scholarly journals Justicia distributiva : Distributive Justice

2019 ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Fernando Aguiar González
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Fair Distribution ◽  
Community Difference

Resumen: En este artículo se realiza un breve recorrido por las teorías de la justicia distributiva más influyentes, partiendo de John Rawls y terminando con los principios propuestos por Martha Nussbaum para el desarrollo de una justicia global. En ese recorrido veremos cómo responden esas teorías a tres preguntas: qué se distribuye, cómo se distribuye y entre quiénes se distribuye. Esto nos permitirá comparar sus fundamentos y sus principios de distribución justa, así como comprender mejor sus límites. Palabras clave: bienes primarios, capacidades, comunidad, igualdad, justicia global, principio de diferencia, renta básica, suerte, utilitarismo. Abstract: This article offers a brief overview of the most influential theories of distributive justice, starting with John Rawls and ending up with Martha Nussbaum´s principles for a global justice. Along this way we will see how they answer these three questions: what to distribute, how it is distributed and among whom it is distributed. This will allow us to compare its foundations and principles of fair distribution, as well as to better understand its limits.  Keywords: basic income, capabilities, community, difference principle, equality, global justice, luck, primary goods, utilitarianism. 

Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 193-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
International Context ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
The Difference

Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
System Property ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Out-Kanting Rawls: An Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Theories of Justice from an Autonomy-Based Account of Normativity

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-372
Author(s):  
Teun J. Dekker
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Human Capacity

ABSTRACT: When considering normative concepts, such as distributive justice, one must consider both the question how concepts can have normative force and which particular conceptions of these concepts have this normative force. In this article I consider the view that the human capacity for autonomy accounts for normativity, and argue that adopting this view commits one to a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This conclusion puts me directly at odds with the work of John Rawls, who derives his responsibility-insensitive difference principle from a similar account of autonomy. However, I argue that such an argument would be based on a mischaracterisation of what is significant about the human capacity for autonomy.

Liberalism and Distributive Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Western World ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Philosopher

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.

Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. ix + 208.

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-132
Author(s):  
DANIEL HALLIDAY
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Oxford University Press

Political liberals very often appeal to a so-called division of moral labour that separates the regulation of institutions from that of personal conduct. Probably the most famous statement of this idea is found in these remarks from John Rawls: The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately. (A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (1999), p. 47) Kok-Chor Tan's excellent new book renews and extends the case for accepting some version of Rawls's view, which Tan calls the ‘institutional focus’ in distributive justice. If Tan is right, then the liberal focus on institutions is not only defensible in its own right, but also helps support further elements of egalitarian theorizing, including some that Rawlsians often reject. In particular, Tan believes that a focus on institutions helps secure a more plausible ‘luck egalitarian’ approach to distributive justice, and that it also supports a version of cosmopolitanism about global justice.

Defending political autonomy: a discussion of Charles Beitz

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Just World ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
The World ◽  
Contemporary Work ◽  
Primary Goods

Among political philosophers, discussion of Charles Beitz's very important book Political Theory and International Relations has focused mainly on Part Three, in which Beitz addresses the issue of global distributive justice, and argues in favour of applying Rawls's difference principle globally: an ideally just world would be one in which the share of income and other primary goods going to the least advantaged group of persons would be maximised, no matter which society those persons belonged to. There has been much debate about whether relationships across the world are cooperative in the sense that this principle is thought to presuppose, how one might construct an international index of advantage and disadvantage, and so forth. Beitz himself has contributed to this debate, and it remains central to contemporary work on global justice.

Meaningful Work, Worthwhile Life, and Self-Respect: Reexamination of the Rawlsian Perspective on Basic Income in a Property-Owning Democracy

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Fukuma
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Leisure Time ◽  
Meaningful Work ◽  
Wage Labor ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Basis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Primary Goods

AbstractAs is well known, John Rawls opposes the idea and policy of basic income. However, this paper posits that his view of self-respect and activity could accommodate its implementation. Rawls lists the social basis of self-respect in social primary goods as the most important good, but does not assume that it is derived from wage labor alone. It appears that his theory of justice aims to criticize the work-centered (wage-labor) society and to overcome it. Besides, as Rawls desires, for our work to be meaningful and our life worthwhile, we should institutionalize basic income because it can improve workers’ bargaining power and their attitude toward work, in addition to enhancing their leisure time. In this paper, by considering the normative relationship between meaningful work, worthwhile life, and self-respect from a Rawlsian perspective, I inquire into the potential of basic income in his well-ordered society.

John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Original Essays ◽  
Introductory Essay ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Domestic Level

This collection of original essays explores major areas of debate inspired by the political philosophy of John Rawls. The volume is divided into ten parts, exploring ten distinct questions: Can Rawls’s conception of public reason offer determinate answers to major questions of justice? Is ideal theory useful or relevant to resolving issues of justice in the nonideal world? Are libertarians correct to criticize Rawls’s work for failing to prioritize economic liberty? Should the problems of distributive justice be understood in terms of luck egalitarian or relational egalitarian assumptions? When institutions aim at equality, what is it that they should seek to equalize—primary goods, capabilities, or welfare? Does Rawls’s theory of justice have the resources to address justice for people who are significantly dependent on others and their caregivers? Is Rawls’s theory adequate for addressing gender injustice? Can or should Rawls’s theory include justice for nonhuman animals? Should the principles of economic justice that hold at the global level be similar to the egalitarian principles of justice that hold at the domestic level? Is Rawls’s theory of global justice too tolerant of nonliberal societies? For each question, there is an introductory essay, providing an overview of the relevant arguments from Rawls’s work and the historical contours of the debate that ensued. Each introductory essay is followed by two essays written by scholars who take opposing positions, moving the discussion forward in a fruitful way.

A SATISFACTORY MINIMUM CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE: RECONSIDERING RAWLS'S MAXIMIN ARGUMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Minimum Level ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Marginal Value ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Maximin Rule ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is ‘irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’. It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an imprecise account of the satisfactory minimum to be secured under the maximin rule; or that (iii) Rawls relies upon unrealistic assumptions about diminishing marginal value. These critics, I will suggest, argue from a number of assumptions that are confused or false. The satisfactory minimum that choosers in the original position – employing the maximin rule – seek to achieve is not a minimum level of primary goods, nor is the satisfactory minimum sought under the maximin rule supplied by the difference principle. I will argue that the maximin argument is more robust than has generally been recognized and that this argument performs a number of important functions in clarifying the nature and implications of Rawls's argument for justice as fairness.

Political Liberalism, Constructivism, and Global Justice

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 621-644
Author(s):  
Alexander Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Resource Distribution ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Distribution Principle ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Difference

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls develops a theory of global justice whose scope and ambitions are quite modest. Far from justifying a global resource distribution principle modeled on the difference principle, Rawls’s theory does not argue for significant redistribution among peoples. This paper focuses on Rawls’s claim that the character and scope of his account of global justice are determined by the constructivist method that he employs to extend political liberalism’s project from the domestic to the global sphere. The principles of an acceptable law of peoples, he argues, are simply those principles that would be selected by rational representatives of peoples from the standpoint of a suitably characterized fair choice position. This paper argues that Rawls’s constructivist method in fact provides support for an account of global justice of greater scope and ambition than Rawls’s Law of Peoples.

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