scholarly journals Practice Of Accounting Conservatism In MBE Firms

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1785 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Hyun Park ◽  
Jaywon Lee

Managers sometimes manage earnings upward (i.e., engage in earnings management) or guide analyst forecasts downward (i.e., engage in expectation management) to meet or beat analysts earnings forecasts (MBE). Our results suggest that certain management behavior to achieve MBE is highly associated with firms level of accounting conservatism. In detail, we find that (1) the level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years, (2) engaging in earnings management to achieve MBE lowers firms level of conservatism, and (3) firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years (CMBE firms) whose credit rating had been elevated practice less conservative accounting implying that the MBE string itself might act as a substitute for conservative accounting in lowering firms cost of debt.

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Howard ◽  
Warren Maroun ◽  
Robert Garnett

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) using adjusted earnings as a part of an impression expectation management strategy focused on demonstrating how reported earnings measures meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach A multiple response analysis approach is used. Earnings adjustments are coded according to a defined typology and assessed for their status as either valid or invalid. The number of occurrences of adjusted earnings measures over a five year period (2010-2014) meeting or beating analyst forecasts is calculated. Findings The use of adjusted earnings by JSE listed companies is a common occurrence. There is evidence to suggest that this is used part of an impression expectation management strategy. Most of the adjustments are invalid. When otherwise valid adjustments are used in a particular year, these are frequently repeated, and when adjusted earnings are reported, these normally exceed analysts’ forecasts. Research limitations/implications The paper is based on a relatively small sample from a single jurisdiction and limited time period. Nevertheless, the findings point to the need to revisit how financial performance is measured and reported, evaluate additional regulation to protect investors and understand in more detail exactly how and why companies use adjusted earnings as an impression expectation management tool. Originality/value The paper adds to the limited body of research on performance reporting outside of the USA and Europe. It also examines the use of adjusted earnings in a unique setting where, in addition to IFRS numbers, companies are required to report a mandatory adjusted earnings figure (headline earnings).


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 366-384
Author(s):  
Qiuhong Zhao

Purpose This study aims to investigate whether firms engage in earnings management behavior that attempts to manipulate Credit Rating Agency (CRA) perceptions during the Watchlist process and, if so, whether earnings management behavior appears to influence CRAs’ decisions. Design/methodology/approach To measure earnings management activities, this paper computes accrual-based and real earnings management measures in the year or in the quarter immediately before the Watchlist resolutions for all negative and positive Watchlist firms. To examine the association between the levels of earnings management and Watchlist resolutions, a logit model is applied to the data obtained from a sample of Watchlist firms. Findings Some evidence suggests that managers in Watchlist firms manage earnings in attempts to gain favorable Watchlist treatment. The findings are consistent with the Graham et al.’s (2005) survey evidence, which shows that one of the primary reasons for earnings management is to gain (or preserve) a desirable rating. In addition, CRAs appear to be misled by these attempts during the negative Watchlist process period. Research limitations/implications The findings support SEC’s (2011, 2013a, 2013b) rules to reduce its reliance on credit ratings and the recent regulation reforms concerning the competition in the rating industry [the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (2006)], and concerning conflicts of interest of CRAs among others [Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010)]. Originality/value While many studies examine whether managers use discretionary accruals as a tool to manage earnings to obtain favorable ratings, those studies do not consider manipulation of real operating activities to manage earnings and CRA perceptions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anwer S. Ahmed ◽  
Bruce K. Billings ◽  
Richard M. Morton ◽  
Mary Stanford-Harris

Using both a market-based and an accrual-based measure of conservatism, we find that firms facing more severe conflicts over dividend policy tend to use more conservative accounting. Furthermore, we document that accounting conservatism is associated with a lower cost of debt after controlling for other determinants of firms' debt costs. Our collective evidence is consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and in reducing firms' debt costs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 947-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hak Woon Kim ◽  
Sooro Lee

This paper investigates how firms manage the revenue-expense relationship in the presence of a going-concern audit opinion (GCO). Using Korean data, we find that firms with GCOs both delay and accelerate recognition of current expenses for current revenues. We also find that firms in severe financial distress that receive GCOs exhibit conservative accounting, whereas GCO firms in relatively less financial trouble adopt aggressive accounting. Overall, our results imply that firms’ matching extent and behavior provide useful information regarding financial reporting and can explain the earnings management behavior of firms with GCOs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1450005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youngtae Yoo ◽  
Jaehong Lee ◽  
Jinho Chang

The purpose of this paper is to inform investors of differences in opportunistic behavior between managers of BBB- and BB-graded firms as measured by earnings management and accounting conservatism. Previous studies investigate the gaps between grades and between investment and speculative grades by grouping together the various characteristics of investment and speculative firms, assuming that the incentives to make significant economic changes are homogeneously the same. However, this study demonstrates that this is not the case. Using 1,225 Korean firm-year observations, we identify noteworthy features distinguishing BBB- and BB-graded firms. More specifically, in BBB-graded firms, discretionary accruals (DACC) (a proxy used to represent earnings management) are larger than those in BB-graded firms. As for accounting conservatism, BB-graded firms exhibit a higher degree of conservatism than BBB-graded firms. According to the conventional credit rating scenario, higher-graded firms have fewer DACC and are more conservative in comparison with firms of lower grades. However, the results of this study imply that the reverse is true for firms of grades BBB and BB, which are commonly accepted as straddling the border between investment and speculative grades.


Author(s):  
Aziz Xavier Beiruth ◽  
Talles Vianna Brugni ◽  
Mônica Lourdes Marinho ◽  
Fábio Moraes da Costa

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Kang ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo ◽  
Michael C. Wolfe

Previous research shows that accounting conservatism facilitates debt contracting. Extending this line of literature, we examine whether the role of accounting conservatism in accessing external debt to attain firm growth varies with its maturity. We find evidence of a positive relationship between conservatism and debt maturity. We also observe a positive relationship between conservative accounting and future growth funded by all classes of debt, but this relation is due to long-term rather than short-term debt, which is less prone to agency risk. Furthermore, the associations between conservatism and debt maturity and conservatism and growth financed by long-term debt are mostly observed for firms with fewer anti-takeover provisions in place. These findings suggest that the demand for accounting conservatism is not uniform across different debt maturity horizons.


Author(s):  
Kirsten A. Cook ◽  
G. Ryan Huston ◽  
Michael R. Kinney ◽  
Jeffery S. Smith

Prior research demonstrates that manufacturing firms increase production (relative to sales) to transfer fixed costs from cost of goods sold (COGS) to inventory accounts, thereby increasing income to reach or surpass earnings thresholds. We examine how the market reacts to this earnings management strategy. We find that investors respond positively to inventory growth based on an expectation of increased future sales; however, this signal is weaker for inventory manipulators. Further, the market premium from meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts by manipulating inventory is smaller than the premium for achieving this threshold absent inventory manipulation or through accrual manipulation. Finally, we examine firms considered to be “serial” inventory manipulators, finding that the market consistently discounts earnings beats for these firms, suggesting that inventory manipulation erodes investor confidence in firms’ earnings. Collectively, our results provide new insights into a challenge facing operations managers and finance managers in manufacturing firms.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Monteiro Miller

Purpose In a wide variety of settings, individuals target round-numbered thresholds, relaxing effort when they are out of reach. This paper aims to investigate whether this phenomenon occurs in nonprofits as well. Design/methodology/approach The paper empirically examines nonprofits’ propensity to cut expenses relative to the attainability of the zero-profit threshold. Findings This paper finds nonprofit firms are more likely to cut expenses when faced with small expected losses than with larger losses, and this pattern varies predictably with incentives to reach the zero-profit threshold. Research limitations/implications This suggests managers are motivated by desire to reach the zero-profit threshold rather than to improve firms’ economic situations, as the propensity to cut expenses is lower when the threshold is out of reach. Social implications Additionally, the results suggest that even the lack of explicit profit motive may not quell earnings management behavior. Originality/value These results begin to close the gap in our understanding of expense management in nonprofit firms, showing how operating expenses can be used to manage earnings.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiyi Qin ◽  
Jun Cai ◽  
Steven Wei

PurposeIn this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.Design/methodology/approachOur basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.FindingsOur sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.Originality/valueWhen firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.


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