scholarly journals The current state of the nationalization of the party systems in the Slovak Republic and Ukraine

2021 ◽  
Vol 188 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Mykhailo Shelemba ◽  
◽  
Marta Shelemba ◽  

The paper assesses the current state of the nationalization of the party systems in the Slovak Republic and Ukraine based on the results of the latest parliamentary elections. By using formalized methods, the authors of the paper analyzed the composition of the party systems at the empirical level. The results of the conducted research show that the party landscape of the Ukrainian Parliament has changed in the direction of electoral preferences in favour of new participants of the political process. The analysis with the use of the Nagayama triangle showed that the electoral advantage of one political party was provided in most of the regions of Ukraine (the political party «Servant of the People»). Under the M. Jones’ and S. Mainwaring’s technique, a high level of the party system nationalization (0.70) was established while conducting the research. According to the methodology by G. Golosov, a Russian scientist, the nationalization index in 2019 was equal to 0.56. It was proved that the factors of presidentialism, socio-political delimitations of the political regime, forms of government, the entry barrier, and regionalization have impacted nationalization of the party system. Six political parties entered the Slovak Parliament. With the opposition center-right conservative political force «Ordinary People and Independent Individuals» being the leader of this election campaign. Parliament’s The assessment of the Slovak Parliament with the use of the Nagayama triangle shows that in most parts of Slovakia, no political force has been formed as a result of the elections, which would dominate the level of voters support and that competition provides a minimum gap between the two political forces. The analysis indicated that the nationalization of the party system of the Slovak Republic is 0.89 (the high value) according to the Jones and Mainwaring method and 0.67 (the above-average value) with regard to the Golosov method, being a higher value compared to a relatively similar indicator for Ukraine. It should be emphasized that the main factors impacting the actual state of the studied indicator were the entry barrier and the political regime in the country. The predominance in the level of nationalization of the party system of Slovakia, if compared with the relevant indicator in Ukraine is due to the fact that all political forces that entered the National Council of the Slovak Republic are stable and participate in electoral cycles.

Author(s):  
Rafaela M. Dancygier

This concluding chapter reflects on what conditions make it more or less likely that minority political incorporation has significant impacts on intergroup relations, the identities of parties, and the electoral alignments underpinning party systems. The discussion highlights that parties' recruitment strategies can meaningfully affect majority perceptions of the minority, minority views about the political system, and minority social integration. The waning of traditional structures of mobilization—in particular the decline of trade unions—raises the relative attractiveness of minority bloc votes and associated ethnically based campaign styles. Larger, more slow-moving, political and economic forces that shape linkages between the majority electorate and political parties thus also help determine whether and in what ways minorities are brought into the party system. The chapter then posits under what circumstances this incorporation will trigger electoral realignments and, in the process, generate a reordering of European party systems.


Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oleh Protsyk

This article analyzes the patterns of intraexecutive conflict and cooperation in East European democracies that adopted semipresidential constitutional frameworks. It explores how the coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers is shaped by constitutional provisions, parliamentary fragmentation, and party system characteristics. The article emphasizes a critical role that party systems play in the evolution of intraexecutive relations across the region. It argues that variations in the political status of the cabinet, in the character of parliamentary composition, and in the constitutional powers of the president affect both the type and frequency of intraexecutive conflict experienced by semipresidential regimes.


2020 ◽  
pp. 700-716
Author(s):  
Andrii Kudriachenko ◽  
Viktoriia Soloshenko

The article states that the political party system formed on the constitutional basis of the Basic Law of Germany is one of the key pillars of democracy of the German state. The Western German-style political party system, based on a substantial legal framework, political culture, and traditions, has convincingly proved its democratic spirit and viability over several decades of the post-war period. The effectiveness of this system was ensured by the presence of the two large parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. The attractiveness of their policy priorities, broad political activity, and statist approaches made it possible to displace other, less influential, parties. The effectiveness and viability of the political party system of Germany are also proven by the course of the process of restoring the country’s state unity. The current period is characterised by systemic crisis phenomena, which have not spared German major parties. These processes are also taking place in other European countries, as previously stable parties transform over time into an idiosyncratic kind of political and technological institutions. For them, short-term success is a priority and is defined by the number of votes cast, rather than the focus on robust principles and visions of the future. However, it may be fair to claim that the whole previous experience testifies to the creativity of the political party system of post-war Germany, thus making the modern Federal Republic of Germany able to cope with contemporary problems and challenges. This is – and will be – buttressed by time and new approaches pursued by politicians, experts, and scholars as well as the previous practice of reaching compromises and social concord in the name of national interests. The political party system was and remains an important constituent of the entire state and political system of Germany. Keywords: political party system, Federal Republic of Germany, state system, Germany, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats.


2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahid Hasnan

This paper examines the impact of the political party structure on the incentives for politicians to focus on patronage versus service delivery improvements in Pakistan. By analysing inter-provincial variations in the quality of service delivery in Pakistan, the paper argues that the more fragmented, factionalised, and polarised the party systems, the greater are the incentives for patronage, weakening service delivery improvements. Fragmentation and factionalism both exacerbate the information problems that voters have in assigning credit (blame) for service delivery improvements (deterioration), thereby creating the incentives for politicians to focus on targeted benefits. Polarisation, particularly ethnic polarisation, reduces the ability of groups to agree on the provision of public goods, again causing politicians to favour the delivery of targeted benefits.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuuki Maruyama

Shapley-Shubik Power Index per person (SSPIPP) is defined as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in Parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. This model reveals the relationship between the party size and SSPIPP and shows it in a graph. The graph is M-shaped and reveals the optimal party size that maximizes SSPIPP. According to this model, the more votes required to pass bills in Parliament, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. This model also predicts that in countries which require a supermajority vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to last long.


Author(s):  
Vitaly N. Ivanov ◽  

The object of the research is the modern party system in Russia. The aim of the article is to study the organizational, financial, and political potential of the main parliamentary political parties: Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia (UR)), CPRF, LDPR, and Spravedlivaya Rossiya (A Just Russia). The comparative analysis of party resources revealed a significant disparity between the potential of UR and the opposition parties. The latter are inferior to the UR in terms of the number of members and the development of the organizational structure. The total number of members and local organizations of these parties is one-third of UR's indicators. The lack of a developed infrastructure for the opposition parties preserves their limited representation and influence at the local level of public power. The financial potential of the parties is formed mainly by state funding and donations from sponsors. Today, four parliamentary parties are eligible for state support. The share of public finance in their budgets is more than half of all revenues. They also receive the bulk of donations, the size of which is limited by law and is official in nature. It can be argued that Russia has formed a mechanism that allows the state to support parties without allowing the establishment of monopoly influence on their activities by individuals and elite groups. The political potential of the parties is determined by the level of their representation in state and local government bodies. Today it is dominated by UR. Its parliamentary fractions actually control the legislative branch of power at the federal and regional levels. Together with the presidential structures of power, UR also ensures the election of presidential creatures to the posts of heads of regions. Party members today form the basis of the governor's corps, with a single representation from other political parties. UR's organizations include more than half of deputies and heads of municipalities, ensuring its influence on the local government system. The high level of dominance of UR and the limited potential of the opposition parties is an important condition for the stability of the existing political regime. UR's significant opportunities allow the ruling elite to maintain and strengthen their positions: cut off the forces of the radical opposition from power, control the legislative process providing legal support for decisions of the government and the head of state, consolidate the federal and regional elite, ensuring the rotation of elites and coordination of their interests. In these circumstances, the parties of the parliamentary opposition are important for preserving the democratic nature of the political process. They do not question the dominant role of UR, offer limited competition to it, and do not have the potential to really influence key political decisions.


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