scholarly journals TRUMAN DOCTRINE (1946); DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE (1991) & THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2002): THE MACKINDER & SPYKMAN DIALECTICS REVISITED

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-468
Author(s):  
Andre Luiz Varella Neves

The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis that Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman’s geopolitical theories, which sustained the grand strategy of the United States with the implementation of 1946 Truman Doctrine, are still relevant today after their termination. The results indicate that the intellectual matrixes were found in documents of the grand strategy of the United States in two moments. First, in 1992, in the George Herbert Walker Bush’s government’s Defense Planning Guidance document, formulated by the Pentagon, in February 1992. Second, they were found replicated 10 years after in the first term of President George Walker Bush, inaugurated in 2001. In the latter, the theoretical formulations repercussions were depicted in the official documents Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) and the National Security Strategy (2002). The article concluded that the authors’ ideas remain valid to explain and interpret the actions of the United States’ grand strategy in the international scenario.

2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-111
Author(s):  
John M. Callahan

Drawing on President Trump’s statements as a candidate, and relating the status of the world in 2017, this work discusses the origins and evolution of a Grand Strategy for the Trump administration. This work helps to fill a gap in the literature by bringing together an assessment of Trump’s mindset as a candidate with his actions as President, most notably the formulation of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The studies assessment is that Trump had a well-formulated Grand Strategy in mind, nested in the “America First” ideology of the campaign, and that he has learned and modified the strategy based on experience. Finally, proposals for moving forward with a Grand Strategy for the future are considered.


Author(s):  
Marc C. Vielledent

The United States has long enjoyed an essentially unopposed ability to project power and sustain its security forces dispersed throughout the world. However, the uncertainty facing the global security environment, including tenuous alliances, fiscal constraints, and a decline in overseas basing, has increased tensions in emerging areas of potential conflict. These factors are driving change regarding the United States’ defense posture and access agreements abroad. While the preponderance of overseas capability outweighs the preponderance of U.S. forces, deterrence continues to underpin the overarching national security strategy. However, deterrence options impacted by the lack of resilience and investment in distributed logistics and sustainment are generating an additional range of variables and conditions for operators on the ground to consider in shared and contested domains.


Asian Survey ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-20
Author(s):  
Robert Sutter

Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike. Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new government’s security and political objectives. The administration’s national security strategy, released in December, provided a well-integrated security, economic, and diplomatic strategy for Asia and the rest of the world.


Author(s):  
Charles D. Freilich

Chapter 11 presents the primary conclusions derived from the proceeding chapters, as a basis for the national security strategy proposed in chapter 12. The conclusions are divided into four categories, general, politico-military, military, and domestic policy. The chapter also discusses the pitfalls involved in recommending a national security strategy, such as physical and political feasibility; limitations stemming from the absence of classified information; and possible normative biases. The chapter begins by setting out Israel’s vital national security objectives, that is, a core set of fundamental, essentially immutable interests, and then a variety of lesser, though still highly important, ones, some relatively permanent, others that change with circumstances. It further presents a number of “policy instruments” of such importance, for example, preserving the strategic relationship with the United States, that they can be considered vital objectives in their own right and are thus part of the basis for the proposed strategy.


2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-27

Next week I will go before Congress to lay out my priorities for the coming year. There will be no room for misunderstanding. The most basic commitment of our government will be the security of our country. We will win this war; we will protect our people; and we will work to renew the strength of our economy.Our first priority is the military. The highest calling to protect the people is to strengthen our military. And that will be the priority of the budget I submit to the United States Congress. Those who review our budget must understand that we're asking a lot of our men and women in uniform, and we'll be asking more of them in the future. In return, they deserve every resource, every weapon needed to achieve the final and full victory.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Gerson

The release of the Barack Obama administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded an intense, yearlong effort to revamp U.S. nuclear weapons policy to better address modern threats. Despite general agreement that the United States' nuclear policy and posture was in need of overhaul, there were strong disagreements over what kinds of changes should be made. At the core of these debates was the issue of U.S. declaratory policy—the stated role and purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Whereas some members of the administration advocated that the United States retain all of the flexibility and options afforded by the policy of calculated ambiguity, others contended that to fulfill President Obama's commitment to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy,” the United States should adopt a more restrictive nuclear policy such as no first use (NFU), perhaps in the form of a declaration that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack. By not adopting NFU, the NPR missed an important opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy. The traditional case for NFU hinges on the argument that the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary for deterrence. Yet the continued U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first is not only unnecessary but dangerous. Given the size and accuracy of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal, and given the variation in the nuclear capabilities of current and potential adversaries, the first-use option risks creating instabilities in a severe crisis that increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate nuclear use. In a future crisis with a nuclear-armed state, the fear—whether real or imagined—that the United States might attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.


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