Implying a Federal Constitutional Right to Education

Author(s):  
Derek W. Black

In this chapter, Derek W. Black surveys the various litigation, judicial, and scholarly theories through which courts might recognize a right to education under the United States Constitution. He begins by sorting those theories into their major doctrinal categories and subcategories and explaining their basic arguments, including substantive due process, equal protection, privileges and immunities, citizenship, and originalism. Black then critically evaluates those theories, examining both the positives and negatives of the leading theories. He concludes that while a number of theories are plausible, scholarly theories have tended toward originalism in recent years and are the most likely to be successful before the courts.

Author(s):  
Peggy Cooper Davis

In chapter 6, Peggy Cooper Davis notes that in a democratic republic, the people are sovereign and must be free and educated to exercise that sovereignty. She contends that the history of chattel slavery’s denial of human sovereignty in the United States, slavery’s overthrow in the Civil War, and the Constitution’s reconstruction to restore human sovereignty provide a basis for recognizing that the personal rights protected by the United States Constitution, as amended on the demise of slavery, include a fundamental right to education that is adequate to enable every person to participate meaningfully as one among equal and sovereign people.


Author(s):  
Derrick Bell

The supreme court’s 1896 Decision in Plessy v. Ferguson served to bring the law into a dismal harmony with the nation’s view of race in life. The Court decided that segregation in public facilities through “separate but equal” accommodations for black citizens would satisfy the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. The years since the sporadically enforced policies of Reconstruction ended in 1876 had been hard for those former slaves and their offspring whose slavery had legally ended with the passage of the Thir­teenth Amendment in 1865. To ensure their rights to due process and the equal protection of the law, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provided that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Despite legislation intended to provide enforcement of these rights, the laws were poorly enforced and most were subsequently declared unconstitutional. Corrupting law but relying on intimidation and violence, southern governments stripped blacks of political power. Given meaningful if unspoken assurances that the federal government would not protect black civil rights, conservative southerners regained power utilizing racial fear and hatred to break up competing populist groups of poor black and white farmers. In addition to the disenfranchisement of blacks, whites sought to secure their power through intensive anti-Negro propaganda campaigns championing white supremacy. Literary and scientific leaders published tracts and books intended to “prove” the inhumanity of the Negro. In this hostile climate, segregation laws that had made a brief appearance during Reconstruction were revived across the South, accompanied by waves of violence punctuated by an increase in lynchings and race riots. In an effort both to protest the indignity of segregation and challenge its validity, Homer Plessy, acting for a New Orleans civil rights group, attempted to ride in a railroad car reserved for whites. He was arrested and convicted of violating Louisiana’s 1890 segregation law. On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment required absolute equality of the two races before the law, adding: “but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”


Author(s):  
Williams Robert F

This chapter discusses methodology problems arising in cases where similar federal and state constitutional rights claims are raised. Most federal constitutional rights have been incorporated into the federal Constitution's 14th Amendment so as to be applicable to the states. United States Supreme Court interpretations of federal constitutional rights are not binding on state court interpretation of identical or similar state constitutional rights, but state court divergence under these circumstances can raise questions about its legitimacy. A number of questions arise in this context, including for example the proper sequence of arguments, which constitution's rights guarantees should be argued first by counsel, and analyzed first by the state court. The most substantial methodology issue is whether state courts should develop criteria to guide them in deciding whether to interpret identical or similar state constitutional rights to be more protective than the federal analog. The criteria approach is analyzed in some depth, utilizing examples of the use of this methodology in a number of states. The chapter criticizes the use of the criteria approach based on a number of factors that make state court enforcement of state constitutional rights different from the United States Supreme Court's enforcement of the federal bill of rights. The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal constitutional rights guarantees is therefore not presumptively correct for the interpretation of state constitutions. The chapter also discusses briefly several other methodological problems, including the direct right of action for money damages under state constitutions, state action, and substantive due process and economic regulation.


1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-43
Author(s):  
Barry Sullivan

AbstractGood Samaritan laws provide legal immunity to persons who assist in medical emergencies. Because good Samaritan laws eliminate the common law right of victims to secure redress for their injuries, these statutes raise certain constitutional questions. The Article begins by examining the vulnerability of good Samaritan statutes to federal constitutional attack on substantive due process and equal protection grounds. It then considers the susceptibility of such laws to state constitutional attack on the same grounds. The Article concludes that while such statutes are not likely to violate federal substantive due process and equal protection provisions, they may be held unconstitutional on similar state grounds.


1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Shearer

As public employers well know, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee due process to protect property interests associated with workers' legitimate expectations of continued employment. Equally well-established, although probably less often the subject of litigation, are the due process rights of public employees whose liberty interests, i.e., their right to be free of unwarranted professional stigma, are jeopardized by employer conduct. This paper analyzes several recent cases in which public employees charged liberty interest violations as a result of their employers' placing adverse information in their personnel files. Public sector employers should evaluate their exposure to liability for such claims and develop strategies to alleviate their risk as well as to carry out their responsibility to preserve the due process rights of employees.


2021 ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter examines personalized law from the perspective of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution. Some classifications of people, when made for the purpose of differentiated treatment, are subject to stifling doctrinal constraints. Could such classifications be made under personalized law? The chapter argues that personalized law mitigates the constitutional concerns relating to suspect classifications. Treating people as individuals, using multi-attribute data-weighed tailoring, and not as identical members in a certain class, is permissible because members of the class are not singled out for class-specific uniform treatment. The chapter examines landmark Supreme Court cases on sex and race classifications, showing that the limits set by the Court and the narrow permission it granted for some uses of classifications, all fit well within a scheme of personalized law. In addition, the chapter examines problems of unintended disparate impact that could arise under personalized law, and demonstrates the unique advantage of the algorithmic methods fueling personalized law in reducing and eliminating such effects.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-111
Author(s):  
Yu.V. TAI ◽  
S.L. BUDYLIN

Jurisdiction of American state courts over out-of-state defendants is determined by state law, but is limited by constitutional considerations. If the defendant does not have sufficient contacts with the state, it is unconstitutional for the state court to consider the dispute. With respect to defamation suits, not only does the defamatory information actually reach a sufficient number of state residents, but also the foreign defendant’s purposeful actions directed at that state are necessary for state court jurisdiction over the out-ofstate defendant to arise. In the case of the media, such a purposeful action might be, for example, selling a significant number of copies of a magazine in that state or advertising its website in that state. However, the posting of defamatory information on a website available in that state does not, by itself, create jurisdiction over the publisher in state courts. If, for example, a foreign-language website describes events outside the United States, a U.S. court would probably not have jurisdiction, even if the plaintiff’s reputation in the United States was damaged. But if an English-language publication on some website intentionally defames a state resident by describing his or her activities in that state, the publication will likely be found to be “directed at” that state, and a state court will consider the defamation claim. The plaintiff’s location in this state in a defamation action is not sufficient to give rise to state court jurisdiction over a defendant who does not have sufficient minimal contacts in the state. To hear such a dispute in that state would violate the defendant’s constitutional right to “due process” because of the burdensome nature of his participation in the process.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Den Otter

Although several American legal scholars have defended the constitutional right to marry more than one person at the same time on substantive due process or equal-protection grounds, few have underscored the possibility that plural marriage could be beneficial. The standard liberal approach eschews comparative judgments between monogamy and polyamory, ultimately depending on the value of the exercise of autonomy for its own sake. The problem is that those who employ it must remain reticent about the benefits that the legal recognition of polyamorous marriage may produce. In this chapter, I formulate an atypical constitutional argument for polyamorous marriage, drawing inspiration from John Stuart Mill’s well-known idea of experiments of living, rooted in the benefits of unconventional beliefs and practices. I try to explain why polyamory can be a superior marital arrangement for some people under some circumstances. Such marital experiments also may assist polyamorists in becoming better human beings.


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