scholarly journals What Rules and Laws does Socrates Obey?

2019 ◽  
pp. 399-432
Author(s):  
David Xavier Levystone

Socrates´ thought of justice and obedience to laws is motivated by a will to avoid the destructive effects of Sophistic criticisms and theories of laws. He thus requires–against theories of natural law–an almost absolute obedience to the law, as far as this law respects the legal system of the city. But, against legal positivism, Socrates would not admit that a law is just simply because it is a law: he is looking for the true Just. However, as often in Socratic philosophy, Socrates cannot accept that two equally justified and legitimate rights or moral values conflict.

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Dian Latifiani ◽  
Raden Muhammad Arvy Ilyasa

Moral values in legal science are important. However, the flow of law sees a variety of moral values. This paper aims to see the position of moral values in the science of law. Legal positivism separates strictly between law and morals. According to him, there is no law other than the command of the authorities. Even extreme identifying the law (Recht) as the law (wet). Legal positivism activities are aimed at concrete problems, which are different when compared to natural law thinking which engages itself with the validation of man-made law. For adherents of natural law theory, an unjust law is not law. there is an absolute relationship between law and morality. the two cannot be separated, so the law must refer to moral principles.


1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
James Allan

‘Legal Positivism’ is a much abused term. It is often pejoratively invoked by those occupying both the natural law and critical legal studies ramparts. The former see it as a school of thought which ignores the role in law of those standards and values which have not been deliberately laid down or unintentionally evolved. Positivism, for them, fails because it is prepared to describe a legal world where moral values play no necessary part and where transcendent values may not exist at all. The latter group of critics, not too dissimilarly, see legal positivism’s doctrines as over-reliant on rules and too inclined to accept that a legal system somehow can generate a logically mandated code of answers.In order to defend positivism it is advisable to start with an enunciation of its core precepts. With all that has been written attacking and supporting positivism though, this can be a contentious matter. So instead I shall defend one particular version of positivism, that of H.L.A. Hart. As Hart’s The Concept of Law, first published in 1961, is at worst one of the handful of great legal philosophy texts written in English this century and at best “the classic work of philosophical jurisprudence”, this preference for concentrating on the tangible and identifiable precepts of Hart over the woolly, elusive and frequently caricatured precepts of something disparagingly termed positivism has much to recommend it.


Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-175
Author(s):  
Hadley Arkes

The city of Cincinnati, we know, can be an engaging place, but federal judge Arthur Spiegel also found, in the mid-'90s, that it could be quite a vexing place. The city council of Cincinnati had passed what was called the Human Rights Ordinance of 1992, which barred virtually all species of discrimination—including discrimination on the basis of “Appalachian origin.” But the bill also encompassed a bar on discrimination based on “sexual orientation.” This kind of bill, in other places, had been turned into a club to be used against evangelical Christians who might refuse, on moral grounds, to rent space in their homes to gay or lesbian couples. And so a movement arose in Cincinnati, modeled on a similar movement in Colorado, to override the ordinance passed by the council: this would not be a referendum merely to repeal the law, but a move to amend the charter of the municipal government and remove, from the hands of the local legislature, the authority to pass bills of this kind. In effect, this was an attempt to override an ordinary statute by changing the constitution of the local government. The amendment did not seek to make homosexual acts the grounds for criminal prosecutions; it sought, rather, to bar any attempt to make gay and lesbian orientation the ground for special advantages, quotas, or preferential “minority status” in the law. The framers of the amendment objected to the tendency to treat gays and lesbians on the same plane as groups that have suffered discrimination based on race, religion, or gender. The proposal, known as Issue 3, drew wide support and passed in a referendum in 1993. It was, of course, challenged in the courts, which is why it found its way into the hands of Judge Spiegel.


2013 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico Buitendag

The article aims at contrasting the autopoietic understanding of an individual and her or his actions as described by Niklas Luhmann with Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity, focusing on people as legal subjects. The article assumes that when legal subjects necessitate ethical engagement and evaluation, the law could cease to deal with problems in a mere legalistic fashion but is allowed the freedom to appeal to norms of justice external to itself as in other natural law theories. Through narrative identity the deeds of role players are to be understood in greater complexity than what a self-referential legal system is comfortable in dealing with.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-200
Author(s):  
David Dyzenhaus

InLegality,Scott Shapiro – a leading legal positivist – analyses the problem of a wicked legal system in a way that brings him close to natural law positions. For he argues that a wicked legal system is botched as a legal system and I show that such an argument entails a prior argument that there is some set of standards or criteria internal to law which are both moral and legal. As a result, the more successful a legal order is legally speaking, the better the moral quality of its law, and the more it is a failure morally speaking, the worse the legal quality of its law. It is such moral features of law that Shapiro concedes make it plausible to account for law’s claim to justified authority over its subjects. However, Shapiro cannot, as a legal positivist, accept this entailment. His book thus brings to the surface and illuminates a central dilemma for legal positivism. If legal positivists wish to account for the authority of law they have to abandon legal positivism’s denial that law has such moral features. If they do not, they should revive a form of legal positivism that specifically abjures any claim to account for law’s normative nature.


2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-355
Author(s):  
Amirullah Amirullah

Abstract: Corruption is included as a crime which expands into a transnational crime, destroying the moral values of the nation, hampering and harming the development of the nation, a creation of a closed path of justice, prosperity and welfare of the Indonesian people. Death penalty is an option of criminal sanctions applied in the legal system in Indonesia. The death penalty attached and integrated in the legal system in Indonesia which was formerly influenced by the complexity of its background. At the philosophical level it shows that all legislations related to the formulation of corruption and death penalty have the background of moral values based on Pancasila as a philosophical footing. The death penalty of corruption in Indonesia within the perspective of a legal justice, contained in the formulation of Law No. 20 year 2001 about the Amendment of Law No. 31 year 1999 about eradication to corruption, chapter II, article 2, paragraph (2), shows a part of the positive law. The image of the positive law in Indonesia recognizes the existence of natural law. It is reflected in the philosophical values of the nation, Pancasila (believe in one God). Consequently, the products of the positive law in Indonesia must be derived from the natural law, and the natural law is derived from the eternal law (divine law).Keywords: Law, corruption, criminal act, justice


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
FXAdji Samekto

In the teaching of law, there is often "mistaken", that puts legal positivism (jurisprudence)  is identical with the philosophy of positivism. Legal positivism be identified as an instance of positivism philosophy intact. The study of legal positivism, in fact very closely related to the philosophy and teachings of the law from time to time. The effects of natural law in the scholastic era, then the era of rationalism and the influence of positivism in the philosophy of natural science is very attached to the legal positivism until today. Therefore not only the philosophy of positivism affecting the development of legal positivism. Based on that then the legal positivism in fact has a characteristic which is different from the social sciences. If the social sciences were developed based on the philosophy of positivism, the doctrinal teaching of the law is not entirely been developed based on the philosophy of positivism. Not all the logical positivist philosophy can be applied in the doctrinal law. Keywords : positivism, legal positivism, doctrinal


Author(s):  
Ernst Fraenkel

The chapter describes how the prerogative state was able to completely abolish the inviolability of the law. Since the doctrine of the inviolability of law is part of the heritage of rational Natural Law, it is argued, its explicit rejection in the legal system of the Third Reich raises the question of the whole attitude of National-Socialism toward Natural Law. The chapter describes how the repudiation of Natural Law was achieved and also the form this repudiation took. Despite the fact that Natural Law has been refuted time and again by political science, until the period when this text was written it had not yet lost its vitality entirely.


2021 ◽  
pp. 222-250
Author(s):  
Stuart Banner

This chapter examines the status of natural law in the legal system over the past century. In law schools, natural law never ceased to be a topic of study. This academic interest in natural law has had almost no effect on the working legal system, where natural law has been relied upon by only the most idiosyncratic of judges and lawyers. The history of our use of natural law has nevertheless continued to exert influence on the legal system, which still contains doctrines and practices that were once based on the law of nature.


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