scholarly journals The Paradigm of Unity (PU) as the Basis for a “Copernican Revolution” (CR) in the Social Sciences (Note 1)

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. p1
Author(s):  
Adam Biela

Thomas Kuhn regarded the Copernican Revolution (CR) as the one which best illustrates the nature of scientific revolutions in the history of science. This is related with the essence of the paradigm in a Kuhnian sense that is a mental shift involving change in the theories, instruments, values and assumptions used to understand a set of phenomena. Copernicus had to change the well-established geocentric system, which functioned not only in the science of his day but also in the culture, tradition, social perception, and even the mentality of religious and political The concept of Paradigm of Unity (PU) is used to denote the societal activity of Chiara Lubich and the Focolare Movemen—in building the psychosocial infrastructure for unity in various social domains; for example, in the economy of communion, in politics (politicians for unity project), in public media (journalists for unity), in ecumenism and interreligious contacts (ecumenical and interreligious Focolari Centers). This conception is a great inspiration, a kind of Copernican revolution for the social sciences, which would motivate researchers in the social sciences to build their own research paradigm with a mental and methodological power and potentiality that could offer new vision to the social sciences (as Copernicus did in the natural sciences).

Author(s):  
Adam Biela

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to show the methodological power and potentiality of the concept paradigm of unity introduced originally in the ceremony on the occasion of honoring Chiara Lubich with the doctor honoris causa title by the Catholic University of Lublin in 1996. Originally this conception was used to suggest the societal activity of Chiara Lubich in building, via the Focolari movement, psychosocial infrastructures for unity in various social domains, (for example in the economy of communion, in politics (politicians for unity project), in public media (journalists for unity), in ecumenism and inter-religious contacts (ecumenical and inter-religion Focolari Centers) This conception is a kind of a great inspiration (a kind of Copernican revolution in the social sciences) which would motivate the social sciences to build their own research paradigm of a type of mental and methodological power and potentiality which could give a new vision of social world (as Copernicus did in natural sciences (Biela, 1996, 2006)). Thomas Kuhn (1962) regarded the Copernician revolution as the one which, in the history of science, best illustrates the nature of scientific revolution. The essence of paradigm in a Kuhnian sense is a mentality change in its nature. Copernicus had to change the well-established geocentric system which functioned not only in the science of his day but also in culture, tradition, social perception, and even in the mentality of religious and political authorities. And he did it in a well prepared empirical, methodological and psychological way. In a similar way Chiara Lubich created by her social acting a revolutionary inspiration for building paradigm in social science She decided in an extremely difficult and risky situation in 1944 in Trento not only to escape from her own life emergency but she with her friends made a decision to help other people who were in a much more difficult situation to survive. She decided to take a war bombing risk to be with lost children and older people who were in need. It was a practical building of the unity with the real people who were in need. This kind of experience rediscovered the community as a model for the real life and made a concretization and clarification of the charisma of the unity. However, the development of this charisma shows that it is simply a concrete and practical actualization of the new vision of social, economic, political and religious relationships which advises, recommends, suggests, and promotes the unity with others persons (Lubich, 2007).


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Schröter

This chapter is a modified translation of the foreword to the Handbuch Medienwissenschaft(Handbook of Media Studies, Schröter ed.) published in Germany in 2014. The purpose ofthis handbook is to provide an overview of the vibrant and heterogeneous field ofkulturwissenschaftliche Medienwissenschaft – media studies as oriented toward humanitiesand cultural studies interests and approaches rather than those of communication studiesand the social sciences, subsequently referred to simply as “media studies.” Some of thecategories used to structure the handbook have been generated from the historicaldiscussions in the field; and inevitably, these same historical discussions have shown thedifficulties of defining the external boundaries of the field of media studies, its internaldifferentiations and the way they re-connect to traditional disciplines. It gives an overview ofthe history of the disciplinary constitution of ‘media studies’ with a special focus on differentapproaches to disciplinary self-reflection that have accompanied the field from the verybeginning.2 In this way, it introduces the reader to a variety of sources not very well known inthe Anglophone world. Therefore, the penultimate section of this chapter, originally titled “The structure of this handbook” might on the one hand appear to some to be too specific for the current volume. On the other hand, however, it serves as a concrete example of how the field may be configured.


2012 ◽  
Vol 67 (03) ◽  
pp. 391-399
Author(s):  
Didier Lett

The concept of gender has become such an important subject in international historiography over the last two decades that it might appear odd to devote an entire dossier of the Annales to the topic. However, the relative success of this field of research may also conceal ambiguities in both the intellectual project underlying the term as well as its reception in the social sciences. For certain authors, undertaking a history of gender has meant writing a history of women. Though this form of history now enjoys proper recognition, it is still depreciated in two ways: on the one hand, it is qualified as a militant—and therefore unscholarly—history; and, on the other, it is criticized according to some vague argument claiming that no matter how it is labeled—“gender” or “women”—the inquiry is already dated. Without a doubt, the now canonical expression “history of women and gender” has generated real confusion among those scholars who are not particularly engaged with the field.1


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.


2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilan Pappe

One of the most obvious reasons why historians — both professional and academic — find it difficult to challenge hegemonic narratives is psychological. No one wants to be a pariah in their own society by running against the mainstream and finding themselves in an isolated position. But I think there’s a deeper level to why historians have found it so difficult (maybe unlike some of their colleagues in the social sciences) to provide narratives which challenge the one which dominates their society’s media, culture and academia. And that reason, I think, is that challenging historiographical mythology is not just about facts, it’s also about rethinking the role of the historian. It is about being able to update oneself on developments in historiography and even (which is perhaps more difficult I think for historians) in philosophy. This focuses the question on what is reality, what is fiction, what is myth, and what is a fact. I found that one of the most challenging tasks in dealing with the history of my own country, both for Jewish and Palestinian historians, was not just to provide a different narrative to the one that prevails, but also to be able to tie in the concrete discussion with a more epistemological understanding of what history is and how history is received by the public at large.


1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wayne Parsons

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of his argument, T. S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions continues to have a significant impact on the way in which economics and other social sciences view themselves. Indeed, it could be said that Kuhn's influence has been much the greater on the more methodologically disposed social sciences than upon the natural sciences to which his original thesis was addressed. However, since the first flush of enthusiasm for Kuhn amongst the social sciences there has emerged, as Keith Tribe has noted, a growing unease with the thesis on the grounds that it is ‘not capable of doing the work that it is called upon to perform’. Nevertheless, despite these new found doubts Kuhn's ideas still provide – to use a ‘Kuhnian’ expression – a powerful ‘framework’ through which changes in economic theory, such as the ‘Keynesian Revolution’, may be understood. Because consideration of such matters has been primarily the preserve of economists preoccupied with the development of techniques of economic analysis, rather than of students of politics concerned with the history of ideas, other issues, such as Keynes's notion of theoretical change and revolution, have in the analysis of the ‘Keynesian Revolution’ been neglected. Indeed, as Axel Leijonhufvud has observed, the absence from the debate on the structure of scientific revolutions of philosophically disposed case studies from economics and other social sciences has itself left social science ‘unsure about what exactly we can learn from it’.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 289-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Dietrich Bracher

IN THE FIELDS OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND POLITICAL science, the German discussion during the past thirty years has taken many unexpected turns. On the one hand, the expansion of political and social studies has led to often very exaggerated forms of specialization and theorization; the quantity of books and articles either on methodology or on fragmented details can hardly be mastered even by dedicated professionals. On the other hand, symptomatic of profound changes on the institutional and political level of German society is a marked polarization among social and political scientists, which has taken place mainly during the past ten to fifteen years; the historians are following the trend by confronting the ‘progressive’ methods of social and structural analysis with the ‘traditional’ history of persons, events and institutions. At the same time, an increasing demand for more personnel and more funds in the field of the social sciences, initially justified by the scarcity of public support, has now been followed by critical doubts about the expanding number of students and academic people pressing for positions.


Author(s):  
Mats Alvesson ◽  
Yiannis Gabriel ◽  
Roland Paulsen

This chapter introduces ‘the problem’ of meaningless research in the social sciences. Over the past twenty years there has been an enormous growth in research publications, but never before in the history of humanity have so many social scientists written so much to so little effect. Academic research in the social sciences is often inward looking, addressed to small tribes of fellow researchers, and its purpose in what is increasingly a game is that of getting published in a prestigious journal. A wide gap has emerged between the esoteric concerns of social science researchers and the pressing issues facing today’s societies. The chapter critiques the inaccessibility of the language used by academic researchers, and the formulaic qualities of most research papers, fostered by the demands of the publishing game. It calls for a radical move from research for the sake of publishing to research that has something meaningful to say.


Dreyfus argues that there is a basic methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, a difference that derives from the different goals and practices of each. He goes on to argue that being a realist about natural entities is compatible with pluralism or, as he calls it, “plural realism.” If intelligibility is always grounded in our practices, Dreyfus points out, then there is no point of view from which one can ask about or provide an answer to the one true nature of ultimate reality. But that is consistent with believing that the natural sciences can still reveal the way the world is independent of our theories and practices.


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