scholarly journals UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL SUBJECT IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 73-84
Author(s):  
Irina Chernova ◽  
Nataliya Galanina
1995 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Kenneth Minogue

It is one of Karl Popper's great distinctions that he has an intense—some would say too intense—awareness of the history of philosophy within which he works. He knows not only its patterns, but also its comedies, and sometimes he plays rhetorically against their grain. He knows, for example, that the drive to consistency tends to turn philosophy into compositions of related doctrines, each seeming to involve the others. Religious belief, for example, tends to go with idealism and free will, religious scepticism with materialism and determinism. Popper does not believe in a religion, was for long some kind of a socialist, and takes his bearings from the philosophy of science. Aha! it seems we have located him. Here is a positivist, a materialist, probably a determinist. But of course he denies he is any of these things. Again, like many modern thinkers, he wants to extend scientific method not only to the social sciences but also to history. So far so familiar, until we discover that he regards nature as no less ‘cloudy’ than human societies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-234
Author(s):  
Shachar Freddy Kislev ◽  

In British Hegelianism we find, forgotten, a weighty theory of individuality. This theory remains one of the most sustained attempts in the history of philosophy to analyze the individual, not in the social or psychological sense, but as a logical-metaphysical category. The Idealist conceptualization of the individual is bound with their unconventional theory of universals, for they argued that any individual is a “concrete universal,” and vice versa. This article reconstructs the British Idealist theory of individuality, highlighting its key insights: (a) the individual is not a simple unit, but a small system with interrelated parts; (b) the individual is not simply given, but is mediated by thought; (c) the individual is the conceptual glue holding the parts together and assigning them their respective places; (d) the conceptualization of the individual lies at the intersection of logic, aesthetics and systems theory.


Think ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (27) ◽  
pp. 73-76
Author(s):  
Christian H. Sötemann

Philosophers have been known to sometimes conjure up world-views which seem dazzlingly at odds with our everyday take on the world. Among the more, if not most drastic ‘-isms’ to be found in the history of philosophy, then, is the standpoint of solipsism, derived from the Latin words ‘solus’ (alone) and ‘ipse’ (self). What is that supposed to mean? It adopts a position that only acknowledges the existence of one's very own mind and opposes that there is anything beyond the realm of my mind that could be known. What a drastic contradiction to the way we normally view the world, indeed. Allow me to emphasize some implications that would arise were one really to take the solipsist view for granted. The aim is to briefly adumbrate how a solipsist view would cut us off from the social world and from the existential dimension of our own death.


Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (246) ◽  
pp. 487-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Rickman

The history of philosophy provides part of the history, or pre-history, of the social sciences. As they were struggling into being, or even before they existed, philosophy was hammering out some of the conceptual tools, lines of approach and basic hypotheses. One of the constantly recurring themes in the history of philosophy which has a direct bearing on the social sciences is the relationship between mind and matter.


Author(s):  
Pavel Aleksandrovich Gorokhov

The paper examines the main historical-philosophical and worldview parallels that can be found when considering the problem of good and evil in human nature on the example of comparing of J. Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness” and the philo-sophical heritage of S. Freud and F. Nietzsche. It has been revealed that with all the differences in the worldview and the variety of creative approaches to the solving philosophical problems, the views of these thinkers on human nature had been largely identical. These views proceeded from the idea of a person as a dual being, the deep essence of which is determined not only by the introduced social, but also by deep natural, biological components. More-over, the social in the human nature does not at all mean unconditionally positive and good, and the natural world does not at all bring with it an evil principle into the human essence. There is no good or evil in the natural world. The ethical and axiologi-cal coloring of this or that phenomenon is always given by the person himself. The main findings of the study can be used in general and special cours-es on the history of philosophy and foreign litera-ture.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 100-123
Author(s):  
Joshua Cockayne

In this paper, I aim to show that analytic philosophy can contribute to the theological discussion of ecclesiology. By considering recent analytic work on social ontology, I outline how we might think of the Church as one entity, constituted by many disparate parts. The paper begins with an overview of the theological constraints for the paper, and then proceeds to examine recent work on the philosophy of social ontology and group agency. Drawing on this literature, I outline three models of social ontology from the history of philosophy and suggest reasons why all of them fail to provide an account of the Church’s agency. Finally, I develop an alternative model which, I suggest, better fits the conditions stipulated.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-12

The article deals with the fundamental influence on Deleuze of the little-studied strain of French philosophy and epistemology from the 20th century that deals with such concepts as question, theme and problem. Some figures adjoining this lineage are known outside France (Bergson, Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser, Foucault), and others are just beginning to arouse intense interest (Lautman, Ruyer, Simondon); but they have rarely been seen as part of a single tradition of theorizing about problematics. And in spite of the fact (or thanks to it) that thinking about problematics has nominally entered the mainstream of the contemporary academy as a principal methodological basis, its actual current remains unknown and underground. The author offers a brief analysis of Martial Gueroult’s dianoematics. Dianoematics is a structuralist approach to the history of philosophy which consists of two parts: the history of the history of philosophy and the philosophy of the history of philosophy. Gueroult regards the latter as a transcendental science, one which takes philosophy (or, more precisely, the multiplicity of philosophies or problematics) and the conditions of its possibility as its subject. When philosophies lay claim to timeless truth about Real, this inoculates them against any reduction to the pure subjectivity of thinkers or the social circumstances of their thinking. And so Gueroult postulates that the philosophical choices which ground philosophies have their own unitary ahistorical logic. That unity of logic, however, does not reduce the multitude of philosophies to one. Therefore, in place of a single Real there is a multiplicity of Reals which are internal to philosophies — that is the so-called “radical idealism” of Gueroult. The author points out the interplay between Gueroult’s approach not only with the history of philosophy from What Is Philosophy? but also with Laruelle’s non-philosophy, with which Deleuze carries on a dialogue in his book. While Deleuze tries to “sublate” Gueroult’s idealism by taking it as a positive basis for materialist thought regarding immanence, Laruelle takes it as the clearest expression of the idealism inherent in all philosophies and uses it negatively as a building material for non-philosophy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 258 ◽  
pp. 07018
Author(s):  
Ayazhan Sagikyzy ◽  
Yelena Ryakova ◽  
Yelena Savchuk ◽  
Margarita Kakimzhanova ◽  
Torgyn Sadykova ◽  
...  

The article contents analysis of the ideologeme of “traditional culture” and evaluation of its possibility for the understanding of social process. The authors turn to the history of philosophy in understanding the socially significant context of the formation of traditions. Further, the authors show the socio-cultural foundations of the ideologeme of “traditional culture” and shows the causes of methodological “dead ends” of the authors who use it to explain modern social life. The article emphasizes the importance of traditions in the life of society. Authors notes that human development is impossible without the ability to reproduce and preserve the experience. At the same time, authors shows that certain forms of behavior-communication-activities which fixed by customs, rituals can appear and die. The authors of the article have came to the conclusion that the term of “traditional culture” is an ideologeme which testifying to the splitting of the social process. It fills with content depending on the goals of interests groups and serves as a tool for speculative worldview constructions.


Author(s):  
Michael Kremer

Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that emerged from his criticism of the “intellectualist legend” that to do something intelligently is “to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice,” and became a philosophical commonplace in the second half of the last century. In this century Jason Stanley (initially with Timothy Williamson) has attacked Ryle’s distinction, arguing that “knowing-how is a species of knowing-that,” and accusing Ryle of setting up a straw man in his critique of “intellectualism.” Examining the use of the terms “intellectualism” and “anti-intellectualism” in the first half of the 20th century, in a wide-ranging debate in the social sciences as well as in philosophy, I show that Ryle was not criticizing a straw man, but a live historical position. In the context of this controversy, Ryle’s position represents a third way between “intellectualism” and “anti-intellectualism,” an option that has largely gone missing in the 21st century discussion. This argument illustrates how history can inform the history of philosophy, and how the history of philosophy can inform contemporary philosophical inquiry.


1959 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 51-79
Author(s):  
K. Edwards

During the last twenty or twenty-five years medieval historians have been much interested in the composition of the English episcopate. A number of studies of it have been published on periods ranging from the eleventh to the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. A further paper might well seem superfluous. My reason for offering one is that most previous writers have concentrated on analysing the professional circles from which the bishops were drawn, and suggesting the influences which their early careers as royal clerks, university masters and students, secular or regular clergy, may have had on their later work as bishops. They have shown comparatively little interest in their social background and provenance, except for those bishops who belonged to magnate families. Some years ago, when working on the political activities of Edward II's bishops, it seemed to me that social origins, family connexions and provenance might in a number of cases have had at least as much influence on a bishop's attitude to politics as his early career. I there fore collected information about the origins and provenance of these bishops. I now think that a rather more careful and complete study of this subject might throw further light not only on the political history of the reign, but on other problems connected with the character and work of the English episcopate. There is a general impression that in England in the later middle ages the bishops' ties with their dioceses were becoming less close, and that they were normally spending less time in diocesan work than their predecessors in the thirteenth century.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document