scholarly journals The Unnoble Nobles: Notes on Shakespeare’s Masterful Characterization in Macbeth

Author(s):  
Zohreh Ramin ◽  
Alireza Shafinasab

When writing Macbeth, Shakespeare faced a moral and aesthetic challenge. On the one hand, he had drawn the story of Macbeth from Holinshed's Chronicles, in which Banquo is depicted as an accomplice in the murder of King Duncan. On the other hand Banquo was believed to be the ancestor of King James, Shakespeare’s patron. Shakespeare had to write a play that at once pleased King James, remained true to the spirit of history, and could be a popular hit in the commercial world of Jacobean theatre, all seemingly contradictory ends because of the problem with the character of Banquo. So Shakespeare characterizes him in a different manner from his sources. The new characterization served a number of purposes. The most important reason for the alternation was to please King James, the alleged descendant of Banquo. Other than that, there is the dramatic purpose of creating a foil character for Macbeth, who can highlight Macbeth's characteristics. The presence of a noble Banquo also shows that human being can resist evil, as does Banquo. These points have been emphasized in many writings on Macbeth, which mean that Shakespeare's Banquo is an innocent man, a seemingly deviation from history. The present paper, however, tries to examine Shakespeare's complex characterization of Banquo which must meet those seemingly contradicting ends, a characterization far more ambivalent and artful than simple political affiliations might suggest. It will be shown that Shakespeare's Banquo not only is not simply an innocent man he seems to be at the first reading, but he could be as murderous as Macbeth himself. The only difference between the two is that one acts sooner than the other.

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Raquel Borges Blázquez

Artificial intelligence has countless advantages in our lives. On the one hand, computer’s capacity to store and connect data is far superior to human capacity. On the other hand, its “intelligence” also involves deep ethical problems that the law must respond to. I say “intelligence” because nowadays machines are not intelligent. Machines only use the data that a human being has previously offered as true. The truth is relative and the data will have the same biases and prejudices as the human who programs the machine. In other words, machines will be racist, sexist and classist if their programmers are. Furthermore, we are facing a new problem: the difficulty to understand the algorithm of those who apply the law.This situation forces us to rethink the criminal process, including artificial intelligence and spinning very thinly indicating how, when, why and under what assumptions we can make use of artificial intelligence and, above all, who is going to program it. At the end of the day, as Silvia Barona indicates, perhaps the question should be: who is going to control global legal thinking?


Politeia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 238-260
Author(s):  
Franco Manni ◽  

From the ideas of Aristotle, De Saussure and Wittgenstein, philosopher Herbert McCabe elaborated an original anthropology. 'Meaning' means: the role played by a part towards the whole. Senses are bodily organs and sensations allow an animal to get fragments of the external world which become 'meaningful' for the behaviour of the whole animal Besides sensations, humans are ‘linguistic animals’ because through words they are able to 'communicate', that is, to share a peculiar kind of meanings: concepts. Whereas, sense-images are stored physically in our brain and cannot be shared, even though we can relate to sense-images by words (speech coincides with thought). However, concepts do not belong to the individual human being qua individual, but to an interpersonal entity: the language system. Therefore, on the one hand, to store images is a sense-power and an operation of the brain, whereas the brain (quite paradoxically!) is not in itself the organ of thought. On the other hand, concepts do not exist on their own.


After having briefly but exhaustively recalled the main lines of Freudian psychoanalytic thought, we have discussed a possible psychoanalytic theoretical model for human symbolic function mainly centred on the action of a set of primary psychic mechanisms rejoined around the negative, in its widest sense according to the works of André Green. A chief aspect of this pattern has turned out to be an underlying, irreducible dialecticity that reflects on the one hand, the typical feature of human symbolic function, and, on the other hand, the main outcome of the unavoidable presence of a basic dichotomy formalized the so-called phallic logic, that is, that primordial, ancestral and irreducible logical nucleus inevitably present in the deepest meanders of human psyche as an inborn structure phylogenetically preformed and ontogenetically re-established during the psychic evolution of any human being.


1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-490
Author(s):  
Gerd Rodé

AbstractThis paper gives a new characterization of the dimension of a normal Hausdorff space, which joins together the Eilenberg-Otto characterization and the characterization by finite coverings. The link is furnished by the notion of a system of faces of a certain type (N1,..., NK), where N1,..., NK, K are natural numbers. It is shown that a space X contains a system of faces of type (N1,..., NK) if and only if dim(X) ≥ N1 + … + NK. The two limit cases of the theorem, namely Nk = 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ K on the one hand, and K = 1 on the other hand, give the two known results mentioned above.


1862 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 461-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley

As it has ever been the custom of man to act as if he were eternal, and lavishly to scatter the limited force which he embodies as though the supply were inexhaustible, it produces no unaccustomed surprise to witness the useless expenditure of force which is so frequently made at the present time. It may even, perhaps, be deemed a token of some modesty, that the being, who since his first formation has been continually occupied in metaphysical regions with the investigation of the origin of all things, should be content for a while to amuse himself with physical theories concerning his own origin. That which is to be regretted in the new and comparatively praiseworthy occupation is the old evil of hasty theorizing on the one hand, and on the other hand, the evil, scarcely less ancient, of an impetuous eagerness to demolish any theory, however plausible, which comes athwart a favourite prejudice. What though the anatomist does discover a very close resemblance and very slight differences between the structure of a gorilla and the structure of a human being; there is no need, on that account, that mankind in a feeling of injured dignity should angrily rouse up and disclaim the undesired relationship. Whatever may be said or written, it is quite plain after all that a man is not a gorilla, and that a gorilla is not a man; it is furthermore manifest that gorillas do not breed men now-a-days, and that we have not the shadow of any evidence to guide us in forming; an opinion as to what they may have clone in times past. The negative testimony of Du Chaillu, who says that he searched in vain in the gorilla region for any intermediate race or link between it and man, scarcely adds anything to the conviction of the non-existence of any such link, which has long been universally entertained.*


2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 473-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID CHIRON

The purpose of this paper is to relate two notions of Sobolev and BV spaces into metric spaces, due to Korevaar and Schoen on the one hand, and Jost on the other hand. We prove that these two notions coincide and define the same p-energies. We review also other definitions, due to Ambrosio (for BV maps into metric spaces), Reshetnyak and finally to the notion of Newtonian–Sobolev spaces. These last approaches define the same Sobolev (or BV) spaces, but with a different energy, which does not extend the standard Dirichlet energy. We also prove a characterization of Sobolev spaces in the spirit of Bourgain, Brezis and Mironescu in terms of "limit" of the space Ws,p as s → 1, 0 < s < 1, and finally following the approach proposed by Nguyen. We also establish the [Formula: see text] regularity of traces of maps in Ws,p (0 < s ≤ 1 < sp).


1985 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. van der Veen ◽  
Philippe Van Parijs

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick contrasts entitlement theories of justice and “traditional” theories such as Rawls', utilitarianism or egalitarianism, and advocates the former against the latter. What exactly is an entitlement theory (or conception or principle) of justice? Nozick's book offers two distinct characterizations. On the one hand, he explicitly describes “the general outlines of the entitlement theory” as maintaining “that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or by the principle of rectification of injustice (as specified by the first two principles of just acquisition and transfer)” (Nozick, 1974, p. 153). On the other hand, his famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument against alternative theories is first said to apply to (all) “non-entitlement conceptions” (p. 160), and later to any “end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice” (p. 163) — which amounts to an implicit characterization of an entitlement conception (theory, principle) as a conception of justice which is neither end-state nor patterned.


2021 ◽  
pp. 199-216
Author(s):  
Claire Mercier

This paper considers the graphic work of the Chilean artist Claudio Romo from a post-human perspective. Romo's work realizes an opening of imaginaries, above all, new configurations of human being, in order to reconsider the boundaries of human nature and propose a new humanism in relation to a new understanding of modernity. After a theoretical tour of post-humanism, especially of Rosi Braidotti's philosophical nomadism, the paper will approach the post-human bestiary that elaborates Romo, on the one hand, as a questioning of access to empirical realities and, on the other hand, as a presentation of potential life forms. The paper will conclude on the presence, in Romo’s work, of a new affirmative humanism, that is, the experimentation of new modes of subjectivization, as well as the approach of new modes of knowledge.


2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha Th. Frederiks

In the past Christians have used various models in relating to people of other faiths. Most are still in use. Four dominant models immediately come to mind: those of expansion, of diakonia, of presence, and of interreligious dialogue. This article discusses the pros and cons of these models and then proposes a fifth model: the model of kenosis. The model of kenosis calls for imitation of the self-emptying act of Jesus in his Incarnation in relation to people of other faiths, based on a shared humanity. Kenosis demands, on the one hand, a total openness for the other, as a fellow human being and a religious person, while, on the other hand, it offers the possibility to be authentically different from the other, in religion, culture, etc. Thus is seems to offer a model for interreligious living and relating, which honors religious differences, give guidelines for relating to each other, and is firmly based in a shared humanity.


2021 ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat

In this chapter, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling’s thought on the phenomenon of guilt is examined. The main point established is that on the one hand, Schelling can be seen to follow in Kant’s footsteps in that he, too, sees guilt as ultimately grounded in a free, intelligible act. On the other hand, Schelling goes beyond Kant in that he holds that for guilt (empirical or ontological) to be justified, it is necessary that the human being constitute or choose his or her own being in a timeless and free deed. In other words, Schelling endorses a version of the transcendental argument for freedom where guilt implies that the human being is a free causa sui. Schelling’s conception of the human being as causa sui enables him to address the problem of infinite regress that beleaguers Kant’s view.


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