scholarly journals Technocratic Populism à la Française? The Roots and Mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s Success

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 545-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Perottino ◽  
Petra Guasti

This article focuses on the roots and mechanisms of Macron’s success, arguing that in 2017 two conditions were essential in Macron’s rise—the implosion of the established system of the French Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic competence that won him the presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left–right cleavage and, as a result, has a broader appeal than its left- and right-wing counterparts. Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the (crumbling) system and positioning himself as an outsider—refusing the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruitment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron and <em>La Republique en Marche</em> attempted to create new forms of responsiveness by ‘giving voice to the people,’ while relying on technocratic competence as a legitimation mechanism. In power Emmanuel Macron attempts to balance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti &amp; Buštíková, 2020).

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 656-676
Author(s):  
Igor V. Omeliyanchuk

The article examines the main forms and methods of agitation and propagandistic activities of monarchic parties in Russia in the beginning of the 20th century. Among them the author singles out such ones as periodical press, publication of books, brochures and flyers, organization of manifestations, religious processions, public prayers and funeral services, sending deputations to the monarch, organization of public lectures and readings for the people, as well as various philanthropic events. Using various forms of propagandistic activities the monarchists aspired to embrace all social groups and classes of the population in order to organize all-class and all-estate political movement in support of the autocracy. While they gained certain success in promoting their ideology, the Rights, nevertheless, lost to their adversaries from the radical opposition camp, as the monarchists constrained by their conservative ideology, could not promise immediate social and political changes to the population, and that fact was excessively used by their opponents. Moreover, the ideological paradigm of the Right camp expressed in the “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” formula no longer agreed with the social and economic realities of Russia due to modernization processes that were underway in the country from the middle of the 19th century.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-653
Author(s):  
Gennadiy N. Mokshin

This article reconstructs the cultural doctrine of the famous publicist of populism (narodnichestvo), I.I. Kablits (Yuzov). To just equate Kablits views with the slogan of yuzovshchina would be a narrow interpretation of his kul'turnichestvo; the slogan is characteristic for extreme right-wing populism during the upsurge of the revolutionary populist movement (narodovol'cheskoe dvizhenie). In 1880, Kablits was the first of the legal populists to pose the question, What is populism? According to the publicist, true narodnichestvo should be based on the principle that the forms of public life of the people must be in conformity with the development level of their consciousness. The author explains Kablits evolution from Bakunism to a peasant-centered narodnichestvo by his interpretation of the reasons for the split between the intelligentsia and the people. Kablits considered them antagonists, and defined the ultimate goal of the narodniki as the liberation of the people from the power of the intellectualbureaucratic minority, the latter supposedly trying to subjugate the life of the masses to its will. The article analyzes the main provisions of Kablits sociocultural concept of social transformations: apolitism, populism, and the initiative of the masses. The article identifies the differences between his program of developing the cultural identity of the people, on the one hand, and other populists' understanding of the tasks of cultural work, on the other. Particular attention is paid to Kablits-Yuzov's attitude towards the problem of educating the masses. Kablits was one of the few Russian populists who opposed the idea that the foundations of the worldview of the people must be changed, arguing that this would eliminate the traditional moral values of the village, including the sense of collectivism. The author assesses how Kablits, the leading publicist of the newspaper Nedelya, contributed to the establishment of a cultural direction in narodnichestvo at the turn of the 1870s and 1880s. According to the author, Kablits played a leading role in shaping the ideology of the right flank of the cultural direction in narodnichestvo. However, the pure populism of Kablits turned out to be too pseudo-scientific, dogmatic and irrational to attract the democratic intelligentsia for a long time; the latter had already become disillusioned with the idea of the people as the creator of new forms of social life.


Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-53
Author(s):  
Magdalena Nowicka-Franczak

This article revisits the category of self-criticism, which, as a speech act, plays a special role in the discourse of the intelligentsia, emerging from the peripheral status of Poland and from the imperative to catch up with the West. In contemporary Poland, self-criticism has revived as a discursive strategy in the context of coming to terms with the democratic transformation. For the right-wing intelligentsia, self-criticism is mainly a postulate that is addressed to political adversaries. For the left-liberal intelligentsia, self-criticism is not only a political weapon but also a strategy of introspective enunciation directed at the post-transformation society. A qualitative discourse analysis of selected acts of self-criticism performed by Polish left-liberal elites between 2013 and 2019 highlights two interconnected conflict-generating fields of debate: (1) reckoning with the neoliberal and pro-Western model of the 1989 democratic transition and (2) retribution on the post-transition intellectual elites that patronized the people and the attribution of responsibility for the Elite-People Division. The distinguished functions of self-criticism point to the political and class conflict as well as to the growing delegitimacy of the dominance of the neoliberal narrative about the Polish model of modernization.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-334
Author(s):  
Viktor Pál ◽  
Leonardo Valenzuela Perez

Authoritarian regimes are often seen to be hostile toward the environment, albeit there is a growing body of literature suggesting a more nuanced image when it comes to authoritarian governments and the environment. However, several aspects of human-nature relationship need further clarification in non-democratic systems, both on the political left and right. In this article we aim to address that challenge by analysing Cold War economic and environmental goals and responses of the right-wing military junta in Chile under Pinochet and the Hungarian state-socialist, USSR-satellite regime under Kádár. By analysing two radically different political and economic approaches to economic catchup, while mitigating environmental costs on the way, this study aims to understand better the ecological motivations in authoritarian regimes operating diverse political and economic agendas.


2002 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alistair Cole

The 2002 Elections In France Were A Gripping Drama Unfolding in four acts. Each act has to be understood as part of a whole, as each election was ultimately dependent upon the results of the first round of the presidential election on 21 April. However untypical in the context of Fifth Republican history, the first round of the presidential election strongly inf luenced the peculiar course of the subsequent contests. The outcome of the first election on the 21 April – at which the far-right leader Jean-Marie Le Pen won through to the second ballot against Jacques Chirac, narrowly distancing the outgoing premier Lionel Jospin – created an electric shock which reverberated around the streets of Paris and other French cities and sparked a civic mobilization without parallel since May '68. The end-result of this exceptional republican mobilization was to secure the easy (initially rather unexpected) re-election of Chirac as president at the second round two weeks later. The election of 5 May was unlike a typical second-round election. Rather than a bipolar contest pitting left and right over a choice of future governmental orientations, it was a plebiscite in favour of democracy (hence Chirac) against the far-right (Le Pen). Chirac was re-elected overwhelmingly as president, supported by at least as many leftwing as right-wing voters. This enforced plebiscite against the extreme right allowed a resurgent Jacques Chirac to claim a renewed presidential authority. At the parliamentary election of 9 and 16 June, the Fifth Republic reverted to a more traditional mode of operation, as a new ‘presidential party’, informally launched just weeks before the elections, obtained a large overall majority of seats to ‘support the President’ in time-honoured Fifth Republican tradition.


Politik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Silas L. Marker

This paper examines the phenomenon of right-wing populism in Denmark in the year of 2019 by applying qualitative discourse analysis to a sample of central public texts from the right-wing populist parties New Right and The Danish People’s Party. Both parties utilize populist discourse by constructing a popular bloc (“the people”) stabilized by its constitutive outside: The elite and the Muslim immigrants. However, the discourses of the two parties differ from each other insofar as New Right articulates the strongest antagonism between the people and the elite, while The Danish People’s Party downplays this antagonism, most likely because the party has a central power position in Danish politics. 


Significance However, as opinion polls show that contending left- and right-wing party blocs are closer in terms of voting intentions, the government's performance and ability to collaborate with smaller parties remain key to the left’s ability to return for another term in office. Impacts Tight electoral competition between left and right points to a couple of years of political uncertainty for international investors. In the event of an early election, the most plausible scenario is a coalition of the centre-right People's Party and far-right Vox. The People's Party’s move further to the right could open space for the liberal Ciudadanos party to reclaim centrist support.


1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jarzombek

Joseph Goebbels' famous claim about the connection between politics and art in his letter to Wilhelm Furtwängler in 1933 epitomizes Nazi theories concerning the cultural benefits of art. In it he attempts both to legitimize and cunningly obscure an underlying reactionary agenda: We who are giving form to modern German politics, see ourselves as artists to whom has been assigned the great responsibility of forming, from out of the brute mass, the solid and full image of the people. Though there are many studies of post-World War I cultural aesthetics, especially in the context of Hitler's final solution, little has been done to trace that concept back to its nonreactionary, Wilhelmine roots. This paper, which looks at the discourse on cultural aesthetics as it emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century, also challenges some received notions about the Werkbund, an organization of artists, architects, and industrialists founded in 1907. With the Werkbund, the utopian potential of cultural aesthetics that emerged in the context of liberal bourgeois theory long before it was co-opted by the right wing revealed itself for the first time as a powerful instrument of cultural definition. This paper will also discuss some of the early formulators of Wilhelmine cultural aesthetics in various disciplines, Karl Scheffler (art critic), Heinrich Waentig (economist), Hermann Muthesius (architect), and Georg Fuchs (playwright), among others.


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