Do Privacy and Competition Concerns Go Hand in Hand? Exploring the Theoretical and Practical Hurdles for the Incorporation of Privacy Concerns in a Competition Law Regime that Emphasizes Economic Efficiency and Consumer Welfare.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anuradha Bhattacharya
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Privacy Concerns

Is “Privacy” a Means to Protect the Competition or Advance Objectives of Innovation and Consumer Welfare?

2020 ◽  
pp. 106-124
Author(s):  
Arletta Gorecka
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Multidimensional Approach ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The relationship between competition law and privacy is still seen as problematic with academics and professionals trying to adequately assess the impact of privacy on the competition law sphere. The chapter looks at the legal development of the EU merger proceedings to conclude that EU competition law is based on the prevailing approach and assesses decisions involving data through the spectrum of keeping a competitive equilibrium in hypothetical markets. Secondly, it considers the legal developments in the EU Member States' practice, which acknowledges the apparent intersection between the phenomena of competition law and privacy. This chapter attempts to propose that privacy concerns appear to hold a multidimensional approach on competition legal regime; nevertheless, it does not result in the need of legal changes within the remits of competition law, as the privacy concerns are already protected by the data protection and consumer protection law.

scholarly journals DELIMITING THE SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASEAN: A COMMON APPROACH?

2014 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haniff Ahamat ◽  
Nasarudin Abdul Rahman
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Social Goals ◽  
Social Boundaries ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Applications ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Proportionality Principle

This paper examines the interface between the economic and social elements of competition law in ASEAN. Generally, the aim of competition law should be to protect the process of competition, promote market efficiencies and enhance consumer welfare in the countries. Nevertheless there is a concern arising from such interface. Competition law strives to ensure competition and economic efficiency but market structure and behavior which harm competition or lead to inefficiency may have positive impact on the society. Along these lines, this paper looks into the social applications of competition legislation of Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Variations between different ASEAN Members are expected to influence any discussions on this issue but social objectives of competition law, and social exclusions are among others the tools used to further social goals in the laws of the ASEAN Members that have been analysed. To address the possibility of political and special interest capturing such social interpretations of competition law, this paper proposes a model that requires increasing reliance on economic analysis and the use of proportionality principle to minimise subjectivity.

scholarly journals The Role of Economic Efficiency in Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Current Application ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Evaluation Standard ◽  
The Us ◽  
Antitrust Analysis

The main focus of the paper is the function of economics in the current application of competition law. While advocating further economization of the law, it is seen as necessary to widen the extent to which aspects of economic efficiency encompassing static and dynamic efficiency are taken into consideration in an antitrust analysis. Much attention is devoted to these issues, while clarifying what is meant by them, how they are to be understood and implemented in the practice of antitrust authorities, as well as discussing their importance for the promotion of innovation. It is noted that accounting for the economic efficiency aspects differently in the light of competition law allows for the assessment of the market behavior of dominant companies, which traditionally has been seen as anticompetitive. This main issue of the paper is analyzed extensively and explained using the case of Microsoft, a company accused by the US and EU antitrust authorities of abusing its dominant position on the market of operating systems in that it integrated the sale of its base product Windows OS exclusively with other applications (Media Player and Internet Explorer). The differences presented in the research part of the paper as to the way Microsoft was treated by these authorities originated in their different methodology of analysis and assessment of the effects of the sales model launched by Microsoft for products offered to the PC manufacturers and their users, in spite of the US and EU antitrust authorities adopting the same evaluation standard – consumer welfare. Aspects of dynamic efficiency adequate in the assessment of the behavior of innovative firms holding a dominant position proved to be deciding. On the other side of the Atlantic, taking into account the aspects of dynamic efficiency was crucial in coming up with a lighter assessment of Microsoft’s tying compared to the European authorities’ assessment which was based largely on the structural analysis, where the benefits arising from dynamic efficiency are not visible. It is clear from the decisions made by the Commission that it favours regulation over effects generated by competition forces at a later time.

scholarly journals Digital Economy, Big Data and Competition Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-89
Author(s):  
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate voluminous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with information about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input. The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of dominant position. In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/ WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn. It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy imposed by Facebook on its users. The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of competition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven economy.

2 Elements of Competition Law Economics

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Second World War ◽  
World War ◽  
Structural Interpretation ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Leading Schools ◽  
Methodological Aspects ◽  
Second World

This chapter describes the leading schools of thought in regards to competition economics as they have evolved over the years. Classical and neoclassical economists were the first to focus on competition issues. The classical economists saw competition as a behavioural process. Meanwhile, with the neoclassical economists came a structural interpretation of competition. Immediately after the Second World War, competition economics became more normative. The chapter then looks at the methodological aspects of competition economics or, more concretely, the instruments and concepts on which competition economics rely. The main focus of study of competition economics is ‘market power’. Indeed, EU competition rules today are based, if not wholly at least mainly, on the concept of market power. Market power can enable behaviours with pernicious effects on economic efficiency. Thus, economists have designed instruments to help authorities, courts, and undertakings to identify and measure market power and its possible abuses.

Part II Economic Regulation, 11 Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muchlinski Peter T
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Economic Regulation ◽  
Global Networks ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Production And Distribution ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
National Approach

This chapter studies competition law (antitrust law in US terminology), which protects competition to maximize consumer welfare. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may use their market power to distort competitive conditions. Unlike purely domestic firms, MNEs can do this in a transnational context. Therefore, regulating MNE competition involves not only substantive rules but also jurisdictional questions which have led to extraterritoriality conflicts. The chapter then examines the competition issues arising from the market power of MNEs operating global networks of production and distribution in often concentrated markets. It also assesses whether competition law should control MNE entry and establishment to preserve the national economy from harmful foreign competition, involving issues of industrial policy and national security. Moreover, MNE operations challenge the hitherto predominantly national approach to competition regulation. To date, there has been little progress towards global competition rules, but it remains a worthwhile question, especially in the context of sustainable development, which has been introduced into competition policy debates in recent years.

1. Introduction to Competition Law

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-74
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Competition Analysis ◽  
Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Demand Curves ◽  
Producer Surplus ◽  
Total Welfare

This chapter provides an introduction to, and basis for, the material discussed in the subsequent chapters. It introduces some relevant concepts of microeconomics including demand curves, consumer and producer surplus, elasticity of demand, and economies of scale and scope. It discusses the model of perfect competition and the concepts of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency; the problems in competition terms of monopoly and oligopoly; and the concept of welfare, particularly consumer welfare and total welfare. It considers various schools of competition analysis and theories and concepts relevant to competition law. It discusses the possible objectives of competition law, and particularly considers what objectives are pursued by EU competition law. The chapter also looks at US antitrust law; competition law and the digital economy; competition law and regulation; and at some basic issues in the application of EU competition law.

Is protecting sunk investments an economic rationale for antitrust law?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darryl Biggar ◽  
Alberto Heimler
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Hypothesis ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Specific Investments ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Economic Foundation

Abstract In recent years, the economic foundation of antitrust law is increasingly being called into question. The hypothesis that antitrust law seeks to promote consumer welfare has historically been extremely popular but in recent years has come under attack. In part, this is due to the fact that neither the law, nor the decisions of competition law enforcers, can be fully explained as consistent with a strict consumer welfare standard. Neither do competition laws promote a textbook concept of total economic welfare, neither in their wording, nor in the way they are enforced. Some commentators argue that competition law should protect the competitive process, but this approach lacks a foundation in welfare economics and therefore lacks the ability to make basic trade-offs between desirable goals. This article puts forward an alternative hypothesis, which focuses on the sunk, relationship-specific investments made by market participants. We propose that an important, and overlooked, role of competition law is to protect trading partners from the threat of hold-up, where it is unreasonable for the parties to use conventional mechanisms to protect those sunk investments themselves. This approach can help to explain features of competition law and law enforcement that cannot be explained by the traditional consumer welfare or total welfare frameworks. We suggest that this approach offers promise as providing a consistent, comprehensive, economic foundation for competition law.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document