scholarly journals Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or 'Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?'

Author(s):  
Stephen Ansolabehere ◽  
John M.P. de Figueiredo ◽  
James M. Snyder
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Hebenstreit

US election campaigns have always attracted enormous amounts of money. But when the Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that bans on donations from corporations, interest groups and individuals were unconstitutional, it marked nothing less than a watershed moment in US campaign financing. But what are the consequences of unlimited campaign contributions: Can elections, as is often claimed, in fact be bought so that the candidate with the most money always wins? What effects do election campaigns worth billions of dollars have on citizens’ trust and participation, but also on the overall functioning of the political system? This book deals with these and other questions, in particular with the help of quantitative empirical methods. It appears that although money is a precondition for electoral success, it is not automatically a deciding factor. Nevertheless, campaign money can also undermine the proper functioning of US democracy in other places.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Schuler ◽  
Kathleen Rehbein

We examine the characteristics of business firms that gain access to legislative and executive branch officials in the trade policymaking area. Our empirical analysis of over 1200 manufacturers reveals that legislators were most attracted to firms with foreign market expertise, firms which actively participated in politics with outside lobbyists and campaign contributions, and firms with significant employment in the state and/or district. Executive branch officials were responsive to firms with foreign market expertise, firms from industries that had previously received tariff protection, firms using in-house government affairs specialists and outside lobbyists to convey information, and firms making campaign contributions to members of the trade oversight legislative committees. Our results largely support the political market framework and provide insights about the attractiveness of certain demanders to suppliers of trade policies from the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. federal government.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Fremeth ◽  
Brian Kelleher Richter ◽  
Brandon Schaufele

Individuals dominate money in politics, accounting for over 90 percent of campaign contributions, yet studies of drivers of individuals' giving are scarce. We analyze data on all contributions made between 1991 and 2008 by all 1,556 people who became S&P 500 CEOs during that interval. We exploit variation in leadership status over these individuals' careers to identify that being an S&P 500 CEO causes a $4,029 or 137 percent jump per election cycle in personal giving. While some fraction of CEOs' contributions can be attributed to long-standing preferences, the striking changes in behavior cannot be explained by these factors alone. (JEL D72, G34)


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
John A. Dove

Abstract A large body of literature has emerged regarding the proper role and scope of state level merger oversight and enforcement in the U.S., handled by each states respective attorney general (AG). Much of it suggests that due to the set of incentives and constraints that state AGs face, state level enforcement has become much more politicized and arbitrary as compared to federal enforcement. Although numerous studies have provided ample anecdotal evidence, none of these studies have formally tested what actually impacts state merger reviews. Therefore, by employing a dataset of state merger review cases between 1998 and 2010 this paper attempts to empirically test and examine the political incentives surrounding a state AGs decision to review a potential merger. Overall, I do find evidence that electoral aspirations and campaign contributions have a relatively limited but robust impact, while cases involving Fortune 500 companies, as well as multiple states pursuing die same case have a much more profound impact on a state AG’s decision to scrutinize a merger.


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 626-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
James G. Gimpel ◽  
Frances E. Lee ◽  
Joshua Kaminski

Author(s):  
Joshua L. Mitchell ◽  
Karen Sebold ◽  
Andrew Dowdle ◽  
Scott Limbocker ◽  
Patrick A. Stewart

Author(s):  
Thomas Stratmann

The role of money in politics has long been a contentious issue. Over the last decade the amount of money given in contributions to political campaigns has grown substantially. This chapter provides an overview of both theoretical and empirical studies and the scholarly literature that has emerged on this topic over the last forty years. Further, the chapter describes the history of US campaign finance laws. Then, it documents what has been learned from the several literatures that have emerged on campaign expenditures, campaign contributions, and campaign finance regulations. This chapter also suggests shortcomings in the current literature and points to potential avenues for future research.


Author(s):  
Daron R. Shaw ◽  
Brian E. Roberts ◽  
Mijeong Baek

Chapter 1 describes the Supreme Court’s reasoning on campaign finance regulation, free speech, and political campaigns and then offers a chapter-by-chapter plan for testing the key assumptions underlying the Court’s reasoning. The behavioral model of the Buckley v. Valeo (1976) links individuals’ perceptions of corruption to their decisions to participate politically, hypothesizing that the greater an individual’s perception of corruption the less likely that person is to participate in the political process (e.g., vote) because of an erosion of trust in government. Based on these assumptions, the Court accepts the mitigation of corruption as the (lone) compelling state interest for limits on money in politics. Chapter 1 outlines how the authors will empirically explore the behavioral model posited by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision.


Elections are the procedural foundations of democracy. We cannot conceive of democracy without elections, but it is equally impossible to imagine elections without money. This book is the first in-depth investigation of the role money plays in Indian politics. Drawing on extensive fieldwork on political campaigns, unique surveys, and creative and innovative data analysis, this book opens readers’ eyes to the opaque and enigmatic ways in which money flows through the political heart of the world’s largest democracy. The contributions in this volume are structured around five central questions: What is the institutional and regulatory context governing the flow of money in politics? What are the sources of political finance? What do campaigns spend on and why do they spend such vast sums? How does money operate at, and interact with, different levels of government? And what are the substantive implications for democracy itself?


2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua M. Jansa ◽  
Virginia Gray

Scholars focus on interstate competition and intrastate economic conditions as the primary determinants of state economic development policies, including direct subsidies. New data from the Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker illustrates large differences in subsidy spending across the states and that established firms are the disproportionate beneficiaries. In light of this new evidence, we argue that the political presence of the business sector within the state is an important determinant of state subsidy spending. A large political presence helps forward industry interests before government and has the potential to capture state governments. We find support for the cultural capture model by demonstrating that a greater number of lobbyists and campaign contributions from businesses leads to more subsidy spending, all else equal. We conclude that subsidies, and which companies receive them, are a product of both politics and economics.


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