Co-Evolution of Cooperation and Cognition: The Impact of Imperfect Deliberation and Context-Sensitive Intuition

Author(s):  
Adam Bear ◽  
Ari Kagan ◽  
David G. Rand
2017 ◽  
Vol 284 (1851) ◽  
pp. 20162326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Bear ◽  
Ari Kagan ◽  
David G. Rand

How does cognitive sophistication impact cooperation? We explore this question using a model of the co-evolution of cooperation and cognition. In our model, agents confront social dilemmas and coordination games, and make decisions using intuition or deliberation. Intuition is automatic and effortless, but relatively (although not necessarily completely) insensitive to context. Deliberation, conversely, is costly but relatively (although not necessarily perfectly) sensitive to context. We find that regardless of the sensitivity of intuition and imperfection of deliberation, deliberating undermines cooperation in social dilemmas, whereas deliberating can increase cooperation in coordination games if intuition is sufficiently sensitive. Furthermore, when coordination games are sufficiently likely, selection favours a strategy whose intuitive response ignores the contextual cues available and cooperates across contexts. Thus, we see how simple cognition can arise from active selection for simplicity, rather than just be forced to be simple due to cognitive constraints. Finally, we find that when deliberation is imperfect, the favoured strategy increases cooperation in social dilemmas (as a result of reducing deliberation) as the benefit of cooperation to the recipient increases.


Author(s):  
Francois Vaillancourt ◽  
Richard M. Bird

The question considered in this chapter is whether decentralization is likely to hurt or help national unity in “countries at risk.” We begin with a literature review, focusing on three particular questions: the size and number of nations; the determinants of decentralization; and, finally, and bearing most directly on our topic, the links between decentralization and political outcomes. We next set out in capsule form some of the very mixed stories of linkages between decentralization and national unity found in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, before considering more closely the ongoing discussions of secession in three European countries – Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. We conclude that the impact of decentralization on national unity is so complex and context-sensitive that no general answers to our initial question emerge: in some instances, decentralization may be an inducement for regions to stay in a country; in others, however, it may prove to be only a way station on the road to the exit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 894-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niels Spierings

Abstract Our knowledge of social trust's drivers in the MENA region is limited and there are good reasons to expect that theories based on Western countries cannot be copied to the MENA one-to-one. Arguing for a broader and at the same time context-sensitive comparative approach, I translate the ‘societal winners’, social capital, and religious beliefs mechanisms explaining trust to the MENA context. Moreover, I acknowledge intraregional diversity and test how the impact of these factors also differs among MENA countries. Empirically, I synchronize 47 surveys from 15 MENA countries, which provides the broadest and most systematic assessment of trust in the MENA to date. The results show that the societal-winner mechanism does not hold: employed, higher education and wealthier citizens are not more trusting. However, higher-educated citizens distrust other citizens more, particularly in the strongest autocracies. Religiosity seems pivotal too. Among others, service-attending citizens are more trusting, mainly where regimes regulate religious affairs. Overall, this study provides insight into what shapes generalized social trust in the Middle East and North Africa and it underscores that at a comparative level we need to consider inter-regional and intra-regional forms of context-dependency were we to formulate a broadly applicable theoretical framework of trust's drivers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (11) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Liang Zhao ◽  
Xiaojun Ding ◽  
Feng Yu

As COVID-19 struck worldwide, we were inspired by behavioral immune system theory and wondered whether there would be changes to public morality brought about by the pandemic. We tracked public reactions through posts on Chinese social media to analyze the dynamics of public moral motivation. Big data analysis shows that the impact of disaster upon moral motivation was context-sensitive. The level of the severity of the disaster played a leading role in variation of moral motivation. We found that disaster increased moral motivation only when the situation was severe, and such augmentation rapidly faded when the disaster was under control and recovery began. The sentiment of news shared during the pandemic played a regulating role, such that positive or encouraging news helped augment moral motivation only when the situation was severe. Finally, we found that the pandemic increased expressions of both agency and communion in a similar way to that of moral motivation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Solveig Jurkat ◽  
Moritz Köster ◽  
Relindis Yovsi ◽  
Joscha Kärtner

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaipeng Hu ◽  
Yewei Tao ◽  
Yongjuan Ma ◽  
Lei Shi

AbstractDespite the fruitful evidence to support the emergence of cooperation, irrational decisions are still an essential part of promoting cooperation. Among the many factors that affect human rational decision-making, peer pressure is unique to social organisms and directly affects individual cooperative behaviors in the process of social interaction. This kind of pressure psychologically forces individuals to behave consistently with their partners, and partners with inconsistent behaviors may suffer psychological blows. As feedback, this psychological harm may in turn affect individual cooperative decisions. There is evidence that when peer pressure exists, partnerships can reduce free-riding in enterprise. Based on interdependent networks, this paper studies the impact of peer pressure on cooperation dynamics when the strategies of corresponding partners from different layers of the networks are inconsistent. We assume that when individuals are under peer pressure, their payoffs will be compromised. The simulation results show that the punishment effect will force the expulsion of partners with different strategies, which will further reduce the proportion of partners with inconsistent strategies in the system. However, in most cases, only moderate fines are most conductive to the evolution of cooperation, and the punishment mechanisms can effectively promote the interdependent network reciprocity. The results on the small world and random network prove the robustness of the result. In addition, under this mechanism, the greater the payoff dependence between partners, the better the effect of interdependent network reciprocity.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Dong Mu ◽  
Xiongping Yue

Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.


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