scholarly journals Shielded shipping container for fissile material class 1 or large quantities of radioactive material, supplement

1974 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.E. Noyes
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Class 1

Operational Readiness of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container for Fissile Materials

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Kenneth E. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Competent Authority ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Other Information ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse bulk Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) shipping containers for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification container was terminated for shipment of radioactive material on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 shipping container as a replacement for the 6M. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised nine times. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, in support of foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and a Competent Authority Certificate from the DOT. The utility of the ES-3100 continues to grow. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to be able to use this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system.

A Review of a Radioactive Material Shipping Container Including Design, Testing, Upgrading Compliance Program and Shipping Logistics

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Celovsky ◽  
Randy Lesco ◽  
Brian Gale ◽  
Jeffrey Sypes
Keyword(s):  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Global Transport ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
Compliance Program ◽  
Integrity Tests ◽  
Key Aspects

Ten years ago Atomic Energy of Canada developed a Type B(U)-85 shipping container for the global transport of highly radioactive materials. This paper reviews the development of the container, including a summary of the design requirements, a review of the selected materials and key design elements, and the results of the major qualification tests (drop testing, fire test, leak tightness testing, and shielding integrity tests). As a result of the testing, improvements to the structural, thermal and containment design were made. Such improvements, and reasons thereof, are noted. Also provided is a summary of the additional analysis work required to upgrade the package from a Type B(U) to a Type B(F), i.e. essentially upgrading the container to include fissile radioisotopes to the authorized radioactive contents list. Having a certified shipping container is only one aspect governing the global shipments of radioactive material. By necessity the shipment of radioactive material is a highly regulated environment. This paper also explores the experiences with other key aspects of radioactive shipments, including the service procedures used to maintain the container certification, the associated compliance program for radioactive material shipments, and the shipping logistics involved in the transport.

Design and Analysis of Shipping Container for Big Rock Decommissioned Reactor Vessel

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce (Bart) Slimp ◽  
Mick Papp ◽  
Phuong H. Hoang
Keyword(s):  
Structural Analysis ◽  
Base Material ◽  
Reactor Vessel ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Type B ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Analysis Methodology ◽  
Maximum Wall Thickness ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions

A major milestone in 2003 on the Big Rock Point (BRP) decommissioning project involved shipping the Reactor Vessel (RV) in a steel cask for burial. The Reactor Vessel Transport System (RVTS) cask was a sealed integral container, which provided necessary radiological shielding and containment of radioactive waste for shipping and disposal. The RVTS, using the provisions of the ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, was designed as a Type B package in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. This included meeting Normal Condition of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) loading per 10 CFR 71, Regulatory Guide 7.6, “Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels,” Regulatory Guide 7.8, “Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material” and Regulatory Guide 7.11, “Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches.” The RVTS was designed to withstand accelerations and shocks postulated during highway and rail transit using guidelines from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and ANSI N14.2. The design analysis methodology, fabrication process and transportation planning for the Big Rock RVTS Cask are presented in this paper.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

scholarly journals Pu/SS Eutectic Assessment in 9975 Packagings in a Storage Facility During Extended Fire

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Stainless Steel ◽  
Eutectic Temperature ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Interface Temperature ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Storage Facility ◽  
Containment Vessel ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Term Storage

In a radioactive material (RAM) packaging, the formation of eutectic at the Pu/SS (plutonium/stainless steel) interface is a serious concern and must be avoided to prevent of leakage of fissile material to the environment. The eutectic temperature for the Pu/SS is rather low (410°C) and could seriously impact the structural integrity of the containment vessel under accident conditions involving fire. The 9975 packaging is used for long term storage of Pu bearing materials in the DOE complex where the Pu comes in contact with the stainless steel containment vessel. Due to the serious consequences of the containment breach at the eutectic site, the Pu/SS interface temperature is kept well below the eutectic formation temperature of 410°C. This paper discusses the thermal models and the results for the extended fire conditions (1500°F for 86 minutes) that exist in a long term storage facility and concludes that the 9975 packaging Pu/SS interface temperature is well below the eutectic temperature.

Training in Quality Assurance for Radioactive Material Transportation Packaging

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Fabian ◽  
L. Garrison ◽  
B. Shelton ◽  
J. Liaw ◽  
V. Shah ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Quality Assurance ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Practical Experience ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Federal Regulations ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Rule Changes ◽  
Material Transportation

The Department of Energy (DOE) has established guidelines for qualifications and training of the technical experts preparing and reviewing the safety analysis reports for packaging (SARP) and transportation of radioactive materials. One of the qualifications is working knowledge of, and familiarity with the quality assurance (QA) requirements in Subpart H of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 71. DOE is sponsoring a course on quality assurance for radioactive material transportation packaging. The objective of this paper is to describe the salient features of the course, the purpose of which is to provide QA training and practical experience that are required to develop and implement a QA plan or prepare the QA chapter of a SARP for the design, fabrication, assembly, testing, maintenance, repair, modification, and use of the packaging. The applicable QA requirements from DOE orders, federal regulations, and NRC regulatory guides will be highlighted, along with a graded approach to selected QA elements from Subpart H of 10 CFR Part 71. The paper will also briefly discuss ASME NQA-1 for Type B and fissile material packaging, current issues resulting from the different emphasis between a compliance-based QA program (in Subpart H, 10 CFR 71) for packaging and a performance-based QA program for DOE nuclear facilities (based on 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management”), and the final rule changes in 10 CFR 71 that became effective on October 1, 2004.

Thermal Analysis of Drum Type Radioactive Material (RAM) Packaging Arrays in Storage

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Structural Integrity ◽  
Operating Conditions ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Design Requirements ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Term Storage

Drum type packages are routinely used to transport radioactive material (RAM) in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. These packages are designed to meet the federal regulations described in 10 CFR 71. In recent years, there has been a greater need to use these packagings to store the excess fissile material, especially plutonium for long term storage. While the design requirements for safe transportation of these packagings are well defined, the requirements for safe long term storage are not well established. Since the RAM contents in the packagings produce decay heat, it is important that they are stored carefully to prevent overheating of the containment vessel (CV) seals to prevent any leakage and the impact limiter to maintain the package structural integrity. This paper analyzes different storage arrays for a typical 9977 packaging for thermal considerations and makes recommendations for their safe storage under normal operating conditions.

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