A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict Between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders During Times of War

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Baim
2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver

President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence—both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players—shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.


Author(s):  
Dakota S. Rudesill

What civil-military challenges will arise from the virtual world of cyber warfare? Congress and the president have grown increasingly comfortable with permissive grants of authorities and decentralized delegations—including via classified documents with legal force (secret law)—, allowing military commanders to operationalize cyber tools in both defensive and offensive modes with greater ease and frequency. These cyber tools are unusually complex in their variety, design, and potential uses, at least relative to more traditional and conventional weapons. Their technical attributes render them difficult to monitor and regulate because those responsible for decisions to use such weapons—civilian officials—are often least likely to have experience or familiarity with them. The relatively low-cost, rapid-effect nature of cyberwar also encourages not just use in armed conflict, but also below the standard threshold of war. Cyber operations initiated without careful inter-agency planning, decision process, and presidential review drive up operational risk and undermine civil-military norms. To foster more effective civilian oversight and control of the nation’s military’s cyber sword, and to encourage more deliberative application of ever-evolving technologies, Congress should use its constitutional authorities over “the [cyber] land and naval Forces” to craft better decision processes and better civil-military and legal transparency balances.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 877-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen ◽  
Sten Rynning

Abstract Over the past thirty years Denmark has become a capable and willing expeditionary ally, not least on account of an accelerated investment in new forces in the early to mid-2000s. With the 2005–2009 defence agreement the Danish Army scrapped its concept of conscripted mobilization and fully committed to deployable capacities; the navy became a ‘blue water’ navy given the commitment to build two combat support ships and three frigates and to scrap the submarine force; and the air force fully focused its organization on specialized and deployable ‘wings’. The literature suggests that external threats and technological innovation are key drivers of military change, which in broad strokes helps us understand Danish change—but not in full. As a small state, Denmark has been particularly attuned to the threat of abandonment by its NATO allies and the concomitant but rival desire to pay as little for defence as possible. NATO standing and money are thus the critical drivers of Danish military change and we are able to show how they have shaped three successive waves of military reform, beginning piecemeal in the 1990s and then continuing with deeper waves of reform in 2001 and 2014. Civil–military relations have throughout been quite solid and enabled change, which has to do with the political priority of securing Denmark's standing in NATO with as little money as possible, leaving it to the military services to figure out how to shape the toolkit.


Al-Risalah ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 159
Author(s):  
Agus Suntoro

In the history of Indonesia, civil-military relations changed in the reformasi era with the separation of the military and the police, resulting in the removal of the dual-function doctrine and military reform. Despite so, two decades after reformasi has not formed a standard and ideal mechanism to govern civil-military relations within the framework of objective civilian control. This paper addresses issues regarding (a) how the dual-function concept and internal reform within the military; (b) regulatory issues that govern military operations other than war; (c) the ideal model of civil-military relations in Indonesia to ensure democratic life and an overview of the siyāsah sharʻiyyah aspects. Using descriptive qualitative method and conducting discussions with military and human rights experts, this paper demonstrates that military reform in Indonesia after the New Order has not yet been fruitful to accomplish the mission to form professional soldiers. The military is still involved in political and civilian life under the pretext that there is no military assistance law. As a consequence, the ideal model of civilian control that puts the military under the control of civilian authority according to siyāsah sharʻiyyah principle has not been fully successful and effective.


TEME ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 779
Author(s):  
Срђан Старчевић ◽  
Илија Кајтез

Criticizing the social events in France during the French Revolution, Edmund Burke also dealt with military issues. He criticized the changes that the Revolution brought in the military organization in order to demonstrate the futility and harmfulness of the revolution. In this paper we have analyzed three types of his arguments against the reform of the army in France in order to check if those aspects of Burke's views on military are still valid. These are arguments against electing military officers for officers' duties, the arguments against a weak supreme commander and the arguments against interfering of political parties in the military and against political engagement of the soldiers. As a key social relationship that must prevail in the military, Berk emphasized discipline (as an internal functional relationship) and subordination (an external functional relationship, which refers to subordination to civil authorities). He underlined singularity and political neutrality of the military as its essential characteristics. He was the first to unequivocally point to the connection between officers and soldiers as the central point of the structure of a military. He proved that the military reform in France during the revolution would lead to a military dictatorship, but he failed to note that the reform also meant the abandonment of feudal mercenary military as a form of organization, as well as creating conditions for the introduction of a mass military based on general conscription. His understanding of the relations between military and civilian spheres, makes him one of the forerunners of the modern theories of civil-military relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Wagstaff

What determines military effectiveness? Previous literature has examined factors such as military doctrine, culture, and capabilities, as well as regime type and civil–military relations, but has largely ignored military leadership quality. Competent military leaders positively influence battle outcomes by ensuring proper implementation of battleplans and quick reaction to an increasingly dynamic battlefield. This paper formally models the relationship between high-ranking military commanders and their immediate subordinates to examine the commander’s ability to evaluate her personnel. I vary the ability of the subordinates to signal their commander to determine how different signaling structures influence what commanders may learn. This analysis reveals that commanders opt for less informative signals from subordinates as the military professionalizes, potentially impeding their ability to identify and remove incompetent subordinates. Leaving incompetent subordinates in command reduces the ability of the military to improve. Evidence from the US Army’s leadership decisions after the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Operation Avalanche illustrates these results.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Nelson Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha ◽  
◽  
Adegbite Simon Aboluwoye ◽  
Kelechi Johnmary Ani ◽  
◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document