scholarly journals PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MENTALISTIC LOGIC

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-43
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Petik
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Phenomenological Study ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
General Structure ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rational Behavior

Paper deals with philosophical problems of mentalistic logic. Mentalistic logic is a formal system that concentrates on underpinning processes of mental life instead of certain elements of extrinsic rational behavior as most of existing logics (like BDI calculi) do. The project is compared to the existing logics of actions. Mentalistic logic is patually a formal system and partually phenomenological study of human mind. We presume formal signs such as propositions and modal operators refer to mental states and can describe the general structure of mental activity. That is purely the approach of classical phenomenology – the study of experience and its structures. On the other hand the usage of formal logic is a classic analytic philosophy of mind. So the things are getting more complicated when taking in consideration that the initial framework of a study is analytic philosophy and not continental phenomenology. Phenomenology is of different intellectual and methodological tradition than any type of analytic philosophy including analytic philosophy of mind. From that stanpoint it may be said that paper is also interesting as a purely methodological project – it tries to find bridges between phenomenology and philosophy of mind. As for the action logics, mentalistic logic also studies rational behavior but does it on the other lever and often with a different purpose. The main problem in this case is philosophical interpretation of modality. Minor problems include shared content, many leveled self-referential structures and vagueness. The paper also studies brain in a vatt thought experiment as a methodological concept. The research will have implications for philosophy of logic, artificial intelligence and theory of reference.

Metaphysics of Mind

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darragh Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Phenomena ◽  
Metaphysics Of Mind

Philosophy of mind addresses fundamental questions about mental or psychological phenomena. The question held by many to be most fundamental of all is a metaphysical one, often labeled the “mind-body problem,” which concerns the relation between minds and material or physical phenomena. Physicalists (and/or materialists) contend that mental phenomena are physical, or at least that they may be accounted for in terms of physical phenomena (brains, for example). Dualists deny this, maintaining that mental phenomena have fundamentally nonphysical natures, so that to account for minds we must assume the existence of nonphysical substances or properties. Nowadays physicalism is more widely espoused than dualism, but physicalists differ over which physical states/properties should be considered relevant, and over the precise nature of the relation between physical and mental phenomena. This is one of four bibliography entries on the philosophy of mind, and this particular entry concentrates on this metaphysical issue of the relation between mental and physical/material phenomena. Inevitably, there is a good deal of overlap between this and topics covered in the other three entries. For example, this entry includes authors who attack physicalism by arguing that it cannot account for the distinctive phenomenal qualities of conscious experiences; but that line of antiphysicalist argument features even more prominently in the entry on consciousness. Moreover, the other entries feature various issues that might perfectly properly be categorized as concerning the metaphysics of mind: for example, the debate between internalists—philosophers who hold that propositional attitudes (mental states such as beliefs and desires, which have representational contents) are intrinsic properties of minds/brains—and externalists, who think of certain attitudes as extrinsic or relational, is surely a question about the metaphysics of mind: but this is discussed in the entry on intentionality instead of here.

Beckett and the Cognitive Method

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bernini
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Modeling Technology ◽  
Dialogic Interaction ◽  
The Mind

How can literature enhance, parallel or reassess the scientific study of the mind? Or is literature instead limited to the ancillary role of representing cognitive processes? Beckett and the Cognitive Method argues that Beckett’s narrative work, rather than just expressing or rendering cognition and mental states, inaugurates an exploratory use of narrative as an introspective modeling technology (defined as “introspection by simulation”). Through a detailed analysis of Beckett’s entire corpus and published volumes of letters, the book argues that Beckett pioneered a new method of writing to construct (in a mode analogous to scientific inquiry) “models” for the exploration of core laws, processes, and dynamics in the human mind. Marco Bernini integrates models, problems, and interpretive frameworks from contemporary narrative theory, cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind to make a case for Beckett’s modeling practice of a vast array of processes including: the (narrative) illusion of a sense of self, the hallucinatory quality of inner speech, the dialogic interaction with memories and felt presences, the synesthetic nature of inner experience and mental imagery, the developmental cooperation of language and locomotion, the role of moods and emotions as cognitive drives, the layered complexity of the mind, and the emergent quality of consciousness. Beckett and the Cognitive Method also reflects on how Beckett’s “fictional cognitive models” are transformed into reading, auditory, or spectatorial experiences generating through narrative devices insights on which the sciences can only discursively or descriptively report. As such, the study advocates for their relevance to the contemporary scientific debate toward an interdisciplinary co-modeling of cognition.

scholarly journals Internalism and syntax

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matjaž Potrč
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Syntactic Position

The article criticizes the internalist approach to the philosophy of mind. First, it uses Popper's evolutionary grounded thought experiment, to claim that the study of intentional mental states should proceed by accounting far evidence from the surroundings of the organism. Then, the syntactic position in psychological research is presented as being compatible with internalism, as the view that research should be centered on the processes in the organism only. It is then argued that processes inside the organism crucially depend on external factors.

scholarly journals La mente mecánica

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Miguel Suay Belenguer
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Turing Machines ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Gödel’S Theorem

Resumen: La mente humana es capaz de razonar, de manera similar que lo haría un ordenador, sobre cuestiones que son formuladas algorítmicamente, pero tam­bién es capaz de realizar otras funciones que algunos autores consideran que son imposibles de simular por una máquina. Los diferentes respuestas a cómo fun­ciona la mente han sido abordadas por la filosofía de la mente, la lógica, la psico­logía y la neurología, incluso hoy en día por la mecánica cuántica. En este trabajo intentaré realizar un compendio de las algunas teorías que han apoyado por un lado la posibilidad, y por otro la imposibilidad, de una mente mecánica.Palabras clave: filosofía de la mente, intencionalidad, dualismo, maquinas de Tu­ring, Teorema de Gödel. Abstract: Human mind is capable of reasoning, as much as a computer would do, on issues algorithmically formulated, but it is also able to play other roles which are regarded by some authors impossible for a machine to mimic. The different answers to how human mind works have been addressed by philosophy of mind, logics, psychology and neurology, and nowadays even by quantum mechanics. In this paper I will intend to present an overall review of the several theories that have supported on the one hand the feasibility, and on the other hand the impos­sibility, of a mechanical mind.Key words: Philosophy of mind, Intentionality, dualism, Turing machines, Gödel’s theorem. Recibido: 07/09/2011. Aprobado: 10/12/2012. 

scholarly journals FILSAFAT IBN THUFAYL DAN NOVEL HAYY BIN YAQDHAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Muh. Syamsuddin
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
Middle Way ◽  
The One ◽  
Active Intellect ◽  
Life On Earth

Hayy bin Yaqdhan is a treatise aimed at providing a scientific explanation of the beginnings of human life on earth. This treatise is Ibn Thufayl’s presentation of knowledge, which seeks to harmonize Aristotle with Neo-Platonists on the one hand, and Al-Ghazali with Ibn Bajjah on the other. Ibn Thufayl followed the middle way, bridging the gap between the two parties.Hayy bin Yaqdhan is a thought experiment. It was built on Ibn Sina’s thought experiment about “Flying Man” which calls for a living human mind, driven by the Active Intellect, the principle by which God communicates His truth to the human mind and establishes order and intelligence to nature.The findings of Ibn Thufayl’s thought experiment with his fiction is that language, culture, religion, and tradition are not essential for the development of a perfect mind even, perhaps, blocking its progress. This result shows a hard slap for social structures that exist in general and specifically Institutional Islam. Social criticism, which complements Ibn Thufayl’s critical message, is not left implicit. The criticism was explained in the meeting between Hayy bin Yaqdhan and members of a society governed by the religion of prophetic revelation. Ibn Thufayl has expressed Neo-Platonism postulates about religious harmony and philosophy.

Conflicts of Desire

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Ashwell
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Everyday Experience ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
The Mind ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Pushing And Pulling ◽  
Dispositional Properties

In standard presentations of functionalism in the philosophy of mind, it is generally assumed that our mental states determine our behavioral dispositions as a holistic unit. Thus, although our mental states may them-selves conflict, the behavioral dispositions we have in virtue of these mental states do not. On the other hand, the everyday experience of desiring is often that of competing wants pushing and pulling us in different directions. Our ordinary conception of desiring involves thinking of desires as forces that battle against each other, that cause us to feel torn, and that may overpower each other. Such desire conflicts, I will argue, give us reason to think that the behavioral dispositions we have in virtue of having these desires can themselves conflict—the conflict that we experience when we have conflicting desires is mirrored in the conflicting ways that we are disposed to behave. In this paper I develop a metaphysics for the mind that better respects this sort of conflict, and which requires treating dispositional properties as fundamental properties out of which a mind is constructed.

scholarly journals Metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-42
Author(s):  
Alexey S. Pavlov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Demarcation Criterion ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Cognitive Limitations ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Performative Contradiction

This article is dedicated to the metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn. McGinn is known as a main proponent of “new mysterianism” in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. According to mysterianism, we can’t solve the mind-body problem because of the natural cognitive limitations on our side. McGinn’s view on the nature of philosophy is the component of this conception. In general, mysterian metaphilosophy didn’t get enough coverage in the research literature but it deserves a bigger interest. McGinn argues that philosophy is actually a combination of unsolvable problems. He identifies the scientific/philosophical demarcation criterion as the potential solvability for the human mind. However, this metaphilosophical position faces serious difficulties. At first, if the objections of U. Kriegel and D. Dennett are right and the mysterian cognitive closure thesis is not sufficiently proved, then the termination of research on a number of philosophical issues may also be an unreasoned decision. Secondly, there is a threat of performative contradiction. But we could try to explain this contradiction by considering the style of analytic philosophy itself which is characterized by dialogical form and free dealing with the ideas considered as possible options. In the article, the standard methods of historicophilosophical investigation are used including the comparative analysis and the principle of objective analysis of a text in the work with sources.

Composite Subjectivity in Organisms, Organs, and Organizations

2019 ◽  
pp. 189-226
Author(s):  
Luke Roelofs
Keyword(s):  
Corpus Callosum ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cerebral Hemispheres ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Collective Mentality ◽  
Unified Consciousness

This chapter looks at four potential cases of mental combination, to examine what the theory sketched in the previous chapter might say about them. It starts with the “Nation-Brain” thought experiment, originally offered as a reductio ad absurdum of functionalism, where a few billion people agree to collectively simulate a single human mind. It then considers actual human social groups, the ways that they differ from this thought experiment, and the significance of these differences for questions of collective mentality. It next considers the split-brain phenomenon, where patients with a severed corpus callosum seem at times to exhibit two distinct consciousnesses in one head, and then finally comes back to the ordinary human brain, where two cerebral hemispheres, each capable of supporting consciousness without the other, are able to establish richly unified consciousness through their intact corpus callosum.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham A. Singer
Keyword(s):  
General Structure ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Normative Analysis ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Key Features

This chapter introduces the main argument of the book, describing key concepts such as the idea of “norm-governed productivity,” the use of norms to structure cooperation instead of prices. It then defines the concept of the corporation, describing the institution’s key features, and lays out the general structure of the book. Finally, it considers some conceptual and methodological issues that frame the rest of the book: the distinction between economic and political approaches, and the problem of trying to subsume the topic wholly into one or the other; and an argument for why a normative analysis of the corporation has to take certain features of markets and capitalism for granted.

scholarly journals Natural Science and Supernatural Thought Experiments

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
James Robert Brown
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Theological Thought

Religious notions have long played a role in epistemology. Theological thought experiments, in particular, have been effective in a wide range of situations in the sciences. Some of these are merely picturesque, others have been heuristically important, and still others, as I will argue, have played a role that could be called essential. I will illustrate the difference between heuristic and essential with two examples. One of these stems from the Newton–Leibniz debate over the nature of space and time; the other is a thought experiment of my own constructed with the aim of making a case for a more liberal view of evidence in mathematics.

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