Meaningful Work, Worthwhile Life, and Self-Respect: Reexamination of the Rawlsian Perspective on Basic Income in a Property-Owning Democracy

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Fukuma

AbstractAs is well known, John Rawls opposes the idea and policy of basic income. However, this paper posits that his view of self-respect and activity could accommodate its implementation. Rawls lists the social basis of self-respect in social primary goods as the most important good, but does not assume that it is derived from wage labor alone. It appears that his theory of justice aims to criticize the work-centered (wage-labor) society and to overcome it. Besides, as Rawls desires, for our work to be meaningful and our life worthwhile, we should institutionalize basic income because it can improve workers’ bargaining power and their attitude toward work, in addition to enhancing their leisure time. In this paper, by considering the normative relationship between meaningful work, worthwhile life, and self-respect from a Rawlsian perspective, I inquire into the potential of basic income in his well-ordered society.

Author(s):  
Rodney G. Peffer

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


Author(s):  
Robert Allen

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 84-99
Author(s):  
Viturino Ribeiro da Silva

A cooperação equitativa é um conceito central da filosofia de John Rawls e possui uma estreita relação com as noções de racionalidade, razoabilidade e tolerância. Portanto, faz-se necessário ressaltar que tais temas são fundamentais para uma adequada compreensão da teoria rawlsiana de justiça. Rawls elege a justiça como virtude primária e princípio norteador na construção da sua teoria. Em virtude disso, a preocupação de Rawls é a resolução das desigualdades sociais que ocorrem nos sistemas políticos democráticos. A noção de justiça como equidade faz-se indispensável frente à necessidade de eleger a liberdade enquanto preocupação com o justo equilíbrio e ao “consenso nas sociedades plurais”. É a partir da concepção de cooperação equitativa que Rawls tenta resolver o impasse contemporâneo da convivência de diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis sejam elas, religiosas, filosóficas ou morais. Dessa forma, a teoria rawlsiana de justiça tem como proposta a “coexistência pacifica” ante essa pluralidade de doutrinas compreensivas. Assim posto, a justiça como equidade, pode plausivelmente, ser a forma mais viável de coexistência pacífica que agrupamentos sociais poderiam seguir ou se pautar. Sob essa ótica, acredita-se que a noção de cooperação equitativa rawlsiana será uma via de justiça que enfatiza os direitos individuais sem desmerecer aquilo que é próprio do coletivo. Abstract: Fair cooperation is a central concept of J. Rawls´s philosophy and keeps a close relationship with the the notions of rationality, reasonability, and tolerance. Thus it is important to claim that these notions are necessary for a correct comprehension of rawlsian theory of justice. Rawls claims justice as the primary virtue and main principle of his theory. The aim of Rawls is to solve the social inequalities that occur in democratic political systems. The concept of justice as fairness is essential before the need of electing the liberty as concerning to the just balance and to the “consensus in the plural societies”. By starting from the conception of fair cooperation Rawls tries to solve the contemporary problem of different comprehensive doctrines sharing the same political and social space, no matter they are religious, philosophical or moral ones. The rawlsian theory of justice claims to propose as “pacific cohabitation” among that plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In this way, justice as fairness may plausibility be the most viable form of pacific cohabitation that social groups can follow or be ruled. Under this perspective, we believe that the rawlsian concept of fair cooperation will be a way of justice that focus on individual rights without deprive the significance of collective. Keywords: Rawls, fair cooperation, original position, rationality, reasonability. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 417
Author(s):  
Juanrico A.S. Titahelu ◽  
Irwansyah Irwansyah ◽  
Hamid Awaludin ◽  
Muhammad Ashri

Pela-Gandong could be seen as an alliance among two or more villages in Central Maluku territory. Pela-Gandong, besides as brotherhood and friendship among them,this alliance also shared common purpose of cooperation and collective security. Conflict in the beginning of 1999 draws up public attention to the effectiveness of the principles which contains in pela-gandong alliance. Important question come forward because of the plurality condition among current Indonesian society. Should pela-gandong principles nowadays, still playing role to develope social, economy and cultural life of Maluku traditional society? The purpose of this writings is to find out the weaknesses of pela-gandong alliance(s). Based on this, it should offers some suggestion how to strengthening the principles of pela-gandong alliance into the state and the social life in Indonesia.


Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter examines the impact of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice on the liberal audience that took it up. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers a defense of civil disobedience that would make politically motivated disobedience a much more acceptable part of our political life than either the U.S. Supreme Court or the English judiciary seems likely to contemplate. Furthermore, his views about the subservience of economic institutions to “social justice” place him firmly on one side of what is currently the most fiercely contested dividing line in politics in Britain today. The chapter also considers Rawls's use of the theory of the social contract to support his arguments; his principle of “the priority of liberty”; and his “difference principle.” It asserts that Rawls is safe from those critics who maintain that what purports to be a defense of liberalism actually collapses into a wholesale collectivism.


10.18060/210 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-327
Author(s):  
Denise L. Levy

Trends in contemporary social work include the use of an eclectic theory base. In an effort to incorporate multiple theories, this article will examine the social problem of homophobia using two different theoretical perspectives: John Rawls’ theory of social justice and lesbian feminist theory.Homophobia, a current social problem, can be defined as “dislike or hatred toward homosexuals, including both cultural and personal biases against homosexuals” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 2). Rawls’ theory of justice and lesbian feminist theory are especially relevant to the issue of homophobia and provide a useful lens to understanding this social problem. In this article, these two theories will be summarized, applied to the issue of homophobia, and compared and contrasted based on their utility.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

In A Theory of Justice in (1971), John Rawls laid out his objections to utilitarianism and advanced a powerful critique of the welfare metric, replacing it by attention to primary goods. Sen later advanced arguments against the welfare metric and called for attention to something like opportunity (under the title “capability”). This chapter argues that Sen moved away from Rawlsian and other views in two directions which were orthogonal to each other. If Rawls and welfarists fixed on what a person gets in welfare or goods, Sen fixed on what he gets in a space between welfare and goods (nutrition is delivered by goods supply and it generates welfare), but he also emphasized what a person can get, as opposed to (just) what he does. The chapter exposes the ambiguity in Sen's use of “capability” (and cognate terms), and proposes an answer to the question, “Equality of What?” which departs from his own in a modest way.


This collection of original essays explores major areas of debate inspired by the political philosophy of John Rawls. The volume is divided into ten parts, exploring ten distinct questions: Can Rawls’s conception of public reason offer determinate answers to major questions of justice? Is ideal theory useful or relevant to resolving issues of justice in the nonideal world? Are libertarians correct to criticize Rawls’s work for failing to prioritize economic liberty? Should the problems of distributive justice be understood in terms of luck egalitarian or relational egalitarian assumptions? When institutions aim at equality, what is it that they should seek to equalize—primary goods, capabilities, or welfare? Does Rawls’s theory of justice have the resources to address justice for people who are significantly dependent on others and their caregivers? Is Rawls’s theory adequate for addressing gender injustice? Can or should Rawls’s theory include justice for nonhuman animals? Should the principles of economic justice that hold at the global level be similar to the egalitarian principles of justice that hold at the domestic level? Is Rawls’s theory of global justice too tolerant of nonliberal societies? For each question, there is an introductory essay, providing an overview of the relevant arguments from Rawls’s work and the historical contours of the debate that ensued. Each introductory essay is followed by two essays written by scholars who take opposing positions, moving the discussion forward in a fruitful way.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zuzana Uhde

Abstract This paper explores the possibilities of the recognition and valuation of care by implementing an unconditional basic income (UBI) and presents a feminist redefinition of the concept of a UBI. The author proposes the notion of a caring revolutionary transformation as a process of institutionalising the social and economic conditions for recognition of care which is a cornerstone of struggles for women’s emancipation and gender equity. It is a process of practically realisable transformative steps which together with their combined and mutually reinforcing effects enable more radical social changes beyond a mere reform. The author argues that these transformative steps have to address two conditions embedded in the institutionalised structures of late modern capitalist society: the limited understanding of meaningful work as paid employment; and the liberal ideal of the independent and autonomous individual. Whereas a UBI can challenge the first condition, a public model of care questions the second condition by shifting the primary responsibility of care from the family towards a social solidarity. While insufficient when introduced separately, the combination of these two remedies has the potential to radically alter social structures on which gendered inequalities rest.


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