scholarly journals The Cultural Populism of Iosif I. Kablits (Yuzov) and its Foundations

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-653
Author(s):  
Gennadiy N. Mokshin

This article reconstructs the cultural doctrine of the famous publicist of populism (narodnichestvo), I.I. Kablits (Yuzov). To just equate Kablits views with the slogan of yuzovshchina would be a narrow interpretation of his kul'turnichestvo; the slogan is characteristic for extreme right-wing populism during the upsurge of the revolutionary populist movement (narodovol'cheskoe dvizhenie). In 1880, Kablits was the first of the legal populists to pose the question, What is populism? According to the publicist, true narodnichestvo should be based on the principle that the forms of public life of the people must be in conformity with the development level of their consciousness. The author explains Kablits evolution from Bakunism to a peasant-centered narodnichestvo by his interpretation of the reasons for the split between the intelligentsia and the people. Kablits considered them antagonists, and defined the ultimate goal of the narodniki as the liberation of the people from the power of the intellectualbureaucratic minority, the latter supposedly trying to subjugate the life of the masses to its will. The article analyzes the main provisions of Kablits sociocultural concept of social transformations: apolitism, populism, and the initiative of the masses. The article identifies the differences between his program of developing the cultural identity of the people, on the one hand, and other populists' understanding of the tasks of cultural work, on the other. Particular attention is paid to Kablits-Yuzov's attitude towards the problem of educating the masses. Kablits was one of the few Russian populists who opposed the idea that the foundations of the worldview of the people must be changed, arguing that this would eliminate the traditional moral values of the village, including the sense of collectivism. The author assesses how Kablits, the leading publicist of the newspaper Nedelya, contributed to the establishment of a cultural direction in narodnichestvo at the turn of the 1870s and 1880s. According to the author, Kablits played a leading role in shaping the ideology of the right flank of the cultural direction in narodnichestvo. However, the pure populism of Kablits turned out to be too pseudo-scientific, dogmatic and irrational to attract the democratic intelligentsia for a long time; the latter had already become disillusioned with the idea of the people as the creator of new forms of social life.

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. 656-676
Author(s):  
Igor V. Omeliyanchuk

The article examines the main forms and methods of agitation and propagandistic activities of monarchic parties in Russia in the beginning of the 20th century. Among them the author singles out such ones as periodical press, publication of books, brochures and flyers, organization of manifestations, religious processions, public prayers and funeral services, sending deputations to the monarch, organization of public lectures and readings for the people, as well as various philanthropic events. Using various forms of propagandistic activities the monarchists aspired to embrace all social groups and classes of the population in order to organize all-class and all-estate political movement in support of the autocracy. While they gained certain success in promoting their ideology, the Rights, nevertheless, lost to their adversaries from the radical opposition camp, as the monarchists constrained by their conservative ideology, could not promise immediate social and political changes to the population, and that fact was excessively used by their opponents. Moreover, the ideological paradigm of the Right camp expressed in the “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” formula no longer agreed with the social and economic realities of Russia due to modernization processes that were underway in the country from the middle of the 19th century.


Author(s):  
Weichzhen` Gao

The basic principles of SCS implementation are as follows: Formation of sustainable social structure and its operational management; Monitoring and correction of social transformations and behavior of the general population: transparency as a major factor in the life of an innovative society; Stimulating competition as a motivation for success. Due to the transparency of social life, different patterns of behavior in different conditions are published in the information space of the society. Accordingly, actionable life scenarios are made available to the general public, which is fulfilling an educational mission regarding adaptation mechanisms in an innovative society; the SCS system is a significant component of the national strategy of integration and consolidation of the Chinese innovation society; carrying out softpolicy foreign policy: The positive experience of the Chinese innovation society in implementing SCS is a prerequisite for expanding its area of application in Asian, African and Latin American countries, especially the countries participating in the One Belt One Road project. SCS covers all spheres of social life of the modern Chinese citizen, forms a sustainable form of accountability to the society for the content and flow of their daily activities, aspirations and preferences.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Wodak

Abstract In this paper, I discuss the attempt by all right-wing populist parties to create, on the one hand, the ‘real’ and ‘true’ people; and on the other, the ‘élites’ or ‘the establishment’ who are excluded from the true demos. Such divisions, as will be elaborated in detail, have emerged in many societies over centuries and decades. A brief example of the arbitrary construction of opposing groups illustrates the intricacies of such populist reasoning. Furthermore, I pose the question why such divisions resonate so well in many countries? I argue that – apart from a politics of fear (Wodak 2015) – much resentment is evoked which could be viewed as both accompanying as well as a reaction to the disenchantment with politics and the growing inequalities in globalized capitalist societies.


PALAPA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-284
Author(s):  
Nurhadi Nurhadi ◽  
Mawardi Dalimunthe

The purpose of this study is to find out the concept of khilafah according to Sayyid Quthub and Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, differences and legal basis. This study is a library model, with primary data sources, the Zhilalal-Qur'anic Tafseer and Nizham Al-Hukmi Fi Al-Islam and qualitative descriptive analysis methods. The result is the thought of the concept of khilafah according to sayyid Quthub: 1). The concept of the ruler / caliph, that who becomes the ruler of the choice of the Muslims, acts in absolute freedom, but that person gets the authority because he constantly applies the law of Allah Almighty. 2). The Islamic government system, the Supra Nasional government (the unity of the entire Islamic world). 3). The pillars of his Islamic government: a). Justice of the ruler; b). People's obedience; c). Consultation between the people and the authorities. Thought of the concept of the Caliphate according to Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani: 1). The concept of the ruler / caliph is a person who represents the Ummah in government affairs and power and in applying syara 'laws. 2). The system of government is khilafah. 3). The pillars of his Islamic government: a). Sovereignty in the hands of syara '; b). Power of the people; c). To appoint a legal Caliph fardlu for all Muslims; d). Only Khailfah has the right to carry out tabanni (adoption) against syara 'laws; e) The Caliph has the right to make constitutions and all other laws. The differences in the concept of khilafah are both: 1). According to Sayyid Quthub, if the ruler fails, then the ruler can be dismissed if the Muslims are no longer satisfied with him. This statement gives a signal that the people get rid of the rulers who no longer fulfill their functions (zhalim rulers). It is different from the opinion of Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani. An Amir al-mu'minin (Khalifah), even though he is responsible before the people and his representatives, but the people and their representatives are not entitled to dismiss him. Nor will the Caliph be dismissed, except when deviating from Shara law. The one who determined the dismissal was only the Mazhalim court. 2). The system of Islamic government according to Sayyid Quthub does not question any system of government in accordance with the system of conditions of society, but this government is characterized by respect for the supremacy of Islamic law (shari'ah). Whereas According to Taqiyuddin Al-Nabhani that the system of Islamic government is khilafah. 3). The pillars of Islamic government according to Sayyid Quthub and Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani, points three parts a and b at the above conclusions are: 1). Sayyid Quthub: a). Justice of the ruler; b). People's obedience; c). Consultation between the people and the authorities. 2). Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani: a). Sovereignty in the hands of syara; b). Power of the people; c). To appoint a legal Caliph fardlu for all Muslims; d). Only Khailfah has the right to do tabanni (adoption) against the laws of shara; e). The Caliph has the right to make constitutions and all other laws. The legal bases for determining the Caliphate according to both: 1). The legal basis for the establishment of the Caliphate according to Sayyid Quthub: 1). Ruler, Qur'an Surah (2) al-Baqarah verse 30; 2). Islamic Government System, Qur'an Surah (24) an-Nur verse 55; 3). Pillars of Islamic Government, Qur'an Surah (4) an-Nisa 'verse 58. 2). The legal basis for the establishment of the Caliphate according to Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani: 1). Ruler, hadith of Muslim history from Abu Said Al khudri, Hadith no. 1853 and Muslims from Abdullah Bin Amru Bin Ash, Hadith no. 1844; 2). Islamic Government System, Al-Qur'an surah an-Nisa '(4) verse 59, an-Nisa' (4) verse 65. Muslim, saheeh Muslim, volumes, 3 pp., 1459 and 1480; 3). Islamic Pillars of Government al-Qur'an surah An-Nisa (3) verse 65, and Surah An-Nisa (3) verses': 5.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Biedenkopf

European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU’s level of ambition, stirring some turbulence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament’s climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identifies three distinct policy narratives: <em>Poland is in a unique situation</em>, <em>Poland pursues an alternative pathway</em>, and <em>climate policy endangers competitiveness</em>. The <em>alternative pathway</em> narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the <em>unique situation</em> narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland’s uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party’s narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-53
Author(s):  
Magdalena Nowicka-Franczak

This article revisits the category of self-criticism, which, as a speech act, plays a special role in the discourse of the intelligentsia, emerging from the peripheral status of Poland and from the imperative to catch up with the West. In contemporary Poland, self-criticism has revived as a discursive strategy in the context of coming to terms with the democratic transformation. For the right-wing intelligentsia, self-criticism is mainly a postulate that is addressed to political adversaries. For the left-liberal intelligentsia, self-criticism is not only a political weapon but also a strategy of introspective enunciation directed at the post-transformation society. A qualitative discourse analysis of selected acts of self-criticism performed by Polish left-liberal elites between 2013 and 2019 highlights two interconnected conflict-generating fields of debate: (1) reckoning with the neoliberal and pro-Western model of the 1989 democratic transition and (2) retribution on the post-transition intellectual elites that patronized the people and the attribution of responsibility for the Elite-People Division. The distinguished functions of self-criticism point to the political and class conflict as well as to the growing delegitimacy of the dominance of the neoliberal narrative about the Polish model of modernization.


1990 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
Joe Latakgomo

The political scene in South Africa today is perhaps one of the most complex in the modern world. The easiest analysis would be to have the white minority government on the one hand, and the back resistance and liberation organizations ranged against it on the other. Unfortunately, it is not that easy. The white minority itself is torn by divisions and differences in ideology, with essentially two divisions into the right-wing and the centrists. Both camps, however, are themselves divided into various notches on the scale to the right, but never beyond to the left of centrist. That position has been reserved for black politics, which is also positioned at various points on the scale to the left.


2021 ◽  
pp. 310-312

This chapter examines Hanna Yablonka's Children by the Book, Biography of a Generation: The First Native Israelis Born 1948–1955 (2018). This book is unique in that it is neither politically committed to nationalist political slogans that are thrown daily into the arena of Israeli politics in the days of Netanyahu nor connected to the one-dimensional, sweeping condemnation of critics of the Israeli enterprise on the Right and Left. Instead, it suggests to set aside, even if only for a moment, what Yablonka calls “the current Israeli discourse, which furiously shatters everything that has happened in the state since it was established, brutally erasing all the achievements of Little Israel.” Yabonka is guided by Karl Mannheim's concept of a “historical generation”: a group in which there is a shared historical consciousness derived from historical experience. She shows how the state educational system fashioned the image of the new Israeli, endowing children with a local, native identity and imbuing them with the consciousness of belonging both to the people and to the land.


2020 ◽  
Vol 249 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-52
Author(s):  
Julio Cesar Magalhães de Oliveira

Abstract The objective of this article is to place the study of urban protest and violence in the period from about 300 to about 600 CE in a broader perspective and to subject the investigation of plebeian activism to the basic precepts of analysis of collective action developed by social scientists and historians studying other periods. Its main argument is that, contrary to wide held assumptions in the historiography, what characterized Late Antiquity was not simply the exacerbation of violence or its tighter control, but the crisis of aristocratic hegemony and the expansion of opportunities for popular intervention in city life. What has been perceived as the product fanaticism, irrationality and deprivation of the masses, of the manipulation of bishops and aristocrats or of the failure of the mechanisms of coercion was actually the result of a dramatic social change that, on the one hand, involved a new dynamic of power and, on the other, a shift in the way the people understood their role and power in local communities.


Race & Class ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-71
Author(s):  
Campaign For Social Democracy

While a stalemate in the predominantly Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka continues despite Indian intervention on the government's behalf, in the Sinhala South death squads associated with the pseudo People's Liberation Front, the JVP, have been ruthlessly eliminating its opponents. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), having created and nurtured popular racism for over thirty years in order to get into power (through a ready-made Sinhalese majority of 70 per cent of the population), * would now like to draw back from the brink of another crippling civil war, this time in the South. But they are unable to do so because the JVP has taken up the Sinhala cause and pushed it to the point of social fascism through assassination and murder. Popular racism based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoted in the schools and expressed in song, textbook and media served to fuel the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, in which thousands were killed at the hands of street mobs. Some of the most violently anti- Tamil propaganda (deriving inspiration from mythical Sinhalese history) has emanated from the present government. Colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese was justified on the pretext of protecting ancient Buddhist shrines. And it is an open secret that ministers hired their own hit squads in the 1983 pogrom. When, in a bid to end the unwinnable war with the Tamils, the UNP signed the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, allowing Indian troops to operate on Sri Lankan soil, it alienated the very Sinhala nationalists it had itself fostered. And it was the JVP which capitalised on the resentment over India's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Accusing the UNP government (and other supporters of the Accord) of treachery, it enlarged and deepened popular racism into fanatical patriotism. But what has given the JVP terror tactics a hold over the population has been the steady erosion of democratic freedoms, on the one hand, and the self-abasement of the Left, on the other. Both the SLFP and UNP governments have postponed elections to stay in power, but the UNP went further and got itself re-elected en bloc on a phoney referendum to postpone elections. Local elections were never held under the SLFP and whatever elections took place under the UNP have either been rigged and/or carried out under conditions of massive intimidation. In the process, the political literacy that the country once boasted has been lost to the people and, with it, their will to resist. At the same time the collaborationist politics of the Left in the SLFP government of 1970-77 have not only served to decimate its own chances at the polls (it obtained not a single seat in the election of 1977) but also to leave the working-class movement defenceless. So that it was a simple matter for the UNP government to crush the general strike of 1980, imprison its leaders and throw 80, 000 workers permanently out of work. And it has been left to the JVP to pretend to take up the socialist mantle of the Left even as it devotes itself to the racist cause of the Right, and so win the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist people. In the final analysis the choice before the country is that of two terrors: that of the state or that of the JVP. Below we publish an analysis of the situation as at October 1988, put out by the underground Campaign for Social Democracy in the run up to the presidential elections.


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