scholarly journals The Notion of Effectiveness in the Law of the European Union

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Łukasz Stępkowski

THE NOTION OF EFFECTIVENESS IN THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNIONThe work submitted herein aims to address the question of effectiveness of EU law. Effectiveness of that law is subject to an ongoing controversy, as there is no agreement in legal literature either on the legal status of effectiveness or its use by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The author undertakes to outline the grounding of effectiveness in EU law in relation to both written law and jurisprudence of the Court. The work assumes the use of the descriptive approach in the legal doctrine, specifically the explanatory non-normative legal doctrine by A.R. Mackor. In this manner, this paper elects to present descriptive statements with extensive use of the Court’s case law as a feature to establish the content of applicable law. This work takes account of the law and jurisprudence as they were on 11th of October 2015.

Climate Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Suzanne Kingston

In EU law the polluter pays principle (ppp) enjoys constitutional status: Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (tfeu) enshrines it among the fundamental principles of the EU’s environmental policy. This article considers the legal status and development of the ppp in EU law, in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) and in EU policy, most recently in the EU’s Green New Deal. It goes on to identify three bodies of climate-related litigation where the ppp has been most influential to date: first, cases concerning the EU ets and emissions; second, cases concerning EU energy law; and third, cases concerning EU state-aid law. The conclusion reflects on the potential role of the ppp in other areas, including climate cases based on human and environmental rights, and climate cases brought against private parties.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federica Falconi

Riassunto: Il presente contributo propone una breve analisi della prassi applicativa italiana in relazione al regolamento (UE) n. 1259/2010 in tema di legge applicabile al divorzio e alla separazione personale. Solo in un ristretto numero di casi le parti si sono avvalse della facoltà di optio legis loro concessa dall’art. 5 del regolamento, accordando preferenza alla legge nazionale comune. Più spesso, in mancanza di un accordo delle parti, la legge applicabile è individuata in applicazione dell’art. 8: ciò conduce nella maggior parte delle ipotesi all’applicazione della legge dello Stato di residenza abituale dei coniugi, con il risultato di favorire l’integrazione sociale e ripristinando altresì la corrispondenza tra forum e jus.Parole chiave: Regolamento (UE) n. 1259/2010, divorzio e separazione personale, conflitti di leggi, diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea, optio legis, legge applicabile in mancanza di scelta.Abstract: This article offers a brief analysis of the Italian case-law concerning Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 on the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. Only in a few cases, spouses have chosen the applicable law according to Article 5, by designating the law of their State of nationality. More frequently, absent a valid choice by the spouses, the law applicable to divorce or legal separation has been determined in accordance with Article 8: this usually leads to the application of the law of the country where the spouses are habitually resident, thereby promoting social integration and also restoring the correspondence between forum and jus.Keywords: Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010, divorce and legal separation, conflict-of-laws rules; private international law of the European Union, choice of law agreement, applicable law in the absence of a choice by the parties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 139-167
Author(s):  
Ester Herlin-Karnell ◽  
Theodore Konstadinides

Abstract The principle of consistency has a prominent place in EU law. In the Treaty of Lisbon, it constitutes an umbrella under which a number of legal principles of EU law follow as corollaries. Consistency manifests itself within both horizontal and vertical levels of governance. This chapter will unpack this principle and will focus on the broader implications of consistency for the division of powers in EU law. In doing so, the authors aim to discuss the rise of consistency in EU law and decrypt its various constitutional expressions in order to determine its scope of application. Two notions of consistency are presented: a formal one that appears in the Treaty of Lisbon and a strategic one, prominent in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that consistency is relevant to both traditional (integrationist) and alternative (differentiated) routes to European integration. The chapter concludes by discussing whether the undefined nature of ‘consistency’ puts it at risk of becoming an empty vessel.


2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eirik Bjorge

This article questions whether the law of the European Union (eu) can impose jurisdictional constraints on so-called intra-eu investment arbitration proceedings. Would an arbitral tribunal hearing an intra-eu case under either a bilateral investment treaty (bit) or under the Energy Charter Treaty (ect) have to declare itself incompetent to conduct the case proceedings owing to the operation of eu law? This article subjects that proposition to criticism, finding that, for a number of reasons, connected either with the drafting of the bit or the ect or the operation of general principles of international law, it does not withstand scrutiny. An arbitral tribunal seized of a treaty claim under a bit or the ect cannot rely on eu law to negate rights expressly granted under the instrument providing for its jurisdiction.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-27
Author(s):  
Ondrej Hamuľák ◽  
David Kopal ◽  
Tanel Kerikmäe

The aim of this paper is to determine the position of the CJEU towards the national identity with regard to its case law and whether the Court gives preference to the national identity or to the primacy of EU law during the balancing between the constitutional principles and the interests of member states with EU law. The introductory part of the paper addresses the insertion and the development of the national identity clause in the primary law. Its main part consists of analysis of the case law of the CJEU, as well as of the opinions of Advocates General, in the period before and after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-52
Author(s):  
Marco Galimberti

Twenty years after its drafting and more than one decade after its entry into force, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has ceased to be part of British law as a consequence of Brexit. Looking into this issue raised by the UK withdrawal from the European Union, the essay sheds some light on the legal status and impact of the EU Bill of Rights in the British legal order. Against this background, the article detects a connection between the UK Supreme Court’s case law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the direct effect of the Charter. From this perspective, the analysis highlights the implications of the UK departure from the Charter and disentanglement from the Luxembourg case law, thus arguing that they may weaken the standards of fundamental rights protection.


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