scholarly journals Causation and mnemonic roles: on Fernández’s Functionalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-153
Author(s):  
Nikola Andonovski
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
Causal Theories

Debates about causation have dominated recent philosophy of memory. While causal theorists have argued that an appropriate causal connection to a past experience is necessary for remembering, their opponents have argued that this necessity condition needs to be relaxed. Recently, Jordi Fernández (2018; 2019) has attempted to provide such a relaxation. On his functionalist theory of remembering, a given state need not be caused by a past experience to qualify as a memory; it only has to realize the relevant functional role in the subject’s mental economy. In this comment, I argue that Fernández’s theory doesn’t advance the debate about memory causation. I propose that this debate is best understood as being about the existence of systems, which support kinds of interactions that map onto the relations dictated by (causal) theories. Since Fernández’s functionalism tells us very little about this empirical question, the theoretical gains from endorsing it are minimal.

Causal Theories of Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Costa
Keyword(s):  
Intentional State ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Bodily Movement ◽  
Composite Event ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Bodily Movements

Causal theories of action are attempts to develop an account of actions in terms of events (typically bodily movements and their effects) which have the right kind of causal ancestry. The causal ancestry must be traced back to some kind of intentional state (or combination of intentional states) in the agent, such intentional state (or states) must have the right kind of content, and it must cause the bodily movement (or other effect) in the ‘right’ way. Causal accounts differ on the nature of the intentional state, the nature of the content it must have, and the specification of the ‘right’ kind of causal connection to bodily movements or other effects. Causal accounts also differ on the identification of the action itself. Some acounts say that the action is the bodily movement, provided that it was caused in the right way and had the right kind of effects. Others identify the action with the triggering intentional state (called a volition or trying), provided that it has the right kind of effects. Yet others identify the action with the composite event of the intentional state's causing the appropriate effects. Finally there are those which fail to identify the action with any of these events or combinations of them.

QUALIA AIN'T OUT HERE EITHER

Think ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (54) ◽  
pp. 31-35
Author(s):  
Christopher Searle
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Spatial Proximity ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Functionalist Theory ◽  
The Right

What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.

scholarly journals Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination

2021 ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
André Sant'Anna
Keyword(s):  
Causal Connection ◽  
Past Event ◽  
Causal Connections ◽  
Recent Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) have suggested that the dispute over the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory.

Prospects for a Causal Theory of Knowledge

1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-473
Author(s):  
Philip P. Hanson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Knowing is something that we do not have much of a theory about. (H. Putman, “The Analytic and the Synthetic,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3 (1962), p. 365.)Interest has recently been shown in causal theories of perception, memory, inference, reference, truth, justification and belief, as well as in a more general “causal theory of knowledge” which would embrace and connect all of these concepts within a broad epistemological framework. The burden of this paper is that prospects are poor for an interesting and general enough causal theory of knowledge. A threat to generality arises from the causal theory's difficulties with knowledge of general truths. A threat to interest arises when attempts to accommodate general truths lead to a weakening of the notion of “causal connection” appealed to, making dubious the explanatory force of such an appeal.

Above and beyond the content: Feelings influence mental simulations

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellen Mrkva ◽  
Luca Cian ◽  
Leaf Van Boven
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representation ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Prediction Errors

Abstract Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist despite substantial experience.

Statistics and parallaxes

1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
T. E. Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Design ◽  
Statistical Methods ◽  
Review Paper ◽  
Systematic Errors ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Random Errors ◽  
Trigonometric Parallaxes ◽  
Systematic And Random Errors

This review paper deals with the use of statistical methods to evaluate systematic and random errors associated with trigonometric parallaxes. First, systematic errors which arise when using trigonometric parallaxes to calibrate luminosity systems are discussed. Next, determination of the external errors of parallax measurement are reviewed. Observatory corrections are discussed. Schilt’s point, that as the causes of these systematic differences between observatories are not known the computed corrections can not be applied appropriately, is emphasized. However, modern parallax work is sufficiently accurate that it is necessary to determine observatory corrections if full use is to be made of the potential precision of the data. To this end, it is suggested that a prior experimental design is required. Past experience has shown that accidental overlap of observing programs will not suffice to determine observatory corrections which are meaningful.

Life Beyond 1MeV

1980 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 30-33
Author(s):  
K.H. Westmacott
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microscopy ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Good Case ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The U.S

Life beyond 1MeV – like life after 40 – is not too different unless one takes advantage of past experience and is receptive to new opportunities. At first glance, the returns on performing electron microscopy at voltages greater than 1MeV diminish rather rapidly as the curves which describe the well-known advantages of HVEM often tend towards saturation. However, in a country with a significant HVEM capability, a good case can be made for investing in instruments with a range of maximum accelerating voltages. In this regard, the 1.5MeV KRATOS HVEM being installed in Berkeley will complement the other 650KeV, 1MeV, and 1.2MeV instruments currently operating in the U.S. One other consideration suggests that 1.5MeV is an optimum voltage machine – Its additional advantages may be purchased for not much more than a 1MeV instrument. On the other hand, the 3MeV HVEM's which seem to be operated at 2MeV maximum, are much more expensive.

Combining Defaults and Transparency Information to Increase Policy Compliance

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 354-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yavor Paunov ◽  
Michaela Wänke ◽  
Tobias Vogel
Keyword(s):  
Independent Effect ◽  
Online Experiment ◽  
Policy Compliance ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

Abstract. Combining the strengths of defaults and transparency information is a potentially powerful way to induce policy compliance. Despite negative theoretical predictions, a recent line of research revealed that default nudges may become more effective if people are informed why they should exhibit the targeted behavior. Yet, it is an open empirical question whether the increase in compliance came from setting a default and consequently disclosing it, or the provided information was sufficient to deliver the effect on its own. Results from an online experiment indicate that both defaulting and transparency information exert a statistically independent effect on compliance, with highest compliance rates observed in the combined condition. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

Y2K: Conspiracies, Trust and Past Experience

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Charves ◽  
Amy Clemens
Keyword(s):  
Past Experience
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document