Organizing evaluation: Assessing combat leadership quality

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Wagstaff
Keyword(s):  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Leadership Quality ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
The Us ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

What determines military effectiveness? Previous literature has examined factors such as military doctrine, culture, and capabilities, as well as regime type and civil–military relations, but has largely ignored military leadership quality. Competent military leaders positively influence battle outcomes by ensuring proper implementation of battleplans and quick reaction to an increasingly dynamic battlefield. This paper formally models the relationship between high-ranking military commanders and their immediate subordinates to examine the commander’s ability to evaluate her personnel. I vary the ability of the subordinates to signal their commander to determine how different signaling structures influence what commanders may learn. This analysis reveals that commanders opt for less informative signals from subordinates as the military professionalizes, potentially impeding their ability to identify and remove incompetent subordinates. Leaving incompetent subordinates in command reduces the ability of the military to improve. Evidence from the US Army’s leadership decisions after the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Operation Avalanche illustrates these results.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 283-298
Author(s):  
Risa Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Future Research ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Military Activity ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The concluding chapter synthesizes insights from the individual chapters, identifying six overarching lessons: civilian control of the US military is complex and understudied; norms are essential for healthy civil-military relations; the relationship between society and the military is less than healthy; partisanship is corroding civil-military relations; public scrutiny of the military is essential to military effectiveness; and the fundamental character of civil-military relations is changing. In turn, it proposes several questions for future research, suggesting that more could be known about public accountability of military activity; the nature and measurement of military politicization; and changing actors and roles in civil-military relations.

The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision

2011 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 87-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter D. Feaver
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
President Bush ◽  
Primary Problem ◽  
Better Than

President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence—both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players—shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.

Georgia: Warlords, Generals, and Politicians

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
Stephen Jones
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Russian Revolution ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

The balance between civil and military structures is central to understanding the development of Georgian statehood since the beginning of the 20th century. The first modern independent Georgian state was established after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence in May 1918. In February 1921, the young republic was incorporated into the Soviet state and had no separate army of its own. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced multiple administrations, and despite significantly different policies on the military, the overall pattern has been one of civilian (though not always democratic) control. Georgian militias and paramilitaries, between 1918 and 1921 and again between 1991 and 1995, played important roles in determining political power at times of revolutionary or constitutional crises. Since 1991 there have been three presidents - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili - with strong executive authority. In 2013, the position of president was made semi-ceremonial and a prime-ministerial system was instituted. Since 2013, there have been multiple prime ministers. Bidzina Ivanishvili was the first and the most powerful. All of Georgia’s leaders have shifted from a Soviet to pro-Western orientation. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relationship with NATO has grown closer, which has had a major impact on the structure of the Georgian armed forces and on their relationship with Georgia’s civil authorities. The 2008 war with Russia had a major impact on the Georgian military, and, since then, the level of professionalization of the Georgian armed forces has increased dramatically. Samuel Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and other Western students of civil-military relations have pointed to the important balance required between civil and military authorities for a stable democracy. Georgia still displays continuing features of nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and dominant political personalities, which has significant consequences for the independence of the Georgian military and for civil-military relations more generally. Western states such as the United States and Germany, and international organizations like NATO continue to urge reform and provide training to the Georgian armed forces

The New Civil-Military Relations

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Historically the character of civil-military relations in the United States has been dominated by the concept of civilian control of the military. This has largely been a response to the fear of praetorianism. As recently as 1949, for example, the first Hoover Commission asserted that one of the major reasons for strengthening the “means of exercising civilian control” over the defense establishment was to “safeguard our democratic traditions against militarism.” This same warning was raised in the report of the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization in 1953. While the overriding purpose of the committee's recommendations was to provide “the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost,” the report made it clear that this had to be achieved “without danger to our free institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military Establishment.” Finally, during the debate on the reorganization proposals of 1958, senators and congressmen used the theme of a “Prussianized” military staff to attempt to slow down the trend towards centralization in the military establishment.Despite this imposing support, the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States. In the first place, military leaders are divided among themselves, although their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between dichomatic doctrines. Air Force leaders who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability.

Retirement Day

2019 ◽  
pp. 291-303
Author(s):  
Andrew Marble
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Partnership For Peace ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The Us ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Operations Other Than War ◽  
Historic Change ◽  
The Military

The chapter is set at Fort Myer, Virginia, on September 30, 1997, the day General John Shalikashvili retired from the US military. The chapter overviews the retirement ceremony from Shalikashvili’s perspective as he reviews the honor guard with President William J. Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen and thinks back to that night when he first laid eyes on US soldiers in Pappenheim and the role that luck has played in his attaining the American dream. The chapter also thumbnails his accomplishments as chairman: (1) confronting historic change, especially by realizing Partnership for Peace and NATO expansion, (2) was more supportive of non-traditional military missions (military operations other than war, MOOTW), (3) prepared the US military for the challenges of the twenty-first century, particularly by downsizing the military yet upgrading their capability and readiness, including by emphasizing joint education, joint planning, and joint training, and (4) rebalanced civil-military relations. The chapter ends with Shalikashvili’s closing remarks, emphasizing his love for soldiers and their families.

Crisis in the Civil-Military Triangle?

2020 ◽  
pp. 191-206
Author(s):  
William E. Rapp
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Us Military ◽  
The People ◽  
The Us ◽  
High Regard ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Despite the high regard for the US military by the American public, a number of tensions continue to grow in civil-military relations in the United States. These are exacerbated by a lack of clarity, and thus productive debate, in the various relationships inherent in civil and military interaction. By trisecting civil military relations into the relations between the people and the military, the military and the government, and the people and the government on military issues, this chapter examines the potential for crisis in coming years. Doing so allows for greater theoretical and popular understanding and thus action in addressing the tensions, for there is cause for concern and action in each of the legs of this interconnected triangle.

Tumultuous Times

2019 ◽  
pp. 250-272
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter discusses contemporary civil–military relations in India, engaging with, and occasionally refuting, a number of narratives. It begins with an overview of four main controversies—the dispute about withdrawal of troops from the Siachen glacier, the contrasting views over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the tenure of General V. K. Singh (chief of army staff from 2010 to 2012), and issues arising from pay commission reports and the equivalence between civilians and the military. These issues highlight the overall theme of this book—that there is considerable distrust and tension between civilians and the military. Next, it briefly discusses civil–military relations under the Modi government. Thereafter, it examines the issue of defense reforms, considered by many as a panacea to overcoming these difficulties. This is followed by an analysis of the divergence in the positions typically taken across all three levels—political, bureaucratic, and the military leaders.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Impact ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter provides an overview of the central claims in the book. It begins by describing some recent vignettes in India’s civil–military relations, which convey the disquiet and its recurring crises. Next, it presents the main argument of this book—India’s pattern of civil–military relations has had an adverse impact on the variables associated with military effectiveness. The pattern, termed an “absent dialogue,” emerges from different factors but, in effect, results in creating strong silos between civilians and the military. Thereafter, the chapter explains why these conditions persist. It then highlights the relevance of this book. The penultimate section describes the sources and methodology, and the chapter concludes with an overview of the rest of the chapters in this book.

The Absent Dialogue

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Deep Dive ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Promotion Policies ◽  
Weapons Procurement ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Postcolonial States ◽  
The Military

Civilian control over the military is widely hailed as among the biggest successes of India’s democracy. This is a rarity, especially among postcolonial states, and is rightfully celebrated. But has this come at a cost? The Absent Dialogue argues that the pattern of civil–military relations in India has hampered its military effectiveness. Indian politicians and bureaucrats have long been content with the formal and ritualistic exercise of civilian control, while the military continues to operate in institutional silos, with little substantive engagement between the two. In making this claim, the book closely examines the variables most associated with military effectiveness—weapons procurement, jointness (the ability of separate military services to operate together), officer education, promotion policies, and defense planning. India’s pattern of civil–military relations—best characterized as an absent dialogue—adversely affects each of these processes. Theoretically, the book adopts the “unequal dialogue” framework proposed by Eliot Cohen but also argues that, under some conditions, patterns of civil–military relations may more closely resemble an “absent dialogue.” Informed by more than a hundred and fifty interviews and recently available archival material, the book represents a deep dive into understanding the power and the limitations of the Indian military. It sheds new light on India’s military history and is essential reading for understanding contemporary civil–military relations and recurring problems therein. While the book focuses on India, it also highlights the importance of civilian expertise and institutional design in enhancing civilian control and military effectiveness in other democracies.

On Resignation

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Kohn
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Senior Officers ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

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