scholarly journals Dispute by Design? Legalization, Backlash, and the Drafting of Investment Agreements

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 919-928
Author(s):  
Tarald Laudal Berge
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Investment Policies ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Investment Agreements

Abstract The investment treaty regime is currently going through extensive reform. Driven by a raft of investor–state dispute settlement cases, states are asking: How should we draft future investment agreements? This article presents the first empirical analysis of what drives risk in investment agreements. Drawing on states’ own reform narratives, and on unique data on the content of over two thousand investment agreements, I analyze how legalization in investment agreements is associated with the risk of attracting investor–state dispute settlement claims. I find that the only legalization dimension that robustly predicts investor–state dispute settlement claims in investment agreements is substantive obligation, and that this risk is not significantly affected by introducing more flexibility or precision. These findings have important implications for states engaged in reform of their international investment policies. Most prominently, they suggest that states should focus more on what substantive clauses they include in their investment agreements, rather than on how these clauses are written.

An Overview of Sri Lanka’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: Status Quo and Some Insights into Future Modifications

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-318
Author(s):  
Dilini PATHIRANA
Keyword(s):  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Global Context ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Investment Law ◽  
Investment Agreements

AbstractSri Lanka is the first country against which a foreign investor has had recourse to international arbitration based on the dispute settlement clause in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This was the case of AAPL v. Sri Lanka. Since then, the country has been challenged twice before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), while its latest encounter was in the case of Deutsche Bank AG v. Sri Lanka. In the intervening years between these two cases, Sri Lanka maintained silence and failed to alter its BITs in a global context where the conventional attitude on international investment agreements (IIAs) is being increasingly reconsidered. This paper provides an overview of Sri Lanka’s BITs, which highlights the urgency of reconsidering the country’s investment treaty-making practice. It suggests some modifications to align the country’s investment treaty-making practice with international investment law (IIL) developments.

International Investment Agreements, 2015–2016

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Coleman Jesse ◽  
Johnson Lise ◽  
Sachs Lisa ◽  
Gupta Kanika
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Right ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers developments in 2015 and 2016 that illustrate trends and features in recent treaty drafting. It first discusses the expanded awareness of, and interest in, the investment regime that has emerged in recent years, followed by the role of ratification in the context of investment treaty drafting and policy. It then discusses four drafting trends: (1) constraining investor access to dispute settlement and limiting arbitral discretion; (2) better protecting the right to regulate; (3) establishing investor obligations; and (4) introducing codes of conduct for decision makers in investment disputes. Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of new provisions regarding the conduct and qualifications of arbitrators, including a glimpse at the EU proposal for a multilateral court.

Once Bitten, Twice Shy? Investment Disputes, State Sovereignty, and Change in Treaty Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 859-880 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Thompson ◽  
Tomer Broude ◽  
Yoram Z. Haftel
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Systematic Investigation ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Investment Agreements

AbstractMore than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) provide foreign investors with substantive protections in host states and access to binding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In recent years, states increasingly have sought to change their treaty commitments through the practices of renegotiation and termination, so far affecting about 300 IIAs. The received wisdom is that this development reflects a “backlash” against the regime and an attempt by governments to reclaim sovereignty, consistent with broader antiglobalization trends. Using new data on the degree to which IIA provisions restrict state regulatory space (SRS), we provide the first systematic investigation into the effect of ISDS experiences on state decisions to adjust their treaties. The empirical analysis indicates that exposure to investment claims leads either to the renegotiation of IIAs in the direction of greater SRS or to their termination. This effect varies, however, with the nature of involvement in ISDS and with respect to different treaty provisions.

scholarly journals International Investment Agreements, Human Rights, and Environmental Justice: The Texaco/Chevron Case From the Ecuadorian Amazon

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Pellegrini ◽  
Murat Arsel ◽  
Martí Orta-Martínez ◽  
Carlos F Mena
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Environmental Rights ◽  
Environmental Liabilities ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Abstract The Texaco/Chevron lawsuit, which started in November 1993 and is still being litigated in 2020, is a prominent example of the process of judicialization of environmental conflict. The Ecuadorian plaintiffs claim that the oil company’s operations generated ruinous impacts on the environment and on the development prospects and health of nearby individuals and communities. The tortuous and lengthy judiciary process was further hindered by an arbitration process, an Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanism nested in the Ecuador—United States Bilateral Investment Treaty. The significance of the case goes beyond the specifics of Ecuador and provides further arguments fuelling the protracted legitimacy crisis experienced by International Investment Agreements. The current praxis of Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms is generating an asymmetrical system, protecting the interest of investors, and intruding into the space of human and environmental rights. These issues are resonating with social movements, activist scholars and policy makers who are reacting to the vulnerabilities engendered by International Investment Agreements through multipronged strategies. These asymmetries provide ammunition to resist the signing of new International Investment Agreements, support the inclusion of human and environmental rights safeguards in International Investment Agreements, and contribute to the rationale of pre-empting extractive projects that are likely to produce severe environmental liabilities. Some of the potential ways in which a somewhat more level playing field can be created include, in addition to denouncing investment agreements, transforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement mechanisms towards a format that can also accommodate the complaints of affected communities or enacting moratoria on extraction projects that are prone to adverse socioenvironmental impacts. Both strategies could prove to be productive avenues towards the achievement of justice.

Human Rights and International Investment Agreements: How to Bridge the Gap?

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 457-483
Author(s):  
Sheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
International Investment ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
Rule Making

Abstract Although an increasing number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) now incorporate the concept of sustainable development, direct reference to human rights is still rare and remains embryonic. A close look at the positions held by some representative groups and countries, including the European Union (EU), the USA, China, India, South Africa, and Mercosur, reveals that the reference to human rights features divergence. The divided positions held by these groups or countries reveal the difficulties of operationalizing human rights obligations into international investment rule making. Even among developed countries or economies, a consistent approach to human rights is yet to be found. Based on these observations, this article proposes a number of pragmatic solutions to bridge the gap between these divided positions. In order to synergize international investment treaty regimes on human rights, internal engagement, including the reform of BIT dispute settlement regimes, and external engagement, including dialogues among stakeholders, should be made.

Canada’s Pro-Ban Stance on Double-Hatting: Playing the Long Game in ISDS Reform?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
CÉLINE LÉVESQUE
Keyword(s):  
Working Group ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Code Of Conduct ◽  
International Investment ◽  
Group Iii ◽  
Investment Promotion ◽  
Long Run ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Investment Agreements

Abstract The practice of arbitrators and counsel in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases simultaneously playing both roles — known as “double-hatting” — has been the subject of much controversy in recent debates on ISDS reform, notably, at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Working Group III where a Draft Code of Conduct for Adjudicators in International Investment Disputes is under discussion. While Canada has been less than consistent in its approaches to ISDS in recent international investment agreements (IIAs), its position against double-hatting has been rather constant. This article explores whether this stance reveals a commitment on the part of Canada towards increased judicialization of ISDS or reflects a “flavour of the month” reform likely to change with differing IIAs and negotiating partners. Analysis of Canada’s recent IIA practices, including its model Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, released in May 2021, and the positions it has taken at UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, lead the author to conclude that Canada appears committed to increased judicialization of ISDS in the long run.

15 Investment Treaty Dispute Settlement

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salacuse Jeswald W
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Investment ◽  
State Governments ◽  
Rule Based ◽  
Host State ◽  
Rule Based System ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Diplomatic Protection ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Investment Treaties

This chapter focuses on investment treaty dispute settlement, examining the nature of conflicts between investors and states and the various means provided by treaties to resolve them. In general, investor–state disputes governed by treaties occur because a host state has taken a ‘measure’ that allegedly violates that state's treaty commitments on the treatment it has promised to accord to investments protected by that treaty. Before the advent of investment treaties, investors basically had three methods to seek resolution of their disputes with host states: (a) direct negotiation with host state governments; (b) domestic courts in the host country; and (c) diplomatic protection by their home states. In order to establish a stable, rule-based system for international investment, treaties provide means to resolve disputes about the interpretation and application of treaty provisions. Most investment treaties provide four separate dispute settlement methods: (1) consultations and negotiations between contracting states; (2) arbitration between contracting states; (3) consultations and negotiations between covered investors and host governments; and (4) investor–state arbitration.

scholarly journals Constitutionality of the Colombia-France Bilateral Investment Treaty

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-478
Author(s):  
Rafael Tamayo-Álvarez
Keyword(s):  
International Investment ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Adverse Impacts ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
The Government ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
Investment Agreements ◽  
Practical Implications

In a judgment issued on June 6, 2019 (Judgment), the Colombian Constitutional Court (Court) examined the constitutionality of the Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments between Colombia and France (Agreement). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Agreement on the condition that the government adopt a joint interpretative statement with France to clarify some of its provisions and prevent interpretations contrary to the Colombian constitutional order. In doing so, the Court articulated a standard of review that takes into account the benefits and costs of international investment agreements (IIAs), the application of which entailed an insightful examination of the Agreement in light of the decisions of investment tribunals. The judgment raises significant issues of public international law, including the practical implications of conditioning ratification of the Agreement on adoption of a joint interpretative statement and the role of such statements in the interpretation of IIAs. Furthermore, the judgment makes important contributions to the ongoing process of reform of the investment treaty regime and the strategies adopted by states to counter the adverse impacts of IIAs on regulatory autonomy.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE 2016 MOROCCO–NIGERIA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 761-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niccolò Zugliani
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Investment ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Law ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
International Investment Agreements ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Investment Agreements

AbstractThe 2016 Morocco–Nigeria bilateral investment treaty (BIT) stands out from other such treaties because of its innovative human rights approach to the protection and promotion of foreign direct investment. Human rights permeate its approach to the regulation of investment in a manner which is most unusual in international investment agreements (IIAs). As a result, this is the most socially-responsible BIT currently concluded. Although it remains exceptional within the investment-treaty framework, the treaty reflects African initiatives to ensure that the next generation of BITs encourages more responsible investments. As such, it shows that human rights-compliant investment treaties can find fertile ground in developing African countries and it sets an example for current and future negotiations aimed at fostering respect for human rights in investment activities.

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