CEO Succession Gap and Firm Performance

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renzhu Zhang ◽  
Gurmeet S. Bhabra ◽  
Hsin-I Chou ◽  
Eric K. M. Tan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Succession

CEO outsiderness and firm performance in an emerging economy: The moderating role of managerial discretion

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 798-814
Author(s):  
Aylin Ataay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Managerial Discretion ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Succession Events ◽  
Moderating Role

AbstractInconsistent findings from prior research on the performance consequences of new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) origin led us to study the moderating effect of managerial discretion on the link between CEO outsiderness and firms’ post-succession performance. Data from 75 CEO succession events from an emerging economy show that new CEO outsiderness, without managerial discretion context influences, has no direct impact on post-succession performance. Further, our findings emphasise the moderating impacts of managerial discretion, stemming from factors in a company’s external and internal contingencies, which either strengthen or weaken the association between new CEO outsiderness and post-succession firm performance. It is found that market complexity, but not munificence, provides CEOs with more discretion in the Turkish context, thus strengthening the positive associations between CEO origin and firm performance. Firms inertia weakens both managerial discretion level and the association between CEO outsiderness and firm performance. The results show that internal corporate governance also matters. Finally, when a CEO assumes the dual role of both the chairman and the CEO, the link between CEO outsiderness and performance of the firm becomes stronger.

The Enigma of the Family Successor–Firm Performance Relationship: A Methodological Reflection and Reconciliation Attempt

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Philipp Ahrens ◽  
Andrea Calabrò ◽  
Jolien Huybrechts ◽  
Michael Woywode
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Member ◽  
Family Involvement ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
The Family ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Methodological Reflection

Empirical studies examining firm performance following CEO succession in family firms predominantly document inferior performance of family successors. This evidence is at odds with general theoretical literature that attests a positive effect of family involvement inside the firm. To explore this enigma, we theoretically and empirically disentangle the influence of the CEO attribute family member (i.e., the CEO is affiliated to the family) on post-succession firm performance, from other, distinct CEO attributes (e.g., CEO-related human capital). Our analysis on the individual CEO level shows that after respective controls, the family member attribute is significantly positively related to post-succession firm performance.

scholarly journals CEO Succession Origin and Firm Performance: A Multilevel Study

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Georgakakis ◽  
Winfried Ruigrok
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Multilevel Study

The aftermath of CEO succession via hierarchical jumps on firm performance and agency cost: Evidence from Chinese firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (21) ◽  
pp. 1744-1748 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Ghulam Meran Shah ◽  
Mingfeng Tang ◽  
Muddassar Sarfraz ◽  
Zeeshan Fareed
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Chinese Firms

Outsider CEO succession and firm performance

2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (6) ◽  
pp. 399-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abu M. Jalal ◽  
Alexandros P. Prezas
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Succession

scholarly journals MYTH OR REALITY? UNVEILING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIERARCHICAL CEO SUCCESSION ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CASH HOLDINGS

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 1008-1025
Author(s):  
Muddassar Sarfraz ◽  
Bin He ◽  
Syed Ghulam Meran Shah ◽  
Zeeshan Fareed
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Middle Level ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Management Activity ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

The objective of the study is to contemplate the effectiveness of hierarchical CEO succession and hierarchical CEO succession intensity on SOEs & Non-SOEs performance separately. Meanwhile, the impact of hierarchical CEO succession on cash holdings has also been analysed. The authenticated data has been accumulated from CSMAR for the years 2012-2016 contemplating the listed companies (SOE and Non-SOEs separately for performance while overall companies for cash holdings) on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. Through categorization of hierarchical CEO succession, it has been signified that middle-level hierarchical CEO succession elevates the SOEs performance. In contrast, middle and high-level hierarchical CEO succession mitigate the cash holdings. Conclusively, earning management as a moderator has been analysed while deducing that hierarchical CEO succession reduces cash holdings despite firms involving earning management activity which is ultimately beneficial for firms’ growth. The empirical results are robust to alternate technique 2SLS instrumental regression that controls for endogeneity.

scholarly journals Is the „bottom line“ the bottom line? The determinants of CEO forced exit

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105
Author(s):  
Andrew Ward
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Earnings Expectations ◽  
Ceo Dismissal ◽  
Business Week ◽  
The Relationship

The linkage between poor firm performance and CEO dismissal has not been consistently demonstrated in prior research, leading to calls to explore factors that moderate this relationship. In an industry-matched sample of firms from the Business Week 1000 that dismiss their CEO and those that don’t, we examine the relationship between different measures of firm performance and dismissal, as well as the power of the CEO, board and shareholders to moderate this relationship. We find that CEO succession is related to stock returns, changes in profitability, and debt downgrading, but not to earnings expectations. Further, CEOs use their power to resist exit under all circumstances, while boards and institutional investors exercise their power to force out the CEO only when performance is poor

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