scholarly journals O problema dos paradigmas nas práticas jornalísticas

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (27) ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Djenane Arraes Moreira ◽  
Gustavo de Castro

O jornalismo é uma atividade cujos estudiosos apontam possuir os próprios paradigmas. Mas existe ciência nessas afirmações? Este artigo tem como objetivo traçar um percurso teórico-histórico sobre o conceito de paradigma. Partimos da popularização do termo com a publicação da obra A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (1998), do físico estadunidense Thomas Kuhn. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica, mostramos como o conceito foi problematizado e remodelado no âmbito das ciências sociais e, em especial, pelos estudiosos do jornalismo, entre eles Jean Charron e Jean De Bonville, que criaram a teoria dos paradigmas do jornalismo. Nossa conclusão aponta para a necessidade da apropriação do termo pelos estudiosos do jornalismo a fim de dar legitimidade acadêmica a essa prática social.Palavras-chave: Thomas Kuhn; paradigmas do jornalismo; estudos de jornalismo; Jean Charron; Jean De Bonville.The problem of paradigms in journalistic practicesAbstractJournalism is an activity whose scholars point to having its own paradigms. But is there science in these claims? This article aims to outline a theoretical-historical path about the concept of paradigm. We started with the popularization of the term with the publication of the book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1998), by the American physicist Thomas Kuhn. Through a bibliographic review, we show how the concept was problematized and remodeled in the scope of social sciences and, in particular, by scholars of journalism, among them Jean Charron and Jean De Bonville, who created the theory of journalism paradigms. Our conclusion points to the need for the appropriation of the term by scholars of journalism in order to give academic legitimacy to this social practice. Keywords: Thomas Kuhn; paradigms of journalism; Journalism Studies; Jean Charron; Jean De Bonville.

1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilana Löwy

O médico e epistemologista Ludwik Fleck desenvolveu, nas décadas de 1920-30, uma abordagem bastante original para o estudo das ciências. Ele apoiou sua epistemologia em duas bases: por um lado, em sua própria experiência profissional de bacteriologista e imunologista; por outro, na reflexão da Escola Polonesa de Filosofia da Medicina sobre as práticas dos médicos. Tal escola julga que os 'fatos científicos' são construídos por comunidades de pesquisadores - segundo os termos de Fleck, "coletivos de pensamento". Cada coletivo de pensamento elabora um "estilo de pensamento" único, composto pelo conjunto de normas, saberes e práticas partilhados por tal coletivo. Os recém-chegados são socializados em seu estilo de pensamento particular e adotam, portanto, seu olhar específico sobre o mundo. Os fatos científicos produzidos pelos membros de um dado coletivo de pensamento trazem sempre a marca de seu estilo de pensamento. Graças a isso, eles são incomensuráveis com os 'fatos' produzidos por outros coletivos de pensamento. A incomensurabilidade dos fatos científicos, aumentadas pela necessidade de 'traduzi-los' em outro estilo de pensamento para sua utilização pelas outras comunidades profissionais é, aos olhos de Fleck, uma fonte importante de inovação nas ciências e na sociedade. Por muito tempo esquecidas, as idéias de Fleck foram redescobertas nas décadas de 1960-70, em primeiro lugar por Thomas Kuhn (que, na introdução de The structure of scientific revolutions presta uma homenagem explícita à sua obra), depois pelos sociólogos das ciências. Além de sua influência diretamente perceptível, a epistemologia de Fleck mostra profundas afinidades com as novas tendências que se afirmam no estudo das ciências: a consideração das práticas dos pesquisadores e o interesse por suas técnicas materiais, discursivas e sociais.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. p1
Author(s):  
Adam Biela

Thomas Kuhn regarded the Copernican Revolution (CR) as the one which best illustrates the nature of scientific revolutions in the history of science. This is related with the essence of the paradigm in a Kuhnian sense that is a mental shift involving change in the theories, instruments, values and assumptions used to understand a set of phenomena. Copernicus had to change the well-established geocentric system, which functioned not only in the science of his day but also in the culture, tradition, social perception, and even the mentality of religious and political The concept of Paradigm of Unity (PU) is used to denote the societal activity of Chiara Lubich and the Focolare Movemen—in building the psychosocial infrastructure for unity in various social domains; for example, in the economy of communion, in politics (politicians for unity project), in public media (journalists for unity), in ecumenism and interreligious contacts (ecumenical and interreligious Focolari Centers). This conception is a great inspiration, a kind of Copernican revolution for the social sciences, which would motivate researchers in the social sciences to build their own research paradigm with a mental and methodological power and potentiality that could offer new vision to the social sciences (as Copernicus did in the natural sciences).


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Tipler ◽  
Wesley Bollinger

If, as Thomas Kuhn suggested in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Copernicus was not superior to Ptolemy, why was Ptolemy rejected? Was Copernican theory more elegant? Frank Tipler shows that Tycho Brahe compared their predictions with his own observations. The winner, on balance, was Copernicus.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (29) ◽  
pp. 31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robinson Guitarrari ◽  
Caetano Ernesto Plastino

Desde The structure of scientific revolutions em 1962 até artigos da década de 70, Thomas Kuhn utilizou a incomensurabilidade entre paradigmas para caracterizar a mudança de compromissos teóricos e práticos nas ciências maduras, destacando aspectos ontológicos, semânticos e epistemológicos. A tese geral afirma a inexistência de uma instância supraparadigmática que resolva conflitos entre comunidades científicas que defendam paradigmas rivais. As primeiras críticas indicavam a irracionalidade que sua defesa instauraria. Críticas de Shapere e de Sheffler incidiram sobre a formulação semântica. Em resposta, Doppelt, defendendo um quadro kuhniano da dinâmica da ciência, destacou que a incomensurabilidade epistemológica seria a mais básica, e que, além disso, ela evitaria as críticas dirigidas à versão semântica. Putnam, posteriormente, também considerou apenas a incomensurabilidade semântica para mostrar a irracionalidade do relativismo kuhniano. Contra Doppelt, mostramos que não há uma redução dos aspectos semânticos aos epistemológicos. São dimensões distintas de um mesmo conceito. Contudo, a favor de Doppelt, entendemos que a dimensão epistemológica acarreta formas de relativismos que se impõem como desafios aos críticos que apenas se detiveram em sua dimensão semântica.


Author(s):  
Paulo Pirozelli

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn resorts to concepts from several disciplines in order to describe the general patterns of scientific development. This blend of disciplines can be explained in part by Kuhn's intellectual path, from physics to history and then to philosophy of science; but it also points to a deeper methodological problem, which is the question of what is the real unity of analysis in his model of science. The primary intention of this article is, thus, to give a solution to this difficulty. The answer, I believe, rests on identifying three fundamental units present in Kuhn's theory of scientific development. They are, respectively, the individual, responsible for producing evidence, spreading information, and choosing theories; the community, a set of scientists investigating a series of phenomena; and the groups, individuals with similar behavior but with looser institutional or social ties — a usually neglected category in Kuhnian literature, but equally fundamental for the final outcome of scientific debates. After investigating these categories in detail, I propose a way of integrating them into a general model for explaining the resolution of scientific controversies. Finally, I try to resolve the apparent conflict among disciplinary vocabularies by offering an account of the function of sociological, psychological, and epistemological concepts for describing controversies, and some of the methodologies appropriate for each of these tasks.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-677
Author(s):  
Student

William James observed that we live forwards but we understand backwards. He used this phrase to express his conviction that the creative, novelty-seeking surge of life comes first and that reflection, articulation, classification, analysis, and understanding come later. Whether or not something constitutes progress depends not upon reaching some preexisting goal but upon the distance traveled from where we have been to where we are now. To understand something is to judge it in the light of already known criteria. In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, philosopher Thomas Kuhn argues that we understand science better if we do not think of it as evolving toward anything. We need not see science "as the one enterprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by nature in advance." The success of science rests in how far it travels "from the community's state of knowledge at any given time."


2015 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICOLAS GUILHOT

AbstractBeyond the initial infatuation with his work, Kuhn’sStructure of Scientific Revolutionshas had a lasting impact on the field of International Relations. The article analyses the reception of Kuhn in IR and suggests that it contributed to overcoming the ‘second debate’ by making science and realism fully compatible. More importantly, Kuhn offered a vision of science in which scientific communities operated on the basis of realist principles. This not only consolidated the academic hold of neorealism, but transformed realism into a theory of knowledge, which its critics have failed to acknowledge. This lasting transformation is analysed by looking at Kuhn’s influence on the classic studies of strategic decision-making by Graham Allison and Robert Jervis.


Author(s):  
Joyce Appleby ◽  
Elizabeth Covington ◽  
David Hoyt ◽  
Michael Latham ◽  
Allison Sneider

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