Fiscal federalism in the Russian Federation and its Asian regions

Author(s):  
Hansjörg Blöchliger ◽  
Michael Alexeev
1994 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Martinez-Vazquez

This paper is an examination of the critical role the assignment of expenditure responsibilities must play in building the Russian Federation. The fiscal federalism system and the expenditure assignments inherited from the Soviet Union were not truly decentralized. All the real decisions were made back in Moscow. Although subnational governments now have authority to create their own budgets, past processes and institutions still undermine local autonomy. However, the most serious threat to the Russian Federation comes from the lack of a stable assignment of responsibilities. Primarily for budgetary convenience, the federal government has jettisoned certain expenditure responsibilities onto oblast and rayon governments in the past two years, putting Russian intergovernmental relations on a perilous path. So far, the Parliament and the Executive have failed to recognize that a stable expenditure assignment is the first and necessary step in the design of a lasting system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Instead, the political system has concentrated entirely on revenue assignments which have not endured. The author analyzes several sets of issues that must be addressed in the design of a stable assignment of expenditure responsibilities in the Russian Federation, including the reassignment of social expenditures and social safety-net responsibilities, the reassignment of capital spending responsibilities, and the divestiture of public services by state enterprises.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-175
Author(s):  
Elena Ryabova

The paper is devoted to the issue of centralization in public finance in Russia, and highlights one of the problems of interpretation of the Russian Constitution clauses. The Rulings of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court from the period 1997–2006 created legal grounds for the process of centralization and reduction of the regional powers regarding budgeting and taxation. But all arguments of the Court are debatable. Wherein, the centralization is justified by the constitutional principle of uniform economic area. The author argues that the Russian Constitution does not have clauses establishing the uniform budget and tax systems directly, and any model of intergovernmental relations might comply with the Russian Constitution. Uniformity of economic area does not imply uniformity in taxation and budgeting in the sense of sameness. Study of foreign practices shows different approaches to the understanding of uniformity in economy, and in taxation and budgeting. The contemporary Russian public finance law is formed under the influence of the Constitutional Court’s legal positions, and the process of centralization is still evolving. The Russian history of intergovernmental relations (1991–1997) shows another model of fiscal federalism – the decentralized federalism. Replacement of the fiscal federalism models is determined by the political considerations, not by constitutional requirements.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-722
Author(s):  
Yu.G. Shvetsov

Subject. Highly regulated financial system, where only federal budget's interests are observed, is inefficient. It entails irrational use of taxable capacity of regions and municipalities and contributes to inflation upturn. This urgent problem requires the earliest solution, as about one third of able-bodied citizens of the Russian Federation are involved in its public sector. Objectives. The aim of the study is to review the status of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Russian Federation and underpin the need for cardinal changes. Methods. The study rests on the systems approach, methods of scientific knowledge and statistical techniques. Results. The paper provides a rationale for the crisis state of the budgetary regulation system in Russia and shows prospects to overcome it; reveals and analyzes gaps in the current order of inter-budget relations formation; defines the need for a shift towards the principles of decentralization of budget organization. Conclusions and Relevance. The study will contribute to substantiation of the change-over to the liberal model of inter-budget relations, which corresponds to world standards.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 1377-1392
Author(s):  
Leyla B. Mokhnatkina

The use of fiscal instruments for regulating territorial development has both positive and negative macroeconomic effects related to the withdrawal of revenue from more economically developed regions. Therefore, using the Pareto principle, this paper assesses the negative effects of budgetary reallocation. This study considers inter-budgetary reallocation as an annually recurring four-stage process of regional budgets reproduction. The article analyses the firs t stag e o f th e process , namely , the creation of resource allocation base. A hypothesis has been tested to examine whether the centralisation of tax revenues in the federal budget and, consequently, an increase in inter-budgetary reallocation does not reduce, but exacerbates inequality in regions due to their revenue depletion and limited self-development. The study assessed the contribution of federal districts and individual constituent entities of the Russian Federation to the federal budget, withdrawal of regional revenues, and the concentration of territorial revenues to the federal budget. Based on the ranking of regional contributions to federal revenues, I built a Pareto diagram, checking the 80/20 rule for grouped and non-grouped data. Calculations and comparison of the data for 2017 and 2010 confirm numerous negative effects. For example, there is an increase in the withdrawal of regional revenues and a significant concentration of federal revenues for a limited number of regions. Additionally, negative effects include the existence of a direct relationship between regional revenues and the rate of their withdrawal, as well as the predominance of the equalising component over the stimulating one in regional socio-economic development. These effects lead to revenue depletion in the territories and increased centralisation of budgetary resources, contradicting the principles of fiscal federalism. Authorities can use the research results, conclusions and suggestions for managerial decision-making to improve intergovernmental relations in the Russian Federation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 114-127
Author(s):  
B.I. Alekhin ◽  

The purpose of this study is to test the proposition that better regional fiscal balances are associated with stronger regional tax autonomy as measured by the ratio of property taxes to expenditures. The study uses panel data for 82 subjects of the Russian Federation over 14 years (2005–2018). A two-step dynamic model of budget balance is estimated by the “system” generalized method of moments. A positive and statistically significant association between fiscal balances and tax autonomy is established. This study emphasizes the importance of regional tax autonomy for the development of market-preserving fiscal federalism in Russia.


2004 ◽  
pp. 111-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Klimanov ◽  
A. Lavrov

The article considers the main changes in the intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia in the beginning of the 2000s and current problems of the realization of the governmental Program of the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation till 2005. The experience of forming several funds for financial aid to sub-national budgets in the federal budget is examined, financial issues of the reform of federal relations and local self-government are analyzed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document