A Review of a Radioactive Material Shipping Container Including Design, Testing, Upgrading Compliance Program and Shipping Logistics

Author(s):  
Andrew Celovsky ◽  
Randy Lesco ◽  
Brian Gale ◽  
Jeffrey Sypes

Ten years ago Atomic Energy of Canada developed a Type B(U)-85 shipping container for the global transport of highly radioactive materials. This paper reviews the development of the container, including a summary of the design requirements, a review of the selected materials and key design elements, and the results of the major qualification tests (drop testing, fire test, leak tightness testing, and shielding integrity tests). As a result of the testing, improvements to the structural, thermal and containment design were made. Such improvements, and reasons thereof, are noted. Also provided is a summary of the additional analysis work required to upgrade the package from a Type B(U) to a Type B(F), i.e. essentially upgrading the container to include fissile radioisotopes to the authorized radioactive contents list. Having a certified shipping container is only one aspect governing the global shipments of radioactive material. By necessity the shipment of radioactive material is a highly regulated environment. This paper also explores the experiences with other key aspects of radioactive shipments, including the service procedures used to maintain the container certification, the associated compliance program for radioactive material shipments, and the shipping logistics involved in the transport.

Author(s):  
Bruce (Bart) Slimp ◽  
Mick Papp ◽  
Phuong H. Hoang

A major milestone in 2003 on the Big Rock Point (BRP) decommissioning project involved shipping the Reactor Vessel (RV) in a steel cask for burial. The Reactor Vessel Transport System (RVTS) cask was a sealed integral container, which provided necessary radiological shielding and containment of radioactive waste for shipping and disposal. The RVTS, using the provisions of the ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, was designed as a Type B package in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. This included meeting Normal Condition of Transport (NCT) and the Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) loading per 10 CFR 71, Regulatory Guide 7.6, “Design Criteria for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Cask Containment Vessels,” Regulatory Guide 7.8, “Load Combinations for the Structural Analysis of Shipping Casks for Radioactive Material” and Regulatory Guide 7.11, “Fracture Toughness Criteria of Base Material for Ferritic Steel Shipping Cask Containment Vessels with a Maximum Wall Thickness of 4 Inches.” The RVTS was designed to withstand accelerations and shocks postulated during highway and rail transit using guidelines from the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and ANSI N14.2. The design analysis methodology, fabrication process and transportation planning for the Big Rock RVTS Cask are presented in this paper.


Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel ◽  
T. T. Wu ◽  
B. R. Seward

This paper evaluates sealed hardware that meets the requirements of DOE-STD-3013, “Criteria for Preparing and packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage” [1] with respect to radioactive material (Type B quantity) transportation requirements. The Standard provides criteria for packaging of the plutonium materials for storage periods of at least 50 years. The standard requires the hardware to maintain integrity under both normal storage conditions and under anticipated handling conditions. To accomplish this, the standard requires that the plutonium be loaded in a minimum of two nested stainless steel sealed containers that are both tested for leak-tightness per ANSI N14.5. As such the 3013 hardware is robust. While the 3013 STD may provide appropriate storage criteria, it is not intended to provide criteria for transporting the material under the requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT). In this evaluation, it is assumed that the activity of plutonium exceeds A1 and/or A2 curies as defined in DOT 49 CFR 173.431 and therefore must be shipped as a Type B package meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements of 10 CFR 71. The evaluation considers Type B shipment of plutonium in the 3013 hardware within a certified package for such contents.


Author(s):  
Narendra K. Gupta ◽  
Stephen J. Hensel ◽  
Glenn Abramczyk

Title 10 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR Part 71.73[1]) requires that Type B radioactive material (RAM) packages satisfy certain Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) thermal design requirements to ensure package safety during accidental fire conditions. Compliance with thermal design requirements can be met by prototype tests, analyses only or a combination of tests and analyses. Normally, it is impractical to meet all the HAC using tests only and the analytical methods are too complex due to the multi-physics non-linear nature of the fire event. Therefore, a combination of tests and thermal analyses methods using commercial heat transfer software are used to meet the necessary design requirements. The authors, along with his other colleagues at Savannah River National Laboratory in Aiken, SC, USA, have successfully used this ‘tests and analyses’ approach in the design and certification of several United States’ DOE/NNSA certified packages, e.g. 9975, 9977, 9978, 9979, H1700, and Bulk Tritium Shipping Package (BTSP). This paper will describe these methods and it is hoped that the RAM Type B package designers and analysts can use them for their applications.


Author(s):  
Mark P. Colino ◽  
Elena B. Rosenstein

This paper provides an overview of the design of natural ventilation systems to control smoke movement in rail tunnels. The paper discusses the current industry standards and design requirements for tunnel emergency ventilation systems, and then addresses the various technical elements that are used to design such systems. These technical elements include parameters in the direct control of the designer, as well as those that are beyond the control of the designer. The paper also presents a case study where various physical design elements are utilized to create a working natural ventilation smoke control system for a short rail tunnel.


2012 ◽  
Vol 450-451 ◽  
pp. 995-998
Author(s):  
Zhe Tao Xiao ◽  
Wen Ye Gong ◽  
Li Jun Hao

Urban residential areas are the first communication space that children enter society. Recreational site are integral part of urban residential areas. In the specific planning and design, it is often to be ignored, or adult. This paper analyzes the design requirements of the children's recreational site and studies the site design elements. It hopes to provide a reference for the design of children's outdoor activities in urban residential areas.


Author(s):  
Zhenxing Zhang ◽  
Huajin Yu ◽  
Zhiguang Wu ◽  
Lina Zhu

Steam generator (SG) is one of the most important equipment in the heat transport system of China experimental fast reactor (CEFR). As per design requirements for improving economics and enhancing safety, it is necessary to make optimization analysis on various key aspects of SG. Many basic parameters were discussed in this paper, such as the design input of SG, tube-length, tube specification and the number of tubes, etc. The optimization analysis provides valuable suggestions about the number of tubes, tube-length, the heat transfer area of the margin and tube specification for the SG in its design life.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.


Author(s):  
Russell Wagner

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.


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