Distinctive Features of BBB- and BB-Graded Firms Using Earnings Management and Conservatism: Evidence from the Korean Market

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1450005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youngtae Yoo ◽  
Jaehong Lee ◽  
Jinho Chang

The purpose of this paper is to inform investors of differences in opportunistic behavior between managers of BBB- and BB-graded firms as measured by earnings management and accounting conservatism. Previous studies investigate the gaps between grades and between investment and speculative grades by grouping together the various characteristics of investment and speculative firms, assuming that the incentives to make significant economic changes are homogeneously the same. However, this study demonstrates that this is not the case. Using 1,225 Korean firm-year observations, we identify noteworthy features distinguishing BBB- and BB-graded firms. More specifically, in BBB-graded firms, discretionary accruals (DACC) (a proxy used to represent earnings management) are larger than those in BB-graded firms. As for accounting conservatism, BB-graded firms exhibit a higher degree of conservatism than BBB-graded firms. According to the conventional credit rating scenario, higher-graded firms have fewer DACC and are more conservative in comparison with firms of lower grades. However, the results of this study imply that the reverse is true for firms of grades BBB and BB, which are commonly accepted as straddling the border between investment and speculative grades.

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (80) ◽  
pp. 216-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edilson Paulo ◽  
Renato Henrique Gurgel Mota

ABSTRACT This study contributes to the literature dealing with the influence of macroeconomic factors on accounting information quality, since it analyzes the earnings management strategies of firms, specifically identifying different discretionary behaviors among economic cycles: 1) different levels of earnings management through accruals between phases of the business cycle, and 2) the trade-off between earnings management through accruals and real earnings management. The results indicate that the accounting information reported should be analyzed with greater caution by its users, especially in periods of great economic oscillations, when managers can increase or reduce opportunistic behavior. The research population comprised non-financial companies with shares traded on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa) and the sample was composed of 247 firms per year, covering the period from 2000 to 2015 and totaling 2,501 observations. The phases of business cycles were used as a proxy for the economic environment and were based on Schumpeter's (1939) study, which divides an business cycle into four distinct phases: expansion, recession, contraction, and recovery. Discretionary accruals were estimated according to the Pae (2005) and Paulo (2007) models. Real earnings management was estimated as described by Roychowdhury (2006), using only the abnormal behavior of production costs and operational decisions. The results of this research show that earnings management strategies, using either accruals or real manipulation, as well as the choice between these strategies, are impacted by the economic environment. The evidence suggests that managers have different opportunistic behavior in each phase of the business cycle. Specifically, they increase the level of discretionary accruals in contractionary phases and reduce it during recoveries, while they manage earnings downwards via real manipulation in recessions and contractions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoon ◽  
Kim ◽  
Lee

Socially responsible firms are believed to behave in a responsible manner to restrict earnings management and thus deliver more reliable and transparent financial information to investors. We test this hypothesis by predicting a higher quality of financial reporting for socially responsible firms in the Korean market. The entire sample analysis provides evidence for the hypothesis in the use of discretionary accruals as proxy variables for the quality of financial reporting. However, our sub-sample analysis indicates that such weak support is driven by a group of environmentally sensitive firms and the affiliates of large family-owned conglomerates, or chaebol. Socially responsible firms are less likely to be involved with earnings management in the group of non-environmentally sensitive industries and non-chaebol affiliates. These firms provide a better quality of financial reporting in terms of both the use of discretionary accruals and real activity manipulations. In line with recent studies, our findings suggest that ethical concerns in producing high-quality financial reports rely significantly on firm characteristics.


Author(s):  
Nan Hu ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Xu Li ◽  
Ling Liu

Purpose Existing literature in experimental accounting research suggests that accounting professionals and people with accounting backgrounds tend to have a lower level of moral reasoning and ethical development. Motivated by these findings, this paper aims to examine whether chief executive officers (CEOs) with accounting backgrounds have an impact on firms’ earnings management behavior and the level of accounting conservatism. Design/methodology/approach The authors classify CEOs into those with and without accounting backgrounds using BoardEx data. Using discretionary accruals from several different models, they do not find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals. However, the authors find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of conservatism, proxied by C-scores and T-scores (Basu, 1997). This finding suggests that CEOs with accounting backgrounds recognize bad news more quickly than good news, consistent with the accounting principle of “anticipating all losses but anticipating no gains”. Findings The authors show that firms whose CEOs have accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of accounting conservatism. However, these firms do not exhibit higher levels of income-increasing discretionary accruals. This study documents the impact of CEOs’ educational backgrounds on firms’ accounting choices and confirms prior findings in experimental accounting research using large sample archival data. Originality/value This paper is the first study that investigates the impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on firms’ financial reporting policy. The findings may have some policy implications. If accounting backgrounds of CEOs can make a significant difference on firms’ behavior, it is reasonable to make CEOs accountable for the quality of financial reporting. This paper is one of the first to empirically test inferences drawn by experimental accounting research. There has been a gap between archival and experimental accounting studies. The authors propose that interesting research questions can be addressed by filling in such a gap.


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1785 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Hyun Park ◽  
Jaywon Lee

Managers sometimes manage earnings upward (i.e., engage in earnings management) or guide analyst forecasts downward (i.e., engage in expectation management) to meet or beat analysts earnings forecasts (MBE). Our results suggest that certain management behavior to achieve MBE is highly associated with firms level of accounting conservatism. In detail, we find that (1) the level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years, (2) engaging in earnings management to achieve MBE lowers firms level of conservatism, and (3) firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years (CMBE firms) whose credit rating had been elevated practice less conservative accounting implying that the MBE string itself might act as a substitute for conservative accounting in lowering firms cost of debt.


2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Young Lee ◽  
Vivek Mande

This study examines how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) affects auditors' incentives to curtail earnings management by client managers. The most significant reform of PSLRA was the elimination of joint and several liability under which auditors and other parties could be named to lawsuits because of ‘deep pockets’ rather than culpability. While the elimination of joint and several liability provides significant relief to auditors from litigation, opponents of PSLRA argue that it discourages meritorious lawsuits and lowers audit quality, reducing investor confidence in markets. The potential benefit would be greatest for Big 6 firms, who have the highest exposure (largest clients) and significant resources to pay damages. In this paper we argue that if PSLRA induces decreases in audit quality, then we should expect increases in the prevalence of accruals after this Act. To investigate this issue we examine the discretionary accruals of a sample of 2,600 companies three years before and after the act. Our results support this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that after PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 firms but not for auditees of non-Big 6 firms.


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Susan Parker ◽  
Gary F. Peters

This study examines the association between audit fees and earnings management, using publicly available fee data. We hypothesize that, due to asymmetric litigation effects, audit fees decrease (increase) with a client's risk of income-decreasing (increasing) earnings management risk. We also hypothesize that the positive relation between income-increasing earnings management risk and audit fees is heightened for clients that are high-growth firms. We test our hypotheses with a sample of 429 public, non-regulated, Big 5 audited companies, using fee data for the year 2000. We find that downward earnings management risk, as estimated by negative (i.e., income-decreasing) discretionary accruals, is associated with lower audit fees. We also document that upward earnings management risk, as estimated by positive discretionary accruals, is associated with higher audit fees and that the interaction of this risk with an industry-adjusted price-earnings ratio has an incrementally significant, positive effect on fees. We interpret our findings as consistent with a conservative bias on the part of auditors. The conservative bias arises from asymmetric litigation risk in which income-increasing discretionary accruals exhibit greater expected litigation costs than income-decreasing discretionary accruals (Simunic and Stein 1996; Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2002; Heninger 2001).


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Temitope Olamide Fagbemi ◽  
Olubunmi Florence Osemene ◽  
Oyinlade Agbaje

Sometimes the rivalry between shareholders and management is an indication of the level of entrenchment within the corporate environment. Managers are believed to routinely manipulate earnings in order to mislead shareholders about their company's actual economic outlook or performance. As a result, the study investigated the impact of managerial entrenchment, firm characteristics and earnings management of conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Employing the ex-post facto research design, the data was gathered from secondary source of the 6 listed conglomerate companies for the 11-year period running (2008-2018). The study used discretionary accruals a proxy for earnings management and to calculate discretionary accruals, the study used modified Jones model. The result showed that management entrenchment and firm characteristics have Impact on multinational firms ' earnings management in Nigeria. Specifically, from the conglomerate’s entrenchment proxies, CEO’s tenure has a positive and significant impact on earnings management (coff. =1.062821, p-value =0.0367) and management entrenchment as measured by CEO’s shareholding has a negative and insignificant effect on earnings management (coff. =-6252391, p-value = 0.4090) while firm size, profitability and leverage indicated a significant and positive impact on earnings management (coff, = 0.124587, p-value = 0.0000; coff. = 0.006647, p-value = 0.0431 and coff. = 0.032065, p-value = 0.0000). The study therefore recommended among others that management should reduce the debt in their capital structure in order to improve their companies’ value and their capital structure should be majorly financed by equity rather than debt and reduce CEOs tenure to minimise earnings management practices.


2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1553-1573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kalyta

ABSTRACT: Empirical research on the impact of managerial retirement on discretionary accounting choices is inconclusive, with most studies finding no evidence of earnings management in the pre-retirement period. I argue that income-increasing accounting choices in final pre-retirement years are particularly appealing to managers whose pension depends on firm performance in these years. Using primary data on retired CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms, I investigate the impact of CEO pension plans on discretionary accruals. Consistent with the prediction, I find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when CEO pension is based on firm performance. I also report evidence of negative abnormal market reaction to CEO retirement in firms with performance-contingent CEO pensions.


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