The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause and the Right of Natural Liberty

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Harrison
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A

This chapter considers the application of federal and state law to conduct that takes place outside the territory of the United States. It begins by discussing the territorial scope of U.S. constitutional rights. Special consideration is given to the extraterritorial application of the right of habeas corpus in light of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, concerning the habeas corpus rights of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba. The chapter then discusses the “presumption against extraterritoriality” that the Supreme Court applies when interpreting federal statutes. For situations in which the presumption is overcome or is inapplicable, the chapter explains how customary international law principles relating to prescriptive jurisdiction can be relevant in U.S. litigation through application of the Charming Betsy canon of construction. In addition, the chapter discusses the role of “universal jurisdiction” in U.S. litigation and criminal prosecution. Possible constitutional limitations on the extraterritorial application of both federal statutes and state laws, based on due process and other considerations, are also considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 798
Author(s):  
Victor Manuel Vicuña-Zambrano ◽  
Alba Rosa Pupo-Kairuz ◽  
Cesar Elias Paucar-Paucar

The investigation focused on conducting a legal analysis on the effectiveness and appeal of habeas corpus, based on an inadequate performance of judges in the Criminal Judicial Unit of the Babahoyo Canton, Ecuador. Methodologically, it was focused on the critical legal analysis of habeas corpus as a jurisdictional guarantee in judicial practice, through the analytical-synthetic method. It was evidenced that the guarantee that allows the exercise of the right to freedom of human beings in Ecuador is being violated, which constitutes a serious violation of the presuppositions that are established as a result of the establishment of a rule of law, therefore Therefore, said violation will be obvious to those who have to resolve a request of this nature.


Author(s):  
Duthie Roger ◽  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander

Principle 38 calls for the repeal or abolition of laws and institutions that contribute to impunity for human rights violations. It considers habeas corpus as a fundamental and non-derogable individual right, and calls for the enactment of ‘legislative measures necessary to ensure protection of human rights and to safeguard democratic institutions and processes’, along with a ‘comprehensive review of legislation and administrative regulations’. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 38 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It shows how this Principle has evolved from an initial narrower focus only on emergency legislation and courts in preparatory reports and prior versions to a broader focus on legislative and institutional reform to combat impunity. It also cites examples of legislative reform in countries such as Morocco, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, and Uganda, particularly where truth commission recommendations have addressed the matter.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-278
Author(s):  
Richard A. Posner

My reply is brief; I do not try to recapitulate the arguments in my book, and the précis that accompanies the comments. There are many good points made in the comments, which I do not repeat either; my focus is on the areas of disagreement emphasized in the comments.Segev. I am puzzled by the reference on the first page of his comment to distributive justice. I understand the term to refer to the principles for allocating wealth or other goods across persons, and I do not think those principles are engaged by efforts to balance concerns of security against concerns of civil liberties.When I said that “what counts as justification is no part of habeas corpus,” I did not mean that the detention of a person cannot be challenged by asking for habeas corpus, or that the detention need not be justified. I meant merely that the creation of a right of habeas corpus does not indicate how great a showing of necessity to detain a person the government must demonstrate. Justification is a separate issue from the existence of a right of habeas corpus. Obviously if little or no justification is required, the right becomes nugatory.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-310
Author(s):  
LARRY MAY

AbstractIn this article I am interested in seeing what the normative jurisprudential support is for a minimalist version of habeas corpus in international law. I investigate what Fuller called ‘procedural natural law’ in contemporary international criminal law. In the first two sections I rehearse some of Hart's and Fuller's views as they pertain to the subject of international law and also to the inner morality of law. In the third section I set out some of my views on these matters, drawing on both Hart and Fuller, concerning the value of fundamental procedural rights. In the fourth section I discuss the right of habeas corpus as a good test case of how to think about these issues. In the final sections I expand on these remarks and argue that procedural rights need to be protected better in international law, if the latter is to have a claim to legitimacy as a mature legal system.


2017 ◽  
pp. 53-62
Author(s):  
Prakat Khati ◽  
Kundan Raj Sharma

The Enemy Alien Disability rule has been a constantfeature of many of Nepal’s constitutions in the past and is also featured in its present Constitution. Under this rule, citizens of an enemy state are not protected by the fundamental guarantees of the right to criminal justice and are disabled from seeking constitutional remedies such as a writ of habeas corpus. In this context, a legal and normative analysis of this rule and its compatibility with current norms of Human Rights and of Humanitarian Law is warranted. This article intends to conduct analyses of the historical, normative and legal aspects of this rule.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Siena Anstis ◽  
Joshua Blum ◽  
Jared Will

Canada maintains a separate legal regime for immigration detainees who, until recently, were denied the right to seek release by way of habeas corpus. This denial of one of the most deeply entrenched rights at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was justified by the proposition that the immigration detention scheme is “separate but equal”—that it provides an adequate remedy such that habeas corpus is not necessary. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this “separate but equal” regime has failed to provide basic procedural and substantive protections that are available in other Canadian legal regimes where liberty is at stake. However, in 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reignited the availability of habeas corpus as a remedy to indefinite detention in the immigration context in Chaudhary v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness). By reversing a line of cases that had confined immigration detainees to review by an administrative tribunal and judicial review in the Federal Court, Chaudhary has opened the door to the superior courts for immigration detainees. This article provides a review of the immigration detention system in Canada, the applicable legislation, procedures, and case law, and canvasses the impact of Chaudhary on the rights of immigration detainees. It then considers the benefits of habeas corpus as a litigation strategy, the role it has played in debunking the “separate but equal” myth, and suggests other potential issues now ripe for further litigation.


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