Hui

We propose and study the competitiveness of a class of adaptive zero-determinant strategies (ZDSs) in a population with spatial structure against four classic strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Besides strategy updating via a probabilistic mechanism by imitating the strategy of a better performing opponent, players using the ZDSs can also adapt their strategies to take advantage of their local competing environment with another probability. The adapted ZDSs could be extortionate-like to avoid being continually cheated by defectors or to take advantage of unconditional cooperators. The adapted ZDSs could also be a compliance strategy so as to cooperate with the conditionally cooperative players. This flexibility makes adaptive ZDSs more competitive than nonadaptive ZDSs. Results show that adaptive ZDSs can either dominate over other strategies or at least coexist with them when the ZDSs are allowed to adapt more readily than to imitate other strategies. The effectiveness of the adaptive ZDSs relies on how fast they can adapt to the competing environment before they are replaced by other strategies. The adaptive ZDSs generally work well as they could adapt gradually and make use of other strategies for suppressing their enemies. When adaptation happens more readily than imitation for the ZDSs, they outperform other strategies over a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratios.


1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.


Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.


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