IS SOCRATES A REAL ENEMY OF AKRASIA?

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (119) ◽  
pp. 329
Author(s):  
Barbara Botter
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
History Of ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
The Way

Recentemente, o tema da akrasia tornou-se um assunto favorito de discussão entre os estudiosos e contribuiu para introduzir a filosofia antiga no debate filosófico contemporâneo. O tema da akrasia foi uma preocupação dos filósofos ao longo da história da filosofia desde os tempos de Sócrates. A reflexão socrática sobre a ação humana é enigmática em seus detalhes, e Aristóteles, e provavelmente o Platão maduro, entraram em desacordo com Sócrates sobre alguns pontos importantes. Apesar disso, o objetivo do presente artigo é mostrar que Platão no Protágoras não representa Sócrates como o filósofo que recusa explicitamente a possibilidade da akrasia. Acho melhor supor que o que está em jogo nas palavras de Sócrates é apenas negar que quem comete uma injustiça a comete em plena consciência de estar agindo mal. Esta afirmação não parece pressupor a negação da akrasia, se com esta palavra indicamos o fenômeno bem conhecido de cometer uma ação moralmente não correta, embora o sujeito conheça a conduta moralmente excelente. Para justificar esta hipótese proponho examinarmos a possibilidade da presença no Protágoras de um segundo elemento cognitivo que age na presença imediata do objeto de desejo. É este o elemento responsável da conduta do agente nos casos de akrasia, embora o conhecimento moral permaneça presente no sujeito, mas não ativo no momento da ação.Abstract: Recently the topic of akrasia has become a favourite subject of discussion among the scholars and has contributed to reintroduce ancient philosophy into contemporary philosophical debate. Akrasia has been a persistent concern of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy since the time of Socrates. The Socratic insight into the way human action should be grasped is always puzzling in its details, and Aristotle, and probably the mature Plato, disagreed with it at some important points. In spite of this fact, our claim in this article is to show that Plato in the Protagoras does not represent Socrates as explicitly denying the possibility of something called akrasia. It is probably best to suppose that what is at stake in Socrates’ words is only denying that anyone can act as a result of his feelings, knowing that what he is doing is base. This argument does not seem presuppose the denying of akrasia, once we have become clear that with this word we intend a manifest phenomenon of our lived lives, like acting against what we know to be the best. To support our claim we will try to show the presence in Plato’s Protagoras of another cognitive element, which is involved when the particular object of desire appears. This is the element that in the cases of akrasia will determine what happens, although the moral knowledge is present and persisting. 

The Historical History of Philosophy and Its Object

2021 ◽  
pp. 44-54
Author(s):  
Michael Frede
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Historical Approach ◽  
History Of ◽  
Or History ◽  
The Way

This chapter evaluates the historical history of philosophy. Given the very strong philosophical assumptions underlying the early philosophical histories of philosophy, and given in particular the fact that they tended to be written from the point of view of some kind of idealism, it is not surprising that they should have met with some resistance, in particular outside philosophy. Thus, one finds Albert Schwegler criticizing Hegel’s method of treating the history of philosophy, rejecting any kind of philosophical history of philosophy as history. He insists that the systematical study of the history of philosophy is the task of a historian and has to be pursued in precisely the way one studies any other kind of history or history in general. Zeller therefore advocates a purely historical approach to the history of philosophy, a historian’s history of philosophy, and his own monumental work on the history of Greek philosophy is inspired by this conception, just as it, in turn, inspires a lot of work, at least on ancient philosophy of the same kind. The chapter then presents a systematical consideration of the historical history of philosophy.

The Liaison between Analytic and Ancient Philosophy and Its Consequences

2018 ◽  
pp. 120-139
Author(s):  
Christof Rapp
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Paradigm Case ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Two Generations ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 1950S

Is it reasonable to expect that the occupation with history of philosophy contributes to our contemporary philosophical debate? The scholarship on ancient philosophy seems to be a paradigm case for the discussion of this kind of question. In the 1950s and 1960s, philosophers and scholars such as John L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, G.E.L. Owen, John Ackrill and Gregory Vlastos initiated a new style of scholarship that was influenced by analytic philosophy. This analytic style of ancient philosophy scholarship encouraged philosophers to take arguments presented by Plato or Aristotle more seriously and to import ancient ideas into contemporary debates. It was objected that analytic scholars tend to be thematically narrow and to neglect the historical context. By sketching the development of the first two generations of analytic scholarship this chapter tries to show that analytic scholarship need not be anachronistic and that the gain of this method outweighs possible excesses.

The Role of Aesthetics in Herder’s Anthropology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Gaukroger
Keyword(s):  
Natural Sciences ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
History Of ◽  
Natural Forms ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
The Way

The aim of this chapter is to offer insight into what it would mean to bridge the methodological gap between the human and natural sciences, by examining one of the most interesting, yet under-studied, episodes in the history of philosophy and science: Herder’s and Goethe’s “science of describing.” Through the use of various artistic devices, Herder and Goethe developed a methodology that enabled them to better understand natural forms and gain insights into the relations between these forms––thereby paving the way for the study of living forms, i.e., biology. In addition to developing a systematic account of their methodology, the chapter will consider its relevance for contemporary attempts to overcome the gap between the human and natural sciences.

WHY STUDYING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY MATTERS

Think ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (60) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Anna Marmodoro
Keyword(s):  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One

The debate over whether and how philosophers of today may usefully engage with philosophers of the past is nearly as old as the history of philosophy itself. Does the study of the history of philosophy train or corrupt the budding philosopher's mind? Why study the history of philosophy? And, how to study the history of philosophy? I discuss some mainstream approaches to the study of the history of philosophy (with special focus on ancient philosophy), before explicating the one I adopt and commend.

Heidegger the Obscure and Heraclitus the Obscure

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 277-287
Author(s):  
John M. Rose ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Intermediate Level ◽  
Thematic Role ◽  
Philosophical Writing ◽  
History Of ◽  
Writer’S Block ◽  
Goucher College

Heidegger’s works are useful in teaching undergraduates in a variety of ways besides simply introducing Heidegger as an important figure in the history of philosophy. This paper outlines the role of Heidegger in the structure of my Ancient Philosophy course, an intermediate level requirement in the history of philosophy for the philosophy major at Goucher College. The thematic role of Heidegger in the course is illustrated with the intersection of Heidegger’s and Heraclitus’ philosophies and their related pedagogy of following language in a polysemic movement that can break the spell of sclerotic ordinary language about beings. Both Heraclitus and Heidegger move from the ordinary opining of the natures of things to the enigma at the heart of language. The paper also references the effect of this pedagogy on students with writer’s block, or graphophobia, when faced with their first attempts at serious philosophical writing. I conclude with describing the outcome of overcoming the fear of writing.

A Metafísica de Copleston e o Debate com Russell

2021 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 1331-1362
Author(s):  
Alexander Maar
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Ultimate Cause ◽  
History Of ◽  
First Cause ◽  
The Way

Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order (vertical) cause of contingent causal series (horizontal). Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Michael Frede
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Ancient Philosophy ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Medieval Philosophy ◽  
Factual Question ◽  
History Of ◽  
Theoretical Question

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the history of philosophy. In general, there is an enormous difference between those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, those who concern themselves with medieval philosophy, and the students of the history of modern philosophy. And, across this distinction, there is a great variety of approaches. One should not forget that the historiography of philosophy itself in many ways is a product of history and reflects the historical context in which it is pursued. Nevertheless, what this book is interested in is not the factual question of why historians of philosophy do what they do, but the theoretical question, the question of how one ought to conceive of and explain what they do; though they themselves in this work may not in fact be guided by these assumptions and principles, there must be such principles to the extent that their activity is a rational activity. It is also important to note that philosophers tend to criticize historians of philosophy as being unduly historical and not sufficiently philosophical.

Philosophy today: cries of alarm and prospects of progress

SATS ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-116
Author(s):  
Paolo Parrini
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Critical State ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Historical Survey ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Philosophy Today ◽  
History Of ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
The Way

AbstractToday’s critical state of philosophy is examined by considering two of its aspects: the way in which philosophy presently is ever more typically practised (increasing professionalism and specialisation) and the new challenges it has to face to keep up with the changed scientific, and more generally cultural and social context. The essay outlines some prospects of progress in the light of those which still now can be considered the proper tasks of philosophical inquiry. Such tasks are singled out through an historical survey of the original characters of philosophy and an appraisal of its theoretical motivations. The importance of the history of philosophy and the necessity of achieving a virtuous relation among the various philosophical disciplines are stressed to contrast the dangers of excess specialisation and professionalism.

Moore And Philosophical Analysis

Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (126) ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Morris Lazerowitz
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Guiding Principle ◽  
Ideal Language ◽  
History Of ◽  
Fruitful Research ◽  
The Way

Occasionally there has appeared in the history of philosophy a thinker who has become aware of the chaotic condition of philosophy and of the intellectual anarchy that exists in all of its branches, and has attempted to remedy the situation. Descartes cast about for a guiding principle, a compass which would show him the way through the treacherous terrain of philosophy. As is well known he devised the method of systematic doubt, by means of which he hoped to discover an axiom on which he could securely erect a system of basic and reassuring beliefs. Leibniz had before his mind the notion of an ideal language which would by calculation solve problems with certainty. With this he thought we “should be able to reason in metaphysics and morals in much the same way as in geometry and analysis.” Descartes' attempt was a failure; and nothing came of Leibniz's ideal, even with the development of modern symbolic logic. Russell's claim that “logic is the essence of philosophy” frightened many philosophers and gave new hope to others; but his claim was as empty as the proverbial political promise. With G. E. Moore we have a further attempt to introduce sobriety and certainty into philosophy and to make fruitful research possible in it. He has made prominent a method for obtaining results in philosophy; and he has also formulated a philosophical platform, i.e., set out a list of Common-sense propositions which he says are known to be true by everyone, philosopher as well as non-philosopher, and are not, therefore, open to debate. The method, which he used extensively and with great skill, is the method of analysing concepts.

HOW THE STOICS BECAME ATHEISTS

2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER BROOKE
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Critical History ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
History Of ◽  
Ralph Cudworth ◽  
The Way

In the middle of the seventeenth century, scholarship on ancient Stoicism generally understood it to be a form of theism. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Stoicism was widely (though not universally) reckoned a variety of atheism, both by its critics and by those more favourably disposed to its claims. This article describes this transition, the catalyst for which was the controversy surrounding Spinoza's philosophy, and which was shaped above all by contemporary transformations in the historiography of philosophy. Particular attention is paid to the roles in this story played by Thomas Gataker, Ralph Cudworth, J. F. Buddeus, Jean Barbeyrac, and J. L. Mosheim, whose contributions collectively helped to shape the way in which Stoicism was presented in two of the leading reference works of the Enlightenment, J. J. Brucker's Critical History of Philosophy and the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document