Out-Kanting Rawls: An Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Theories of Justice from an Autonomy-Based Account of Normativity

Dialogue ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-372
Author(s):  
Teun J. Dekker
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Human Capacity

ABSTRACT: When considering normative concepts, such as distributive justice, one must consider both the question how concepts can have normative force and which particular conceptions of these concepts have this normative force. In this article I consider the view that the human capacity for autonomy accounts for normativity, and argue that adopting this view commits one to a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This conclusion puts me directly at odds with the work of John Rawls, who derives his responsibility-insensitive difference principle from a similar account of autonomy. However, I argue that such an argument would be based on a mischaracterisation of what is significant about the human capacity for autonomy.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
System Property ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Liberalism and Distributive Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Western World ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Philosopher

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.

scholarly journals The Virtues of Economic Rescue Legislation: Distributive Justice, Civil Law, and the Troubled Asset Relief Program

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry S. Kuo
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Relief Program

AbstractThis study constitutes an ethical analysis through the lens of distributive justice in the case of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was enacted in the midst of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. It begins by engaging with the visions of justice constructed by John Rawls and Robert Nozick, using their insights to locate the injustices of TARP according to their moral imaginations. However, this study argues that Rawls’ and Nozick’s theories of justice primarily envision the nature of law as being restrictive of vice, not as instructors of virtue. Thus, it resources the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas to demonstrate how the positive pedagogy of law can enable a more just construction of economic rescue legislation, one that not only prevents future repetitions of economic vices and injustice, but is also formative for a society that prizes economic justice and virtues. In doing so, the study proposes two criteria for a more just consideration of economic rescue legislation that embraces law’s positive pedagogy.

scholarly journals Justicia distributiva : Distributive Justice

2019 ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Fernando Aguiar González
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Basic Income ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Fair Distribution ◽  
Community Difference

Resumen: En este artículo se realiza un breve recorrido por las teorías de la justicia distributiva más influyentes, partiendo de John Rawls y terminando con los principios propuestos por Martha Nussbaum para el desarrollo de una justicia global. En ese recorrido veremos cómo responden esas teorías a tres preguntas: qué se distribuye, cómo se distribuye y entre quiénes se distribuye. Esto nos permitirá comparar sus fundamentos y sus principios de distribución justa, así como comprender mejor sus límites. Palabras clave: bienes primarios, capacidades, comunidad, igualdad, justicia global, principio de diferencia, renta básica, suerte, utilitarismo. Abstract: This article offers a brief overview of the most influential theories of distributive justice, starting with John Rawls and ending up with Martha Nussbaum´s principles for a global justice. Along this way we will see how they answer these three questions: what to distribute, how it is distributed and among whom it is distributed. This will allow us to compare its foundations and principles of fair distribution, as well as to better understand its limits.  Keywords: basic income, capabilities, community, difference principle, equality, global justice, luck, primary goods, utilitarianism. 

On the Relevance of Political Philosophy to Business Ethics

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Moriarty
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

Abstract:The central problems of political philosophy (e.g., legitimate authority, distributive justice) mirror the central problems of business ethics. The question naturally arises: should political theories be applied to problems in business ethics? If a version of egalitarianism is the correct theory of justice for states, for example, does it follow that it is the correct theory of justice for businesses? If states should be democratically governed by their citizens, should businesses be democratically managed by their employees? Most theorists who have considered these questions, including John Rawls in Political Liberalism, and Robert Phillips and Joshua Margolis in a 1999 article, have said “no.” They claim that states and businesses are different kinds of entities, and hence require different theories of justice. I challenge this claim. While businesses differ from states, the difference is one of degree, not one of kind. Business ethics has much to learn from political philosophy.

An Alternative Derivation of the Difference Principle

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nollaig MacKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Alternative Derivation ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Difference

John Rawls' Difference Principle has been well known since his early papers on distributive justice, and has taken on renewed interest with the publication of A Theory of Justice. The principle is one I find attractive, but I am skeptical of the arguments heretofore put forward in its defence. Here I will outline an entirely different defence which, while it may yield Rawls' desired conclusion, leaves one with a rather different picture from his of the place of the Difference Principle in the theory of distributive justice.

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

scholarly journals Axel Honneth and The Reconstruction of Justice: An Attempt to Overcome the "Distribution Paradigm"

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Reciprocal Relationships ◽  
Individual Life ◽  
Axel Honneth ◽  
The Social ◽  
Normative Reconstruction ◽  
Set Up

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.

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