scholarly journals The Sky Is Not Falling: Why Name, Image, and Likeness Legislation Does Not Violate Title IX and Could Narrow the Publicity Gap Between Men’s Sport and Women’s Sport Athletes

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-288
Author(s):  
Alicia Jessop ◽  
Joe Sabin

For decades, the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”) amateurism rules have largely prevented NCAA athletes from commercializing their names, images, and likenesses (“NIL”). The right to license and profit from one’s own image, often referred to as the “Right of Publicity,” is explicitly recognized by statute or common law in 35 states. No federal Right of Publicity statute exists, but in 1977, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right. However, until 2021, NCAA athletes were precluded from benefiting from this right, as under the NCAA’s amateurism principle, “An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport ...” if he “[u]ses athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport.” Until July 1, 2021, by becoming an NCAA athlete and complying with the NCAA’s Bylaws to maintain eligibility, NCAA athletes gave up their right to benefit from their NIL while competing in NCAA athletics. This relinquishment put full commercial marketing control of the athlete, their team, and the college sport in the NCAA’s hands. Research shows that despite the application of Title IX to sport in 1975, NCAA women’s sports have not been commercially marketed in parity with NCAA men’s sports, with NCAA men’s sports experiencing significant publicity and sponsorship windfalls. This article examines the recent decision by the NCAA to allow NCAA athletes to benefit from their NIL, the potential Title IX implications of the decision, and how the decision could narrow the publicity gap between NCAA men’s and women’s sport athletes in furtherance of the plain language and intent of Title IX.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-150
Author(s):  
Jill Oeding

Many state legislatures are racing to pass antiabortion laws that will give the current Supreme Court the opportunity to review its stance on the alleged constitutional right to have an abortion. While the number of abortions reported to be performed annually in the United States has declined over the last decade, according to the most recent government-reported data, the number of abortions performed on an annual basis is still over 600,000 per year. Abortion has been legal in the United States since 1973, when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion prior to viability (i.e. the time when a baby could possibly live outside the mother’s womb). States currently have the right to forbid abortions after viability.  However, prior to viability, states may not place an “undue burden” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The recent appointments of two new Supreme Court justices, Neil Gorsich and Brett Kavanaugh, give pro-life states the best chance in decades to overrule the current abortion precedent. The question is whether these two new justices will shift the ideology of the court enough to overrule the current abortion precedent.



2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.



2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuhao Wang

Evidence law was famously deemed ‘the child of the jury’, its development widely perceived as a by-product of the jury trial. Conventional wisdom tells us that juries, because of their cognitive and epistemic failings, can hardly be trusted and thus need rules of evidence to steer them in the right direction. Therefore, given that jury trials are vanishing in the United States and other common law countries, we must question whether the traditional evidence-law model is sustainable. At the same time that juries have been on the decline, rapid developments in science and technology have led to new forms of evidence, including scientific evidence, electronic evidence and process-based evidence. Presenting these new types of evidence at trials, however, often creates a mismatch with the traditional evidence-law framework. A systematic redesign of 21st-century evidence law to better accommodate the intensified interplay between science, technology and the law seems to be the next natural development. This essay explores these two distinct paths of evidence law—the old, jury-driven model and a new, science-directed model—and argues for preserving the old path while at the same time spending more resources and making greater effort to accommodate these new forms of evidence.



Author(s):  
Mary Garvey Algero

Despite the fundamental differences between the doctrines employed in common law and civil law (or mixed) jurisdictions when it comes to the respect paid to prior court decisions and their weight or value, United States courts that follow the common law doctrine of stare decisis have embraced some of the flexibility inherent in the civil law doctrine, and civil law and mixed jurisdictions throughout the world, including Louisiana, that use the doctrine of jurisprudence constante seem to have come to value the predictability and certainty that come with the common law doctrine. This Article suggests that Louisiana courts are striking the right balance between valuing the predictability and certainty of interpretation that comes with a healthy respect for precedent and maintaining the flexibility and adaptability of the law by not strictly considering precedent a source of law. This Article discusses the results of an ongoing examination of the sources of law and the value of precedent in Louisiana. The examination involves a study of Louisiana legislation, Louisiana courts’ writings about the sources of law and precedent, and a survey of Louisiana judges. Part of the examination included reviewing Louisiana judicial opinions on various issues to determine if there were differences in valuing precedent based on area of law or topic. It also included reviewing judicial opinions from the United States Supreme Court and New York state courts to compare these courts’ approaches to the use of precedent with those of the Louisiana courts. The article is based on a paper presented to the Third Congress of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, which was held in Jerusalem, Israel in June 2011, and the author’s prior writings on the subject.



2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-294
Author(s):  
Carolyn Shelbourn

In recent years there have been protests at Armistice Day services and at the funeral of Margaret Thatcher, but these events seem insignificant compared to the impact of the ‘funeral picketing’ carried out in the United States by members of the Westboro Baptist Church, principally at the funerals of American forces personnel killed on active service. This has caused considerable distress to family members and wide public outrage. In 2011 the United States Supreme Court held in Snyder v Phelps that the right of freedom of speech of the WBC rendered them immune to claims for damages by mourners affected by their picketing. This article will first consider how English secular and canon law could be used to restrict the practice of funeral picketing and secondly discuss whether current law could provide a remedy for mourners distressed by funeral picketing and other forms of protest at funerals, were they to take place.



Author(s):  
Richard Friedman

This chapter examines the right of criminal defendants to be confronted with the witnesses against them. It first provides an overview of the nature, purposes, and costs of the confrontation right before discussing the history of the confrontation right. It then considers a range of issues that may arise in any jurisdiction (or in some cases, any common law jurisdiction) with regard to the confrontation right, using as a touchstone the current status of the right in the United States. In particular, it describes situations in which the question of whether a statement is testimonial typically arises, such as fresh accusations and forensic laboratory reports. It also explores the waiver and forfeiture of the confrontation right, a child’s testimony, and remote testimony as well as the extent of constitutionally protected impeachment before concluding with an analysis of the confrontation right in Europe.



2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Steven R. Shapiro

In 1946, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the declaration of martial law in Hawaii following Pearl Harbor did not suspend the Bill of Rights and did not deprive civilians accused of crime of the right to trial by jury in a civilian rather than a military court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frank Murphy wrote.



2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hock Lai Ho

This essay analyses the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the allocation of the burden of proof in relation to criminal defences. The Court seems generally comfortable about letting the accused carry the persuasive burden of proving excuses and justifications. It is seemingly different in those other common law countries where the so-called ‘golden thread’ proclaimed by the House of Lords in Woolmington v DPP holds sway, and where it is accepted as a general rule that the prosecution must disprove beyond reasonable doubt any defence that has been put in issue. This essay explores and tries to explain this difference. The divergence is explicable as a matter of legal history, but at the bottom of it are arguably a conceptual dispute on the offence-defence distinction and competing visions of politics that bear on the theory of the criminal trial.



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