scholarly journals Shared Obligations and the Responsibility of an International Organization and its Member States: The Case of EU Mixed Agreements

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nataša Nedeski
Keyword(s):  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Mixed Agreements

The Responsibility of Member States of International Organizations?

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 448-467
Author(s):  
Esa Paasivirta
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
General Question ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
Special Case

This article outlines the contours of the special case of the eu in the context of the general question of the responsibility of a member State of an international organization. The special case of eu member States is connected with the modus operandi of the eu in general, and the fact that the implementation of eu acts is largely carried out by national authorities rather than by the eu relying solely on its own organs. This special case is also connected with the phenomenon of so-called ‘mixed agreements’ to which both the eu and its member States are parties. In both situations, the role of the member States is important and appears as part of the normal conduct of the organization. Against the background of these observations, the paper reviews the central concepts of legal personality, competence and responsibility in order to consider and assess the special case of the eu in a broader international law context. The paper also reviews recent legal developments which bear on the assessment of the special case of the eu.

scholarly journals Shared Obligations and the Responsibility of an International Organization and Its Member States

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Nataša Nedeski
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Do So

Abstract Discussions on the allocation of international responsibility between an international organization and its member states do not comprehensively engage with the role of obligations in assigning responsibility to the organization and/or its members. The present article sets out what will be termed an obligations-based approach to the allocation of international responsibility by exploring the phenomenon of sharing international obligations by an international organization and its members, as well as the implications thereof for their responsibility under international law. It will do so by focusing on the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its member states, which commonly results in overlapping obligations for the organization and its members. It is ultimately argued that a distinction should be made between two types of shared obligations in mixed agreements in order to untangle who can be held responsible in case of a breach: the EU, the member state(s), or both.

Foreign Affairs Federalism in the European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 331-351
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Court ◽  
Treaty Of Rome ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
Mixed Agreements

The European Union was born as an international organization. The 1957 Treaty of Rome formed part of international law, although the European Court of Justice was eager to emphasize that the Union constitutes “a new legal order” of international law. With time, this new legal order has indeed evolved into a true “federation of States.” Yet how would the foreign affairs powers of this new supranational entity be divided? Would the European Union gradually replace the member states, or would it preserve their distinct and diverse foreign affairs voices? In the past sixty years, the Union has indeed significantly sharpened its foreign affairs powers. While still based on the idea that it has no plenary power, the Union’s external competences have expanded dramatically, and today it is hard to identify a nucleus of exclusive foreign affairs powers reserved for the member states. And in contrast to a classic international law perspective, the Union’s member states only enjoy limited treaty-making powers under European law. Their foreign affairs powers are limited by the exclusive powers of the Union, and they may be preempted through European legislation. There are, however, moments when both the Union and its states enjoy overlapping foreign affairs powers. For these situations, the Union legal order has devised a number of cooperative mechanisms to safeguard a degree of “unity” in the external actions of the Union. Mixed agreements constitute an international mechanism that brings the Union and the member states to the same negotiating table. The second constitutional device is internal to the Union legal order: the duty of cooperation.

Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Responsibility of Member states of an International Organization

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Odette Murray
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Member State ◽  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Draft Article ◽  
Legal Limit ◽  
Primary Rule

AbstractThis paper applies two manifestations of the principle of good faith – pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of abuse of rights – to the complex relationship between member states and international organizations. The paper argues that these existing doctrines operate as a legal limit on the conduct of states when creating, controlling and functioning within international organizations. The paper begins by exploring an innovative provision in the International Law Commission's recently finalised Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations – Draft Article 61 – according to which a member state will bear international responsibility for the act of an international organization where the member state uses the organization to circumvent its own international obligations. Examining the development of Draft Article 61 and the jurisprudence upon which it is based, this paper argues that the principle which the Commission in fact seeks to articulate in Draft Article 61 is that of good faith in the performance of treaties. As such, being based on a primary rule of international law, this paper queries whether Draft Article 61 belongs in a set of secondary rules. The paper then considers the role of states in the decision-making organs of international organizations and argues that the widely held presumption against member state responsibility for participation in decision-making organs can and should be displaced in certain cases, in recognition of the various voting mechanisms in international organizations and the varied power which certain states may wield. The paper argues that the doctrine of abuse of rights operates as a fundamental legal limit on the exercise of a member state's voting discretion, and thereby forms a complementary primary obligation placed on states in the context of their participation in international organizations.

scholarly journals The relationship between the sovereignty of member states and the supernationality of international organizations

2020 ◽  
pp. 349-353
Author(s):  
Olga Shpakovych ◽  
Sofia Penkovska
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
The State ◽  
International Organization ◽  
State Sovereignty ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
The Eu

The article presents the result of theoretical and practical study of the relationship between state sovereignty and supranationalityof international organizations. In particular, it is determined that the phenomenon of supranationality of international organizations isderived from state sovereignty and acts as its external law. It has been shown that, in view of this, supranationality is limited becauseit arises through the exercise of sovereignty by states, and, accordingly, is limited by the amount of state sovereignty exercised by states.The relevant mechanism has also been studied on the example of the functioning of the European Union.Regarding the theoretical results, the following should be noted. First, it was proved that despite the different approaches of scho -lars to the understanding of supranationality, definitions of this concept and the separation of its features (properties), in each case,supranationality is a direct realization of state sovereignty. At the same time, the realization of state sovereignty in relation to such pro -perties of international organizations as supranational is primary, and supranationality in this case is derivative. In addition, the phenomenonof supranationality of international organizations due to the fact that it is derived is limited, because supranationality arisesthrough the exercise of sovereignty by states, and, accordingly, is limited by the amount of state sovereignty exercised by states. Thatis why when analyzing the relationship between the supranationality of international organizations and state sovereignty, one cannotconsider the priority of one of the two, because supranationality is in essence a manifestation of state sovereignty.Regarding the practical results, the author considers it appropriate to emphasize that both the regional international organization –the EU was studied, and, at the same time, it was proved that all theoretical provisions were reflected in practice, in particular, envisagedfunctions, goals and the tasks of the studied international organizations are limited in scope by the manifestation of sovereignty shownby states, similar to the regulations issued by organizations. Another indication that the state can exercise its sovereignty in any case isthat there is an effective and transparent procedure for leaving these organizations

The European Union

2019 ◽  
pp. 262-283
Author(s):  
Daniel Fiott ◽  
Luis Simón
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Strategy Making

Many theorists and policymakers may be surprised to learn that an international organization, such as the European Union, has the capacity to form and articulate its own grand strategy. However, identifying “who” makes EU grand strategy is challenging. A range of institutions and actors play a role in the formulation, consolidation, and execution of the EU’s grand strategy. These institutions, together with EU member states, define “grand strategy” in differing ways. Furthermore, some actors are more conscious than others that they are actually engaged in “grand strategy”–making rather than simply debating policies. This chapter identifies the leading actors in EU grand strategy; why and how these actors pursue grand strategy goals using a variety of instruments; discusses what those goals have been; and the prospects for their attainment.

Mixed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union

International Responsibility

2021 ◽  
pp. 176-207
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Gasbarri
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
International Responsibility ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Final Consequence ◽  
Law Commission

The final consequence of the dual legal nature discussed in the book concerns the international responsibility of international organizations. In particular, this chapter describes how the absence of a common conceptualization affected the work of the International Law Commission, the International Law Institute, and the International Law Association. Afterwards, the chapter focuses on the dual attribution of conduct to an international organization and to its member states. It contends that dual attribution is extremely important in practice and it reviews the cases in which it was at issue. After providing a set of principles on how to apply the dual attribution, it distinguishes between three sets of circumstances: dual attribution via institutional links, dual attribution via factual links, and exclusion of dual attribution when the conduct is attributable to only the organization or its member states. Finally, it discusses the effects of dual attribution in terms of joint responsibility.

The Union Budget And The Budgetary Procedure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Fasone ◽  
Nicola Lupo
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
National Income ◽  
Gross National Income ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Member States ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Eu

The shape and content of the EU budget define what the EU wants to be, what it can actually do, its nature, and its aspirations. As often happens with the EU, much depends on the terms of comparison: the Union budget, which is slightly higher than 1 per cent of the EU Gross National Income (GNI), is much smaller than the budgets of most Member States but, at the same time, it is three times bigger than that of the United Nations. Its size and, even more so, the EU procedures which set its expenditures—apart from its revenues—reveal that the EU aims to be something different from a mere international organization.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document