Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aris Stouraitis ◽  
Anita Wong ◽  
Stephen Yan-Leung Cheung
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ownership Concentration

Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1511-1543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Sandy Klasa ◽  
Steve Matsunaga
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

ABSTRACT: We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.

Corporate governance and its reform in Hong Kong: a study in comparative corporate governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryane Michael ◽  
S.H. Goo
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Family Relationships ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Comparative Corporate Governance

Purpose – The purpose of this paper was to determine to what extent Hong Kong’s experience proves (or disproves) theories from corporate governance in the areas of family ownership, concentration, self-dealing in Hong, executive compensation and other issues. This paper – written in the comparative corporate governance tradition – uses data from Hong Kong to discuss wider trends and issues in the corporate governance literature. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use the comparative corporate governance approach – exposing a range of corporate governance theories to the light of Hong Kong data. The authors purposely avoid over-theorising – leaving the data to speak for themselves for other researchers interested in such theorising. Findings – The authors find that Hong Kong presents corporate challenges that are unique among upper-income jurisdictions – in terms of potentially harmful (shareholder value diminishing) family relationships, shareholder concentration and self-dealing by insiders. The authors also show that excessive executive compensation, accounting and audit weaknesses do not pose the same kinds of problems they do in other countries. The authors provide numerous comments on theoretical papers throughout the presentation in this paper. Research limitations/implications – The authors chose a relatively unused research approach that eschews theory building – instead, the authors use data from a range of sectors to build an overall picture of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The authors subsequently affirm or critique the theories of others in this paper. Practical implications – The original analysis conducted by the authors provided 22 recommendations for revising listing rules for Hong Kong’s stock exchange. Others – particularly Asian officials – should consider Hong Kong’s experience when revising their own corporate governance listing rules and regulations. Originality/value – This paper offers new and original insights in four directions. First, the authors use the empiricist’s method – presenting data from a wide range of corporate governance areas to comment on and critique existing studies. Second, the authors provide a system-wide view of corporate governance – showing how different parts of corporate governance rules work together using concrete data. Third, the authors provide a new study in the comparative corporate governance tradition – another brick in the wall that is “normal scientific progress”. Fourth, the authors pose tentative resolutions to highly debated questions in corporate governance for the specific time and place of Hong Kong in the early 2010s.

Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhilan Chen ◽  
Yan-Leung Cheung ◽  
Aris Stouraitis ◽  
Anita W.S. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Ownership Concentration

Empirical Study on Correlation of Manufacturing Companies’ Compensation Gap with the Performance

2012 ◽  
Vol 566 ◽  
pp. 525-529
Author(s):  
Lu Zhuang Wang ◽  
Hui Yu
Keyword(s):  
Linear Regression ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Textile Industry ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Enterprise Performance ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Compensation Gap ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Relative Analysis

This paper studied the relationship between executives' compensation gaps and enterprise’s performances of Textile industry in China. By linear regression and relative analysis, it is found that the correlativity of executives’ compensation gap with performance is weak or none with only effective gap between the president and CFO, the compensation gap of executives in coastland areas is larger than inland areas, a positive correlation existed between ownership concentration and enterprise performance, ownership concentration is negatively correlated to executive compensation gap, and the state-owned stock ratio and asset-liability ratio have negative correlation to enterprise performance.

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