scholarly journals ¿Compartir contenidos en línea o no? Un análisis del artículo 17 de la Directiva sobre ropiedad intelectual en el mercado único digital = To upload or not – an analysis of art. 17 of the Directive on copyright in the digital single market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 962
Author(s):  
Gerald Spindler

Resumen: El “filtro de carga” para las plataformas de intercambio en línea ha sido uno de los temas más candentes en relación con la nueva Directiva 2019/790 sobre derechos de autor y derechos afines en el Mercado Único Digital (DCMUD). La batalla continúa en el ámbito nacional a la hora de afrontar la correcta y equilibrada transposición del art. 17 DCMUD, en particular en lo que respecta a garantizar la libertad de expresión. Este ensayo explora el sistema de responsabilidad del citado art. 17 y analiza su potencial contradicción con los derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea, tal y como han sido ponderados por el TJUE en el asunto SABAM Netlog y otros recientes, en particular, con la pro­hibición de deberes generales de control y supervisión. Aunque sería posible argumentar que el art. 17 DCMUD podría superar ese examen de contraste, el precepto articula varias opciones de transposición que podrían emplearse para garantizar los derechos de los usuarios y la libertad de expresión.Palabras clave: propiedad intelectual, derechos de autor, plataformas de intermediación, puertos seguros, filtros de carga, contenidos digitales, contenidos generados por los usuarios, derechos funda­mentales, libertad de expresión, liability, e-commerce.Abstract: The “upload-filter” for online sharing platforms have been one of the hot issues regar­ding the new DSM-directive on copyright. The battle continues at the national level concerning the correct and balanced implementation of Art. 17 DSM-D, in particular regarding the guarantee of free­dom of speech. The article explores the liability system of Art. 17 DSM-D and analyzes its potential contradiction to fundamental EU rights which has been laid down by the CJEU in the SABAM Netlog case, in particular the prohibition of general monitoring duties. Even though one might argue that Art. 17 DSM-D could pass that test the article develops several implementation options in order to safeguard user rights and freedom of speech.Keywords: copyright, intermediary platforms, safe harbours, upload filters, digital contents, user generated contents, fundamental rights, right of free speech, responsabilidad, comercio electrónico.

Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

Este artículo es un estudio relativo a la tutela judicial de los Derechos Fundamentales cuando se aplica Derecho de la Unión en el ámbito interno, y a cuáles son los principales problemas con los que se topa el Juez nacional que aplica el Derecho de la Unión al llevar a cabo dicha función protectora. El trabajo, dicho de forma más concreta, se centra en el examen de una serie de recientes y decisivas resoluciones jurisdiccionales, dictadas tanto por parte del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como por parte del Tribunal Constitucional Español, que analizan problemas y señalan soluciones relativas a esas cuestiones, además de mostrar cuál es la evolución y el estado de la situación al respecto. Se trata de resoluciones que abordan cuestiones de fondo, como, por ejemplo: ¿hasta qué punto es posible utilizar estándares nacionales de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales en situaciones conectadas con el Derecho de la Unión o con su aplicación, en lugar de utilizar el sistema de protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea? Y asimismo, resoluciones que atienden a cuestiones de dimensión más procesal como la de dirimir hasta qué punto tiene autonomía el Juez nacional a la hora de plantear una petición prejudicial (se entiende a la hora de tutelar derechos reconocidos por normas de la Unión) en relación a las normas procesales nacionales.This article deals with the judicial protection of fundamental rights when EU Law is applied at national level and the main problems national judges have to deal with when applying EU Law as protectors of rights. More precisely, the work is focused on the examination of some recent and decisive judicial decisions, both by the European Court of Justice and by the Spanish Constitutional Court which analyze the problems and address the solutions to those questions besides showing the evolution and current situation in that regard. They are decisions that deal with the merits as for example to which extent it might be possible to use national standards of protection of fundamental rights in situations connected to EU Law or to its application instead of using the system of protection of EU human rights. Likewise, they are decisions which handle with more procedural questions as for example to what extent national judges are autonomous to file a preliminary question (it is understood that when it comes time to protect rights acknowledged by the EU) relative to national procedural rules.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Eran Fish

Memory laws are often accused of enforcing an inaccurate, manipulative or populist view of history. Some are also said to violate fundamental rights, in particular the right to free speech. These accusations are not entirely unjustified. Yet, a discussion of memory legislation that concentrates on these faults might be missing its mark. The main problem with memory legislation is not necessarily with the merits of any particular law. Rather, the determination of historical facts is not the kind of matter that should be entrusted to the legislator in the first place. The role of legislation is to make social cooperation possible despite substantial disagreement, but only when such social cooperation is indeed required. Disputes about historical facts, I argue, are not a coordination problem that requires a legislative solution. Still less can they justify legal coercion.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Felix Schwemer ◽  
Jens Schovsbo

Article 17 of the Directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market (the DSM Directive) has strengthened the protection of copyright holders. Moving forward, online content-sharing providers will be responsible for copyright infringement unless the use of works on their platforms is authorized or if they have made ‘best efforts’ to obtain an authorization and prevent the availability of unlicensed works. At the same time, the Directive has made it clear that users of protected works shall be able to rely on the existing limitations and exceptions regarding quotation, criticism and review and caricature, parody or pastiche. The Directive even casts these limitations and exceptions as user rights. This paper points out that copyright’s limitations and exceptions have traditionally consti- tuted a corner stone in the internal balancing of the interests of users against rights holders and with a clear view of safeguarding the interests of free expression and information protected by the Charter. Given the overall purpose of the DSM Directive in strengthening the position of rights holders, there is a dire risk that the benefits of the limitations and exceptions evaporate in the attempts of platform operators to escape liability by use of algorithmic enforcement. The article uses the recent decisions of the CJEU in Pelham, Funke Medien and Spiegel Online to draw attention to the central importance of the limitations and exception as the primary channel for fundamental rights analyses in copyright. It is finally pointed out how the DSM Directive –despite of its on-the-paper recognition of users’ rights– is most likely going to lead to a devaluation of those same rights.


2021 ◽  
Vol specjalny (XXI) ◽  
pp. 413-426
Author(s):  
Helena Szewczyk

The improvement in the quality of life of an employed person and his/her sustainable development are the basis of the concept of work-life balance. In this concept, the professional and private spheres are of equal importance and should complement and strengthen each other. The objective of ILO Convention 156 and ILO recommendation 165 related to it, is to ensure equal treatment and equal opportunities in the scope of employment and professional activity of working women and men who fulfill family responsibilities. Art. 33 section 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European pillar of social rights provides accordingly. The permanence of marriage and equal rights of spouses are among the basic principles of Polish family law. Equal rights of women and men in the context of equal rights of persons carrying out parental and care responsibilities are a fundamental constitutional principle in our country. Therefore, new legal regulations at the EU and national level concerning the balance between the professional and private life of parents and guardians are necessary. It should be de lege ferenda called for the inclusion of the concept of balance between professional and private life of working people who perform parental and guardian functions in labor law and family and guardianship law in a wider scope. It seems that nowadays the most important problem is the introduction of legal solutions in the field of work exemptions, employee holidays and more flexible working hours for employees who have care responsibilities towards the elderly or chronically ill (parents, parents-in-law, siblings) to the Labor Code


Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis

This chapter examines the jurisprudence of national courts on crisis-related measures. The material presented in this chapter will be divided into two parts. First, this chapter will examine some of the most important judgments delivered by courts in lender states during the Euro crisis, the emphasis being on the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court. These cases primarily focus on the effects of financial assistance mechanisms and revised EU fiscal governance rules on the principle of democracy, parliamentary prerogatives, and national budgetary powers. A further strand of case law focuses on the measures adopted by the European Central Bank. Second, this chapter will look at review by national courts in borrower states, the principal focus being on social challenges brought by austerity-hit litigants in Greece. The comparative analysis sheds light on the different types of challenge facing courts in borrower and lender states, as well as the different starting points and the subtle differences in the reasoning provided by courts in their judgments. As regards borrower states in particular, the twin challenge is to examine to what extent litigants had any success in challenging in national courts the bailout conditions; and the extent to which arguments about civil or socio-economic rights had purchase at national level. The chapter further looks at review by national courts in other jurisdictions, as well as review by supranational and international courts or bodies. Last, it puts forward a number of ideas on fundamental rights adjudication in times of economic crisis.


2020 ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Amy Aronson

In June 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act, suspending basic civil liberties in the name of wartime national security. Suddenly, peace work seemed dangerously untenable, even to some in movement leadership. Nevertheless, the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) voted to test the new wartime laws, campaigning to prevent a draft and devising a new category of military exemption based on conscience. But continuing tensions threatened to rupture the AUAM from the inside. Lillian Wald and Paul Kellogg wanted to resign. Eastman proposed an eleventh-hour solution: create a single, separate legal bureau for the maintenance of fundamental rights in wartime—free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, and liberty of conscience. The new bureau became the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). However, Eastman’s hopes to shape and oversee that work, keeping it focused on internationalism and global democracy, were not to be. The birth of her child sidelined her while Roger Baldwin, arriving at a critical time for the country and the organization, took charge and made the bureau his own.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Geiger ◽  
Bernd Justin Jütte

Abstract The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM Directive) introduced a change of paradigm with regard to the liability of some platforms in the European Union. Under the safe harbour rules of the Directive on electronic commerce (E-Commerce Directive), intermediaries in the EU were shielded from liability for acts of their users committed through their services, provided they had no knowledge of it. Although platform operators could be required to help enforce copyright infringements online by taking down infringing content, the E-commerce Directive also drew a very clear line that intermediaries could not be obliged to monitor all communications of their users and install general filtering mechanisms for this purpose. The Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed this in a series of cases, amongst other reasons because filtering would restrict the fundamental rights of platform operators and users of intermediary services. Twenty years later, the regime for online intermediaries in the EU has fundamentally shifted with the adoption of Art. 17 CDSM Directive, the most controversial and hotly debated provision of this piece of legislation. For a specific class of online intermediaries known as ‘online content-sharing providers’ (OCSSPs), uploads of infringing works by their users now result in direct liability and they are required undertake ‘best efforts’ to obtain authorization for such uploads. With this new responsibility come further obligations which oblige OCSSPs to make best efforts to ensure that works for which they have not obtained authorization are not available on their services. How exactly OCSSPs can comply with this obligation is still unclear. However, it seems unavoidable that compliance will require them to install measures such as automated filtering (so-called ‘upload filters’) using algorithms to prevent users from uploading unlawful content. Given the scale of the obligation, there is a real danger that measures taken by OCSSPs in fulfilment of their obligation will amount to expressly prohibited general monitoring. What seems certain, however, is that the automated filtering, whether general or specific in nature, cannot distinguish appropriately between illegitimate and legitimate use of content (e.g. because it would be covered by a copyright limitation). Hence, there is a serious risk of overblocking certain uses that benefit from strong fundamental rights justifications such as the freedom of expression and information or freedom of artistic creativity. This article first outlines the relevant fundamental rights as guaranteed under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights that are affected by an obligation to monitor and filter for copyright infringing content. Second, it examines the impact on fundamental rights of the obligations OCSSPs incur under Art. 17, which are analysed and tested also with regard to their compatibility with general principles of EU law such as proportionality and legal certainty. These are, on the one hand, obligations to prevent the upload of works for which they have not obtained authorization and, on the other, an obligation to remove infringing content upon notification and prevent the renewed upload in relation to these works and protected subject matter (so-called ‘stay-down’ obligations). Third, the article assesses the mechanisms to safeguard the right of users of online content-sharing services under Art. 17. The analysis demonstrates that the balance between the different fundamental rights in the normative framework of Art. 17 CDSM Directive is a very difficult one to strike and that overly strict and broad enforcement mechanisms will most likely constitute an unjustified and disproportionate infringement of the fundamental rights of platform operators as well as of users of such platforms. Moreover, Art. 17 is the result of hard-fought compromises during the elaboration of the Directive, which led to the adoption of a long provision with complicated wording and full of internal contradictions. As a consequence, it does not determine with sufficient precision the balance between the multiple fundamental rights affected, nor does it provide for effective harmonization. These conclusions are of crucial importance for the development of the regulatory framework for the liability of platforms in the EU since the CJEU will have to rule on the compatibility of Art. 17 with fundamental rights in the near future, as a result of an action for annulment filed by the Polish government. In fact, if certain features of the article are considered incompatible with the constitutional framework of the EU, this should lead to the erasing of certain paragraphs and, possibly, even of the entire provision from the text of the CDSM Directive.


Subject The EU's single market for energy. Significance Climate change targets, the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and direct emissions controls increasingly define the end-destination of the EU’s energy transition towards a single market, while the precise path of travel is determined largely by national-level policies. Differences in national approaches create distortions that hamper the increase in cross-border trade required to make the EU single energy market a reality. Impacts The EU will continue to resist capacity markets and strategic-reserve mechanisms, which create significant market distortions. Cross-border electricity trade requires significant new investment, but it is not clear that the financial incentives exist to support it. The long-term future of gas-fired generation is in doubt owing to increasing competition from low-carbon technologies.


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