scholarly journals Legitimacy challenges of trade and investment agreements from a developing country’s perspective

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-108
Author(s):  
E. Ovuko-Opuco
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
African Continent ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
Trade And Investment ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

The article is devoted to the problems of government regulation and supremacy of law as well as situation of international investment regime in developing countries. The author explores problems of investment treaties and compares existing ways to protect investments on regional level in different countries. There is detailed overview of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. The issues are presented from the perspective of developing countries, in particular the African continent. The general conclusion is that for efficiency development of infrastructure by enhancing industries investments it is necessary to increase regional regulation as well as regionalization of regulatory bodies and agencies.

scholarly journals International Investment Agreements, Human Rights, and Environmental Justice: The Texaco/Chevron Case From the Ecuadorian Amazon

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Pellegrini ◽  
Murat Arsel ◽  
Martí Orta-Martínez ◽  
Carlos F Mena
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Environmental Rights ◽  
Environmental Liabilities ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Abstract The Texaco/Chevron lawsuit, which started in November 1993 and is still being litigated in 2020, is a prominent example of the process of judicialization of environmental conflict. The Ecuadorian plaintiffs claim that the oil company’s operations generated ruinous impacts on the environment and on the development prospects and health of nearby individuals and communities. The tortuous and lengthy judiciary process was further hindered by an arbitration process, an Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanism nested in the Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. The significance of the case goes beyond the specifics of Ecuador and provides further arguments fuelling the protracted legitimacy crisis experienced by International Investment Agreements. The current praxis of Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms is generating an asymmetrical system, protecting the interest of investors, and intruding into the space of human and environmental rights. These issues are resonating with social movements, activist scholars and policy makers who are reacting to the vulnerabilities engendered by International Investment Agreements through multipronged strategies. These asymmetries provide ammunition to resist the signing of new International Investment Agreements, support the inclusion of human and environmental rights safeguards in International Investment Agreements, and contribute to the rationale of pre-empting extractive projects that are likely to produce severe environmental liabilities. Some of the potential ways in which a somewhat more level playing field can be created include, in addition to denouncing investment agreements, transforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms towards a format that can also accommodate the complaints of affected communities or enacting moratoria on extraction projects that are prone to adverse socioenvironmental impacts. Both strategies could prove to be productive avenues towards the achievement of justice.

Canada’s Pro-Ban Stance on Double-Hatting: Playing the Long Game in ISDS Reform?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
CÉLINE LÉVESQUE
Keyword(s):  
Working Group ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Code Of Conduct ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Group Iii ◽  
Investment Promotion ◽  
Long Run ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Investment Agreements

Abstract The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.

Investment Protection in Disputed Maritime Areas

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 828-859
Author(s):  
Peter Tzeng
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Political Risk ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Joint Development ◽  
Investment Protection ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Protection Mechanisms ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
Risk Insurance ◽  
Investment Agreements

Abstract Disputed maritime areas are often sources of valuable natural resources, but they are also often sources of conflict. It is thus important for investors investing in such areas to know the array of investment protection mechanisms available to them. This article examines four such mechanisms (dispute settlement under international investment agreements (IIAs), dispute settlement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dispute settlement under contracts, and political risk insurance) in the context of three scenarios of disputed maritime areas (unregulated areas, joint development areas, and provisionally delimited areas). It concludes that dispute settlement under IIAs and UNCLOS face significant obstacles not only on jurisdiction and admissibility, but also on the merits. As a result, the most practical solution for investors is to rely on dispute settlement under contracts or political risk insurance to protect their investments.

Dispute Settlement in EU International Investment Agreements with Third States: Three Salient Problems

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 551-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Burgstaller
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Investment Agreements

The eu institutions are committed to include investor-State arbitration clauses in eu iias with third States. However, there are at least three unresolved problems in doing so. First, the eu is not, and is unlikely to become, a Contracting Party to the icsid Convention. While this deficiency may be remedied by replicating relevant provisions of the icsid Convention, eu investors cannot benefit from icsid’s institutional clout which could facilitate enforcement of awards. Secondly, there may be problems from an eu law perspective. Arguably, the eu could only include investor-State arbitration clauses in eu iias with third States following a change in eu primary law such that investment tribunals could request a preliminary ruling from the cjeu in accordance with Article 267 tfeu. Thirdly, to date there appears to be no agreement within the eu on the question who will be the proper respondent in an arbitration.

An Overview of Sri Lanka’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Status Quo and Some Insights into Future Modifications

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-318
Author(s):  
Dilini PATHIRANA
Keyword(s):  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Investment Agreements

AbstractSri Lanka is the first country against which a foreign investor has had recourse to international arbitration based on the dispute settlement clause in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This was the case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka. Since then, the country has been challenged twice before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), while its latest encounter was in the case of Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka. In the intervening years between these two cases, Sri Lanka maintained silence and failed to alter its BITs in a global context where the conventional attitude on international investment agreements (IIAs) is being increasingly reconsidered. This paper provides an overview of Sri Lanka’s BITs, which highlights the urgency of reconsidering the country’s investment treaty-making practice. It suggests some modifications to align the country’s investment treaty-making practice with international investment law (IIL) developments.

scholarly journals Regulatory autonomy and regulatory chill in Opinion 1/17

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurens Ankersmit
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
The Eu

This article analyses the aspect of the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17 that focuses on the regulatory autonomy of the Parties to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) to decide on levels of protection of public interests. The European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) introduction of regulatory autonomy under EU law coincides with the wider debate around ‘regulatory chill’ under international investment law. This article finds the ECJ’s concept of regulatory autonomy to be narrower than that of the regulatory chill hypothesis put forward by critics of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). It further analyses the ECJ’s reasoning that the CETA’s investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction to call into question the levels of protection sought by the EU. In so doing, it will critically evaluate the certainty of the ECJ’s promise that there will be no negative effect on public interest decision-making through CETA’s investment chapter. Finally, it will explore the legal consequences of Opinion 1/17 for future awards and investment agreements.

scholarly journals Dispute by Design? Legalization, Backlash, and the Drafting of Investment Agreements

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 919-928
Author(s):  
Tarald Laudal Berge
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Investment Policies ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Agreements

Abstract The investment treaty regime is currently going through extensive reform. Driven by a raft of investor–state dispute settlement cases, states are asking: How should we draft future investment agreements? This article presents the first empirical analysis of what drives risk in investment agreements. Drawing on states’ own reform narratives, and on unique data on the content of over two thousand investment agreements, I analyze how legalization in investment agreements is associated with the risk of attracting investor–state dispute settlement claims. I find that the only legalization dimension that robustly predicts investor–state dispute settlement claims in investment agreements is substantive obligation, and that this risk is not significantly affected by introducing more flexibility or precision. These findings have important implications for states engaged in reform of their international investment policies. Most prominently, they suggest that states should focus more on what substantive clauses they include in their investment agreements, rather than on how these clauses are written.

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