scholarly journals Pointwise definable models of set theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel David Hamkins ◽  
David Linetsky ◽  
Jonas Reitz
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
Class Forcing ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

AbstractA pointwise definable model is one in which every object is definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens V = HOD, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if ZFC is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of ZFC. If there is a transitive model of ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of ZFC. What is more, every countable model of ZFC has a class forcing extension that is pointwise definable. Indeed, for the main contribution of this article, every countable model of Gödel-Bernays set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which every set and class is first-order definable without parameters.

scholarly journals Condensable models of set theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Saturated Model ◽  
Infinitary Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Recursively Saturated ◽  
Recursively Saturated Model ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

AbstractA model $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M of ZF is said to be condensable if $$ {\mathcal {M}}\cong {\mathcal {M}}(\alpha )\prec _{\mathbb {L}_{{\mathcal {M}}}} {\mathcal {M}}$$ M ≅ M ( α ) ≺ L M M for some “ordinal” $$\alpha \in \mathrm {Ord}^{{\mathcal {M}}}$$ α ∈ Ord M , where $$\mathcal {M}(\alpha ):=(\mathrm {V}(\alpha ),\in )^{{\mathcal {M}}}$$ M ( α ) : = ( V ( α ) , ∈ ) M and $$\mathbb {L}_{{\mathcal {M}}}$$ L M is the set of formulae of the infinitary logic $$\mathbb {L}_{\infty ,\omega }$$ L ∞ , ω that appear in the well-founded part of $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M . The work of Barwise and Schlipf in the 1970s revealed the fact that every countable recursively saturated model of ZF is cofinally condensable (i.e., $${\mathcal {M}}\cong {\mathcal {M}}(\alpha ) \prec _{\mathbb {L}_{{\mathcal {M}}}}{\mathcal {M}}$$ M ≅ M ( α ) ≺ L M M for an unbounded collection of $$\alpha \in \mathrm {Ord}^{{\mathcal {M}}}$$ α ∈ Ord M ). Moreover, it can be readily shown that any $$\omega $$ ω -nonstandard condensable model of $$\mathrm {ZF}$$ ZF is recursively saturated. These considerations provide the context for the following result that answers a question posed to the author by Paul Kindvall Gorbow.Theorem A.Assuming a modest set-theoretic hypothesis, there is a countable model $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M of ZFC that is bothdefinably well-founded (i.e., every first order definable element of $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M is in the well-founded part of $$\mathcal {M)}$$ M ) andcofinally condensable. We also provide various equivalents of the notion of condensability, including the result below.Theorem B.The following are equivalent for a countable model$${\mathcal {M}}$$ M of $$\mathrm {ZF}$$ ZF : (a) $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M is condensable. (b) $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M is cofinally condensable. (c) $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M is nonstandard and $$\mathcal {M}(\alpha )\prec _{\mathbb {L}_{{\mathcal {M}}}}{\mathcal {M}}$$ M ( α ) ≺ L M M for an unbounded collection of $$ \alpha \in \mathrm {Ord}^{{\mathcal {M}}}$$ α ∈ Ord M .

scholarly journals Outer models and genericity

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. C. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Generic Extension ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
Class Forcing ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

Why is forcing the only known method for constructing outer models of set theory?If V is a standard transitive model of ZFC, then a standard transitive model W of ZFC is an outer model of V if V ⊆ W and V ∩ OR = W ∩ OR.Is every outer model of a given model a generic extension? At one point Solovay conjectured that if 0# exists, then every real that does not construct 0# lies in L[G], for some G that is generic for some forcing ℙ ∈ L. Famously, this was refuted by Jensen's coding theorem. He produced a real that is generic for an L-definable class forcing property, but does not lie in any set forcing extension of L.Beller, Jensen, and Welch in Coding the universe [BJW] revived Solovay's conjecture by asking the following question: Let a ⊆ ω be such that L[a] ⊨ “0# does not exist”. Is there ab∈ L[a] such that a ∉ L[b] and a is set generic over L[b].

Generalized quantifiers and elementary extensions of countable models

1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Dubiel
Keyword(s):  
Countable Model ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Natural Question ◽  
Elementary Extension ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Countable Models

Let L be a countable first-order language and L(Q) be obtained by adjoining an additional quantifier Q. Q is a generalization of the quantifier “there exists uncountably many x such that…” which was introduced by Mostowski in [4]. The logic of this latter quantifier was formalized by Keisler in [2]. Krivine and McAloon [3] considered quantifiers satisfying some but not all of Keisler's axioms. They called a formula φ(x) countable-like iffor every ψ. In Keisler's logic, φ(x) being countable-like is the same as ℳ⊨┐Qxφ(x). The main theorem of [3] states that any countable model ℳ of L[Q] has an elementary extension N, which preserves countable-like formulas but no others, such that the only sets definable in both N and M are those defined by formulas countable-like in M. Suppose C(x) in M is linearly ordered and noncountable-like but with countable-like proper segments. Then in N, C will have new elements greater than all “old” elements but no least new element — otherwise it will be definable in both models. The natural question is whether it is possible to use generalized quantifiers to extend models elementarily in such a way that a noncountable-like formula C will have a minimal new element. There are models and formulas for which it is not possible. For example let M be obtained from a minimal transitive model of ZFC by letting Qxφ(x) mean “there are arbitrarily large ordinals satisfying φ”.

scholarly journals MINIMUM MODELS OF SECOND-ORDER SET THEORIES

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (02) ◽  
pp. 589-620
Author(s):  
KAMERYN J. WILLIAMS
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Minimal Models ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
Transfinite Recursion ◽  
Order Set ◽  
Countable Models

AbstractIn this article I investigate the phenomenon of minimum and minimal models of second-order set theories, focusing on Kelley–Morse set theory KM, Gödel–Bernays set theory GB, and GB augmented with the principle of Elementary Transfinite Recursion. The main results are the following. (1) A countable model of ZFC has a minimum GBC-realization if and only if it admits a parametrically definable global well order. (2) Countable models of GBC admit minimal extensions with the same sets. (3) There is no minimum transitive model of KM. (4) There is a minimum β-model of GB+ETR. The main question left unanswered by this article is whether there is a minimum transitive model of GB+ETR.

First Order Theory of Complete Stonean Algebras (Boolean-Valued Real and Complex Numbers)

1987 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 385-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Jech
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Complex Numbers ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
Horn Sentence

AbstractWe axiomatize the theory of real and complex numbers in Boolean-valued models of set theory, and prove that every Horn sentence true in the complex numbers is true in any complete Stonean algebra, and provable from its axioms.

Elementary extensions of countable models of set theory

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
John E. Hutchinson
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Regular Cardinal ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Elementary Extension ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
Countable Models

AbstractWe prove the following extension of a result of Keisler and Morley. Suppose is a countable model of ZFC and c is an uncountable regular cardinal in . Then there exists an elementary extension of which fixes all ordinals below c, enlarges c, and either (i) contains or (ii) does not contain a least new ordinal.Related results are discussed.

Zermelo and the Skolem Paradox

2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Van Dalen ◽  
Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Systems

On October 4, 1937, Zermelo composed a small note entitled “Der Relativismus in der Mengenlehre und der sogenannte Skolemsche Satz”(“Relativism in Set Theory and the So-Called Theorem of Skolem”) in which he gives a refutation of “Skolem's paradox”, i.e., the fact that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory—guaranteeing the existence of uncountably many sets—has a countable model. Compared with what he wished to disprove, the argument fails. However, at a second glance, it strongly documents his view of mathematics as based on a world of objects that could only be grasped adequately by infinitary means. So the refutation might serve as a final clue to his epistemological credo.Whereas the Skolem paradox was to raise a lot of concern in the twenties and the early thirties, it seemed to have been settled by the time Zermelo wrote his paper, namely in favour of Skolem's approach, thus also accepting the noncategoricity and incompleteness of the first-order axiom systems. So the paper might be considered a late-comer in a community of logicians and set theorists who mainly followed finitary conceptions, in particular emphasizing the role of first-order logic (cf. [8]). However, Zermelo never shared this viewpoint: In his first letter to Gödel of September 21, 1931, (cf. [1]) he had written that the Skolem paradox rested on the erroneous assumption that every mathematically definable notion should be expressible by a finite combination of signs, whereas a reasonable metamathematics would only be possible after this “finitistic prejudice” would have been overcome, “a task I have made my particular duty”.

scholarly journals EVERY COUNTABLE MODEL OF SET THEORY EMBEDS INTO ITS OWN CONSTRUCTIBLE UNIVERSE

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 1350006 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Order Type ◽  
Large Cardinals ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Classical Theorem ◽  
Binary Relations ◽  
Finite Sets ◽  
Nonstandard Model ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
Countable Models

The main theorem of this article is that every countable model of set theory 〈M, ∈M〉, including every well-founded model, is isomorphic to a submodel of its own constructible universe 〈LM, ∈M〉 by means of an embedding j : M → LM. It follows from the proof that the countable models of set theory are linearly pre-ordered by embeddability: if 〈M, ∈M〉 and 〈N, ∈N〉 are countable models of set theory, then either M is isomorphic to a submodel of N or conversely. Indeed, these models are pre-well-ordered by embeddability in order-type exactly ω1 + 1. Specifically, the countable well-founded models are ordered under embeddability exactly in accordance with the heights of their ordinals; every shorter model embeds into every taller model; every model of set theory M is universal for all countable well-founded binary relations of rank at most Ord M; and every ill-founded model of set theory is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations. Finally, strengthening a classical theorem of Ressayre, the proof method shows that if M is any nonstandard model of PA, then every countable model of set theory — in particular, every model of ZFC plus large cardinals — is isomorphic to a submodel of the hereditarily finite sets 〈 HF M, ∈M〉 of M. Indeed, 〈 HF M, ∈M〉 is universal for all countable acyclic binary relations.

Weakly compact cardinals in models of set theory

1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 476-486
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Countable Model ◽  
Weakly Compact ◽  
Uncountable Cardinal ◽  
Power Set ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Countable Compactness ◽  
Omitting Types ◽  
Models Of Set Theory ◽  
Generic Ultrapowers

The central notion of this paper is that of a κ-elementary end extension of a model of set theory. A model is said to be a κ-elementary end extension of a model of set theory if > and κ, which is a cardinal of , is end extended in the passage from to , i.e., enlarges κ without enlarging any of its members (see §0 for more detail). This notion was implicitly introduced by Scott in [Sco] and further studied by Keisler and Morley in [KM], Hutchinson in [H] and recently by the author in [E]. It is not hard to see that if has a κ-elementary end extension then κ must be regular in . Keisler and Morley [KM] noticed that this has a converse if is countable, i.e., if κ is a regular cardinal of a countable model then has a κ-elementary end extension. Later Hutchinson [H] refined this result by constructing κ-elementary end extensions 1 and 2 of an arbitrary countable model in which κ is a regular uncountable cardinal, such that 1 adds a least new element to κ while 2 adds no least new ordinal to κ. It is a folklore fact of model theory that the Keisler-Morley result gives soft and short proofs of countable compactness and abstract completeness (i.e. recursive enumera-bility of validities) of the logic L(Q), studied extensively in Keisler's [K2]; and Hutchinson's refinement does the same for stationary logic L(aa), studied by Barwise et al. in [BKM]. The proof of Keisler-Morley and that of Hutchinson make essential use of the countability of since they both rely on the Henkin-Orey omitting types theorem. As pointed out in [E, Theorem 2.12], one can prove these theorems using “generic” ultrapowers just utilizing the assumption of countability of the -power set of κ. The following result, appearing as Theorem 2.14 in [E], links the notion of κ-elementary end extension to that of measurability of κ. The proof using (b) is due to Matti Rubin.

Leibnizian models of set theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 775-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Enayat
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Complete Theory ◽  
Infinite Cardinal ◽  
First Order ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

Abstract.A model is said to be Leibnizian if it has no pair of indiscernibles. Mycielski has shown that there is a first order axiom LM (the Leibniz-Mycielski axiom) such that for any completion T of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. T has a Leibnizian model if and only if T proves LM. Here we prove:Theorem A. Every complete theory T extending ZF + LM has nonisomorphic countable Leibnizian models.Theorem B. If κ is a prescribed definable infinite cardinal ofa complete theory T extending ZF + V = OD, then there are nonisomorphic Leibnizian models of T of power ℵ1such thatis ℵ1-like.Theorem C. Every complete theory T extendingZF + V = ODhas nonisomorphic ℵ1-like Leibnizian models.

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